1. INTRODUCTION

Brazil has been strengthening its engagement with South–South Cooperation (SSC) for more than a decade through various modalities including coalitions among middle-income developing countries such as the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), the G20, regional cooperation, participation in international peacekeeping operations, and expanding Brazilian trade and investments with developing countries. Important domestic drivers have played key roles, such as presidential diplomacy with the election of President Lula, an activist foreign policy, and international interest in innovative Brazilian programmes to overcome poverty, such as the Bolsa Família programme and the Fight Against Poverty.¹

While there is growing documentation relating to this evolution of Brazil’s SSC,² there are very few references to the inclusion of Brazilian CSOs in these initiatives. As a result, this case study of the relationship between Brazilian CSOs and Brazilian development cooperation is built primarily around a few secondary sources (see the bibliography) as well as interviews with Brazilian informants (see the list of interviews). These individuals have been working through their institution to research and promote civil society engagement within SSC with the Brazilian government.³

The case study provides: 1) an overview of Brazilian development cooperation; 2) documentation of Brazilian CSOs in Brazil’s SSC; and 3) a summary of key issues arising from the case study for effective inclusion of civil society in SSC by middle-income aid-providing countries.
2. OVERVIEW OF BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Development cooperation is both a strong government commitment and an acknowledged important instrument within Brazilian foreign diplomatic and economic policy. The country has a 40-year history of technical assistance, dating from the 1970s and the UN Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (1978). Principles guiding Brazilian cooperation are rooted in a South–South discourse of solidarity, mutual benefit and non-interference in the domestic affairs of partner countries. At the same time traditional donors have played important roles with Brazil in triangular cooperation (particularly the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), and UN agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Food Programme). These donors have promoted the Brazilian social development experience internationally, provided funding for Brazilian SSC initiatives, partnered with Brazil in specific projects in developing countries and provided technical advice and learning opportunities.4

A coordinating mechanism for development cooperation has been in place since 1987. In that year the government created the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC — Brazilian Cooperation Agency) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ABC has had the mandate to negotiate, coordinate, implement and monitor programmes and projects in technical cooperation. But in fact, the initiation and implementation of Brazilian development cooperation is highly decentralized. More than 100 entities in the Brazilian government have implemented SSC, including many ministries, particularly the Ministries of Health (HIV/AIDS) and Social Development (Bolsa Família), but also public research institutes and private institutions closely related to the government.5 In this context, ABC has been challenged in fulfilling its
mandate for coordination (Cabral, 2010). On the other hand, decentralization has provided the opportunities for Brazilian CSOs to participate in SSC initiatives—albeit rather few.

As noted above, SSC has involved cooperation through many aspects of Brazil’s foreign economic and diplomatic programmes. A 2010 study on the recent expansion of Brazilian SSC provided a definition to delineate the parameters for Brazilian SSC directed more specifically to development. They consist of:

“The total funds invested by the Brazilian federal government, entirely as non-repayable grants, in governments of other countries, in nationals of other countries in Brazilian territory or in international organizations with the purpose of contributing to international development, understood as the strengthening of the capacities of international organizations and groups or populations of other countries to improve their socioeconomic conditions.”

This definition creates an important benchmark to begin to measure the quantities and different purposes of Brazilian development cooperation across all ministries.

The Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) study provides an overview of the dramatic growth of Brazilian cooperation — increasing by more than 46 percent in real value — during the period 2005 to 2009. In 2009, the study estimated total cooperation for international development at US$362.2 million, made up of the following components:

- humanitarian assistance: US$43.5 million;
- scholarships for foreigners: US$22.2 million;
- technical cooperation: US$48.9 million; and
- contributions to international organizations: US$247.6 million.
The IPEA study outlined the experience of these four different modalities of delivery for Brazilian cooperation, which have also shifted in some areas. For international humanitarian assistance (IHA), for example, the shift has been away from multilateral intermediaries to direct bilateral assistance for 97 percent of humanitarian assistance in 2009. The primary focus for Brazilian IHA has been regional emergencies in the Americas and the Caribbean. It is coordinated through an Interministerial Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance. Two thirds of IHA were donations by the government of goods-in-kind, while the remaining one third were cash transfers through the respective embassy.

Technical cooperation has been a long-standing component of Brazil’s contribution to international development. It is provided on the basis of well-defined principles:

“By providing technical cooperation, Brazil has been particularly careful to act based on the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations. Nonprofit and disconnected from commercial interests, horizontal technical cooperation... intends to share successful practices in areas demanded by partner countries, without impositions or conditionalities.”

Cooperation is seen as a horizontal partnership-based relationship under which both parties establish shared goals (INESC, 2012) and both parties benefit.

Technical cooperation more than tripled in value between 2005 and 2009. Increasingly, this form of cooperation has been undertaken as triangular cooperation programmes, with ABC or another Brazilian ministry collaborating with a Northern donor or multilateral organization and a developing-country partner. The sectoral emphasis
of its technical cooperation has been socio-economic development, with projects and programmes in agriculture and food security, education, health, and strengthening government institutions and human rights. ABC’s budget, between 2003 and 2012, has allocated 25 percent to agriculture, 19 percent to health, 11 percent to education, and only 3 percent to social development.

Brazil’s cooperation is expanding rapidly and is now operating in more than 65 countries, with more than $125 million in technical cooperation planned over the next three years. Together, sub-Saharan Africa (particularly Portuguese-speaking countries), Latin America and Caribbean regions receive 62 percent of the total volume of technical cooperation resources invested from 2005 to 2009.

The overall approach of Brazil’s cooperation is rooted in the Brazilian experience of development, anchored in its domestic programmes of health or food security, and their accompanying political and social philosophies (Global Health Strategies Initiative, 2012). While there are few direct commercial links with Brazilian cooperation, Brazilian cooperation is closely aligned with foreign policy interests in the immediate region and Brazil’s global political interests as an emerging power.

The recently retired head of ABC, Marco Farani, emphasized an open, responsive model of cooperation based on Brazilian experience: “In the first place, we are a developing country, which is why our attitude towards the challenge of development is one of humility, because development is still a challenge for Brazil.”

The overall approach to cooperation has less emphasis on the transfer of resources and more on the sharing of successful experience through the participation of Brazilian government officials rooted in this experience. The role of
these officials is to share this particular knowledge with counterparts, with ABC playing only a coordinating role with the respective counterparts.\textsuperscript{18}

3. **BRAZILIAN CSOs AND BRAZIL’S INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT**

The IPEA study of Brazil’s international development efforts suggests that “a growing number of [Brazilian] public national institutions or organized civil society, in its diverse categories, have incorporated overseas activities as part of their daily work routines.”\textsuperscript{19} Unfortunately, no further references are made in the report as to the nature of these international cooperation relationships on the part of Brazilian civil society. A close scan of available literature and a series of interviews, however, do reveal a number of Brazilian CSOs’ experiences in international development cooperation. This section highlights some examples of these experiences.

3.1 **SCOPE OF CSOs IN BRAZIL**

The definition of CSOs in Brazil is somewhat indeterminate, based on the relative weight given to different criteria, principally their degree of autonomy from government funding. One estimate puts the number at approximately 300,000 to 350,000 Brazilian CSOs.\textsuperscript{20} Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais (Abong), a major Brazilian CSO platform involved in international cooperation, has in the order of 300 members. These CSOs are drawn from all regions of Brazil, with diverse mandates in agriculture, culture and society, communication, financial services and business, development of regional economy, racism, health, HIV/AIDS, education, human rights and gender equality.\textsuperscript{21}
Among CSOs in Latin America, however, there is no agreement on the status of organizations that work closely with government in the delivery of local services according to government direction. While accepting the rationale for extending the reach of government through local organizations implementing health or education programmes, these organizations are not usually included when discussing CSOs in the region.22

Brazilian CSOs and civil society nevertheless have played a very significant role in Brazil’s development processes since the end of the dictatorship in 1985. An important manifestation is a constitutional guarantee for social partnership in which each domestic ministry is required to maintain a permanent multi-stakeholder body, including civil society, for policy dialogue and monitoring the implementation of ministerial policies and programmes. Brazilian CSOs, in their own right, have also played dynamic and innovative roles at all levels of Brazilian socio-economic development, usually with external resources from official donors or CSOs from the Northern donor countries.

3.2 BRAZILIAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: WORKING WITH BRAZILIAN CSOs

While there are multi-stakeholder bodies attached to the various ministries, this is not the case for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Brazilian government has long considered foreign policy to be the exclusive domain of government-based state-to-state relationships in which Brazilian CSOs have had no institutionalized role similar to other ministries. At the same time, there is some ambiguity, as CSOs have always been included within Brazilian government delegations to international events and conferences.
However, to date, there has been no systematic direct engagement with Brazilian CSOs either in setting policy or in implementation of Brazil’s programmes of development cooperation.

The situation for Brazilian CSOs working with government in international development cooperation is complicated by the absence of formal written policies governing Brazilian international cooperation and by a difficult legal environment in which ABC and CSOs operate. The Brazilian legal regime recognizes the existence of external financial relationships within Brazil as an aid-recipient country, but has no provision for Brazilian entities extending financial support as a donor country. The current legal framework prohibits the provision of money or the purchase of goods or services abroad by either Brazilian state bodies or CSOs.23

It is for these reasons (and perhaps others) that a primary and growing modality for Brazil’s international cooperation has been triangular cooperation involving a third party, which manages the external financial aspect of the relationship. Multilateral institutions such as the UNDP or the FAO play important roles in enabling this cooperation.

The evidence presented in this case study suggests that the few Brazilian CSOs that have engaged in international cooperation have been structured as triangular cooperation. There is documentation of Brazilian CSO engagement in SSC implemented by the Ministries of Social Development and Health.24 Below are a number of examples of Brazilian CSOs’ engagement with Brazilian international development cooperation.
3.3 CASES OF BRAZILIAN CSOs IN BRAZIL’S INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Several cases have been identified where Brazilian CSOs have been playing a role in international cooperation in close collaboration with the Brazilian state — in literacy programmes in various parts of the world, in food security and agriculture (via the FAO and World Food Programme), in extending the experience of Brazilian social protection schemes, and in Haiti (where Brazil plays a peacekeeping role). It should be noted that the cases so far seem to be limited to individual large CSOs that were particularly positioned to move into an international role, and are not characteristic of the wider Brazilian CSO community.\(^{25}\)

**SSC in HIV/AIDS.**\(^{26}\) Brazil had early programmes of SSC on issues related to HIV/AIDS in Latin America and later in providing support to Africa (the Portuguese-speaking countries and South Africa). Brazilian international efforts with respect to HIV/AIDS have been promoted since 2005 by a multi-stakeholder Brazilian Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy involving both CSOs and state entities.\(^{27}\) Brazilian HIV/AIDS CSOs had strong ties with global HIV/AIDS networks and ongoing relationships with counterpart CSOs in many Northern donor countries. These Brazilian CSOs have also more recently initiated projects with CSOs from Colombia, India, China, South Africa and Thailand to share knowledge and experience on access to treatment. Foller (2010) describes “a CSO-driven project [Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association — ABIA]in partnership with the Brazilian Ministry of Health... and the Bolivian and Paraguayan national AIDS programs.”\(^{28}\) Brazilian CSOs also played important roles in encouraging the Brazilian government to develop services for HIV-related patients in South
Africa, in partnership with South African CSOs, at a time when the South African government was hostile towards activist CSOs involved in the South African CSOTreatment Action Campaign. Foller points out that some CSOs have questioned the autonomy of some CSOs with very close involvement with government programmes in service delivery, distribution of drugs and implementation of government policies.29

**AlfaSol and literacy:** AlfaSol is a major Brazilian CSO widely recognized for its high achievements in combating illiteracy in Brazil. Created in 1997, its Solidarity in Literacy programme has contributed to the inclusion of more than 5.2 million socially vulnerable Brazilians that were historically excluded from Brazilian schools, of which 51.2 percent have been women. It has worked in more than 2000 Brazilian municipalities, training over 230,000 literacy instructors, through partnerships with hundreds of higher education institutions and private companies.30

AlfaSol initiated projects abroad in 2000, modelled on its successful methodology in Brazil. Its first projects were in Timor-Leste, followed by Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe in 2001, Cape Verde in 2002 and Guatemala in 2003. It is said to have received US$196,000 from ABC for its work in Africa.31 There is no further information in English on current international programmes underway through AlfaSol.

Based on its international reputation in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other international organizations for its work in Brazil, AlfaSol was able to generate requests for its programmes from ministries in several developing countries. The respective developing-country ministry then made the request for AlfaSol to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. The
projects were created jointly between ABC and AlfaSol and carried out by AlfaSol as the Brazilian executing agency. The ministries in the respective developing countries were the national executing agencies and partners for AlfaSol. AlfaSol’s main contribution was technical assistance as a voluntary contribution, and ABC assisted in the provision of books and materials that had to be purchased in Brazil and sent through an international organization due to the legal restrictions noted above. No ABC funds were passed directly to AlfaSol, and the agency presumably contributed in-kind support to these international programmes.32

**FAO, food security and the Zero Hunger Strategy:**
Brazil is one of the World Food Programme’s 10 largest donors, providing US$237 million for the local purchase of food, and working with the FAO to build on the success of Brazil’s Zero Hunger Strategy. The national Zero Hunger Strategy was a framework on food security and nutrition created by President Lula within which to hold his ministries accountable for goals to eliminate absolute poverty for close to 30 million citizens and the creation of 10 million jobs. It included the successful conditional cash transfer programme, Bolsa Família, a National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF) and the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE). The strategy relied on strong partnerships between the Brazilian government and Brazilian CSOs at many levels, primarily focusing on national accountability, engagement of poor people in rural areas in designing relevant programmes, and policy dialogue between civil society and government on appropriate food security strategies.33

This experience of the Zero Hunger Strategy was taken by Brazil to the recently created global UN Committee on Food Security, coordinated by the FAO to address
the global food crisis. Uniquely within the UN, there is a civil society mechanism associated with the Committee, in which Brazilian CSOs have participated and conveyed their knowledge and sometimes critique of the strategy.

A number of countries in Africa — Mozambique and South Africa, for example — have sought Brazilian cooperation in implementing agriculture and food security strategies that draw on the Zero Hunger experience in Brazil. One key lesson from the Brazilian experience is the need to foster local mobilization of the population and local development networks to assure deeply rooted sustainability of these programmes. At this stage there is seemingly no direct partner-country engagement of Brazilian CSOs, with significant experience in agro-ecology and the local impacts of Zero Hunger programmes in Brazil, in triangular programmes involving ABC, FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture in Mozambique. There is recent evidence that this may be changing. Laite and colleagues (2013) report that “since 2012, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [has provided] financing for Brazilian CSOs’ participation in international humanitarian assistance, in international dialogue and in negotiation forums in the area of Food and Nutritional Security.”

A number of large Brazilian advocacy-oriented CSOs, such as Via Campesina, have developed international relationships not only at the FAO but also with counterparts in countries such as Mozambique. But these CSO solidarity relationships take place independent of official Brazilian government programmes for development cooperation.

Based on SSC experience through the Ministry of Social Development, there is more awareness of the need to ground this SSC in a stronger domestic constituency.
in Brazil and to “strengthen the voice of Brazilian CSOs and subnational governments in the country’s foreign policy.” There is also recognition that there is insufficient human capacity in the ministry to expand SSC. As one study notes, “civil society participation was a fundamental building block in [the national food security] process, and promoting closer ties among Brazilian CSOs and their African counterparts is a promising avenue not only for grounding partners’ development in a rights-based approach, but also to strengthen food and nutrition security policies in Brazil,” as well as building domestic constituencies for the allocation of public resources to promote international development.36

**Brazilian CSOs in Haiti:** Brazil’s military has been leading the United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a peacekeeping mission in Haiti since 2004. It has been noted (without detailed documentation) that several Brazilian CSOs are also involved in Haiti’s reconstruction, notably Viva Rio, Luta pela Paz and Afro Reggae.37 Viva Rio, as one example, was founded in 1993 as a CSO in Rio de Janeiro in reaction to an increasing number of violent crimes in the city. It developed urban social programmes to combat this violence, including small arms disarmament campaigns. Starting in 2004, first under the auspices of UNDP, Viva Rio expanded its work internationally, coordinating various social projects in Haiti. Several of these projects were supported through triangular cooperation, with Viva Rio, the Brazilian Embassy in Haiti and Canada and Norway as financial donors.38

**Refugees:** Support for refugees is included in Brazil’s international cooperation programmes (as it also is for many Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries). Brazil has created a semi-autonomous legal entity, the National Council for
Refugees (CONARE), which is the body responsible for the decision to grant refugee status. A Brazilian CSO, Caritas Brasileira, uniquely participates as a full member of the Council, including in decision-making on refugee status. The Brazilian government receives funding from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for resettlement costs for refugees in Brazil. Funds are then transferred to Caritas, which manages these programmes independently of the government.\(^\text{39}\)

Interviews also noted that some Brazilian CSOs have been invited informally to participate in the coordination of international humanitarian assistance through the Interministerial Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance.

### 4. SOME KEY ISSUES FOR INCLUSION OF CSOs IN SSC

After more than three decades of Brazilian CSOs’ work in areas such as social development, urban violence, economic alternatives, and environmental and human rights, these organizations are now in a position to share this expertise and these approaches to development. Indeed, these CSOs have been operating in a changing political and social context of limited democracy, corruption and endemic violence that are shared conditions for many potential partners in developing countries.\(^\text{40}\)

The policies that were successful to date in reducing poverty and inequality in Brazil were the result of development processes that involved CSOs and social movements. The valuable technical expertise that Brazil undoubtedly has to offer in these areas of socio-economic development could likely have a stronger impact if Brazil’s international cooperation programmes utilize the expertise that also lies within Brazilian CSOs.\(^\text{41}\)
On their side, many Brazilian CSOs support the roles that Brazil is playing in SSC and the principles that define this approach. Some of these CSOs are also experiencing a changing resource environment as traditional Northern donors reassess their approaches to engagements in Brazil. South–South and triangular cooperation may not only be valuable in itself but may also provide a diversification that strengthens Brazilian civil society actors to continue their work in Brazil itself.42

The potential from this growing interest in SSC among CSOs could be better realized through an enabling environment in which actors for Brazil’s official development cooperation create opportunities for participation to share this CSO experience. The case study reveals a number of issues that should be considered in developing this enabling environment in engaging CSOs in SSC for development:

1. **A clear policy for development cooperation**: The 2010 IPEA/ABC study provides an excellent overview of Brazilian cooperation and establishes some basic benchmarks for determining the scope of these programmes.43 However, there is no overarching policy or set of policies in the public realm governing the implementation and evolution of Brazil’s international development cooperation. This situation makes it difficult for Brazilian CSOs interested in expanding their work through SSC. Developed with participation from CSOs, an overarching policy framework would address *inter alia* potential areas of contribution by Brazilian CSOs. It would establish the modalities and guidelines through which they could participate in official Brazilian development cooperation initiatives. Some Brazilian CSOs are seeking a clear funding channel within ABC to enable this engagement.44
2. **An enabling legal environment:** As noted above, the current legal and regulatory environment is not currently conducive for Brazilian organizations, whether from the State or from civil society, to provide direct transfers of financial resources or of goods and services to partners in other developing countries.\(^{45}\) Reforms of the legal regime may be necessary to fully enable appropriate modalities for Brazilian international development cooperation. Furthermore, informants describe the current legal regime for CSOs operating within Brazil as complex and confusing. According to one assessment, “the existing legal and regulatory framework for CSOs in Brazil is confusing and obscure, and its lack of effective transparency and accountability instruments makes it vulnerable to corruption and misuse.”\(^{46}\) There is ongoing dialogue between the government and CSOs on reforming this aspect of the legal and regulatory framework for Brazilian CSOs (which could include the issue of their work abroad).\(^{47}\)

3. **A forum for policy dialogue and learning:** To date there have been no mechanisms within the Department of Foreign Affairs and ABC for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue on Brazil’s policies for development cooperation. Such a forum would enable and strengthen both ABC and Brazilian CSOs in sharing the lessons and experience of Brazilian civil society on development challenges. The latter is consistent with the comparative advantages noted in the rationale for Brazilian international cooperation — that is, the ability of Brazil to draw on successful experience directly relevant to partners in developing countries.
4. **Improved transparency:** Currently, Brazilian CSOs have limited access to information about the specific programmes undertaken by ABC in technical assistance and international cooperation by other ministries.\(^{48}\) Without access to basic information on the priorities, countries of interest and Brazil’s specific programmes, it is difficult for Brazilian CSOs to understand how their experience might contribute.

5. **Improved capacities for Brazilian CSOs:** Observers point out that there is currently a very small awareness and constituency for Brazil’s international development cooperation.\(^{49}\) This is also true for the vast majority of Brazilian CSOs, and not only for Brazil but also for other Latin American countries with international cooperation programmes.\(^{50}\) For those CSOs interested in sharing their experience abroad, new capacities in analysing international opportunities, exploring appropriate partnerships in different countries and securing the skills to make positive contributions in different country contexts may be necessary.\(^{51}\) The study of Brazil’s SSC in social development concluded that “one of the main lessons learned by the Ministry of Social Development was that something working in Brazil would not be a guarantee for it to automatically work in Africa. Effectiveness would depend on both partners understanding each other’s particular realities.”\(^{52}\)
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Nathalie Beghin, Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (INESC) (Brazilian research organization following Brazil's international cooperation policies), which in 2012 published ‘Present and Future: Trends in Brazilian and International Cooperation and Roles of Ecumenical Agencies’ [in Portuguese with English Executive Summary].

Guillermo Correa, RACI, Argentina (regional CSO that has analysed CSO funding in the region and maintains a comprehensive live database on sources of funding for CSOs)

Luara Lopes, Abong (Brazilian CSO platform that is following closely Brazil’s development cooperation and the legal framework for Brazilian CSOs, and formerly a consultant with ABC)

Bianca Suyama, Articulação SUL (Brazilian research centre on South–South cooperation, which is collaborating with the Institute of Development Studies ‘Rising Power in International Development’ programme: www.ids.ac.uk/news/rising-powers-in-international-development-building-an-agenda-for-collaboration).
ENDNOTES

1 Laite et al., 2013: 1–2.

2 It should be noted that this information is at the level of global trends in Brazilian cooperation, and there remains very little information on the operations and impact of Brazilian cooperation at the project and/or recipient-country level (INESC, 2012).

3 Since several informants wished that their particular analysis of the current political situation be confidential, references to analytical points in the case study are made to ‘interview informant’ rather than the specific interview. In the short time available, no interview was possible with an official in ABC, although one of the interviewees had considerable work experience with ABC.

4 Laite et al., 2013:9–10.

5 Laite et al., 2013: 8; Foller, 2010; Cintra, 2011: 16.

6 Coordinated by ABC and the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA). IPEA is a federal public foundation linked to the Strategic Affairs Secretariat of the Presidency. It provides technical and institutional support to government for the formulation and reformulation of public policies and development programmes in Brazil (Cintra, 2011).

7 Cintra, 2011: 17. It is important to note that this definition differs from the OECD DAC’s definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in several significant aspects in that only 100 percent grants are included in the Brazilian definition, not concessional loans. Funding for and membership in Southern international organizations is included.

8 It is important to note that this is total cooperation only at the federal level. It is known that state governments in Brazil are also involved in international development cooperation, but there are no comprehensive statistics that include this level (interview). A more detailed breakdown, based on the IPEA report, can be found in Abreu (2012) in Portuguese.

9 Cintra, 2011: 20. An annual report by the Ibero-America Secretariat (Xalma, 2011) documents SSC projects in the region. In 2010 there were 529 bilateral SSC projects, of which 60 percent were organized by Brazil and Cuba. There were 83 triangular cooperation projects or actions in the region, with Chile, Mexico and Brazil accounting for 93 percent of them.

10 Cintra, 2011: 30.

11 Laite et al., 2013: 2.

12 It is important to note that most of the value of technical cooperation is the estimated value of the salaries of Brazilian officials involved in
this programme.

13 Xalma, 2011; and Correa, 2012. Some of the areas covered by triangular technical cooperation noted by the IPEA study include: combating child labour; civil aviation; education; health; prevention and control of malaria; biofuel production; modernization of legislative processes; public administration; environment; combating hunger and poverty; agriculture; regeneration of urban areas; bio-safety; maintenance of water resources; professional training; electronic government; urban development; strengthening of judicial institutions; food security; vocational, educational and sports training; information society; labour relations; and strengthening of infrastructure.

14 Laite et al., 2013: 9, based on data from Abreu, 2012.


16 Cabral, 2010; and Correa, 2012. While Brazilian cooperation is not directly linked to operations of Brazilian companies, Marco Farani remarked that “[Brazilian cooperation] works as a kind of buffer for tensions in countries like Bolivia, Paraguay or Mozambique, where there is a heavy presence of Brazilian companies” (Frayssinet, 2012).

17 Frayssinet, 2012.

18 Glennie, 2012. In the area of SSC for social development, implemented by the Ministry of Social Development, for example, Brazil shares the experience of the innovative Bolsa Família through knowledge exchanges (in the IBSA initiative), technical assistance and advice to counterpart ministries in developing countries, internships, field visits to Brazil, training activities and workshops in Brazil (Laite et al., 2013: 9)


20 Based on interview for case study.

21 See http://www.abong.org.br/about.php

22 Based on interviews for the case study.

23 Interviews for the case study; and Cabral, 2010.

24 Laite et al., 2013; and Foller, 2010.

25 Informants have also suggested that a number of Brazilian CSOs may be increasing their global outreach more directly (not through the Brazilian State). They do so in triangular relationships with international trade union structures (the Brazilian CUT, ITUC and trade union partners in Angola and Mozambique) or through the mediation of INGOs based in Brazil, working with Brazilian CSOs in agro-ecology, for example, drawing on the connections of the INGO international family in other parts of the world (interview). Unfortunately, there is no documentation of these relationships.

26 This case is dependent on information provided by Maj-Lis Foller in
POSSIBILITIES FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION?

27 See www.dhpoliticaexterna.org.br. The website notes that in 2013 the Commission on Human Rights and Minorities of the Chamber of Deputies (CDHM) of the Brazilian Committee for Human Rights and Foreign Policy (CBDHPE) was suspended due to the exclusion of civil society actors from its deliberations.

28 Foller, 2010: 211.

29 Foller, 2010: 213.


32 Based on an interview with a Brazilian informant with direct knowledge of several AlfaSol projects.

33 Laite et al., 2013: 24.

34 Laite et al., 2013: 23.

35 Information derived from interviews for the case study.


37 Pino, 2010; and Muggah, nd: 6.


40 Muggah, nd: 5.

41 Based on interviews for the case study.

42 Based on interviews for the case study.

43 Cintra, 2011.

44 Based on interviews for the case study.

45 For CSOs the issue relates to the tax-exemption status for their organization in Brazil.


47 Based on interviews for the case study; and Ribeiro and Lopes, 2013.
A government–CSO Working Group has been developing proposals for change, but there have been recent setbacks in regulations and funding Brazilian CSOs as a result of scandals involving ‘false CSOs’. Nevertheless a CSO Platform for a New Regulatory Framework continues to mobilize interest and support for change in 2013 (see details in Ribeiro and Lopes, 2013).

48 Based on interviews for the case study.

49 Cabral, 2010.

50 Based on interview for the case study.

51 Based on interview for the case study.

52 Laite et al., 2013: 14.