• Objective measures of inequality reveal only part of the story. Subjective measures of inequality, related to how people perceive it, are important because people’s perceptions of inequality shape their political attitudes and aspirations.

• People in LAC are aware of how unequal the region currently is and think that this is unfair. They perceive unfairness, not only in the income distribution but also in access to public services and legal guarantees.

• People are also frustrated about unfairness in processes—particularly about the outsized political influence of a few powerful groups.

• Perceptions of unfairness and inequality, together with where people think they fall along the income distribution, determine people’s preferences for redistributive policies.

• Perceptions of unfairness and inequality can also determine different life paths as they affect people’s aspirations. Through their impact on people’s effort, aspirations contribute to reshaping future income and income distribution.
2.1. Listening to what people in LAC think and value

The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region has made significant progress in recent decades towards middle-income status. While this has coincided with substantial gains in poverty reduction and an expansion of the middle class, the consolidation of society around a middle class is not a near-term prospect in the region. As chapter 1 highlights, income inequality has remained stubbornly high, and economic growth has regularly failed to accelerate. Objective measures of inequality explored in chapter 1—such as the Gini index, income concentration at the top, and patterns of convergence in various capabilities—are important in characterizing the nature of the high-inequality, low-growth trap observed in the region. However, they are only able to reveal one part of a larger story. By complementing this view with subjective measures of inequality, this chapter hopes to deepen our understanding of the trap the region is facing by paying attention to how people know, see, think, and feel about it. This is essential because people’s perceptions and their values ultimately shape their behaviour as economic and social actors (what capability sets do individuals consider possible to achieve and how do they go about pursuing them?) and as political citizens (what do individuals believe the government should do and how will they exercise their agency to promote change?). Understanding how people think about inequality in LAC is crucial at the current moment considering the wave of social unrest that swept across the region in late 2019 and early 2020 and continues in some countries in 2021. While the protests have been driven by a range of country-specific concerns, people’s grievances over inequality have been among the largest common denominators.

In comparison with objective measures, subjective measures often face greater scrutiny on the grounds of accuracy. However, as this chapter seeks to illustrate, accuracy is elusive in this context. Both objective and subjective measures can suffer from inaccuracy because of the limitations in the data collected. For example, objective indicators of inequality based on household income surveys become inaccurate if the surveys fail to capture information about the richest individuals (see box 1.3). Similarly, subjective measures of inequality from perception surveys are inaccurate if respondents answer the survey questions based on what they think the interviewer may want to hear rather than their own beliefs or if they care about how they are perceived.

Nonetheless, despite their limitations, both types of measures are informative and provide answers to different questions. Subjective measures can help resolve questions about what people think and what they value. They introduce a human perspective on how we understand the challenges in human development. In some cases, subjective measures may coincide with objective measures. In other cases, they may diverge. In neither case is the information necessarily wrong. Each measure simply offers an additional layer of information and deepens the understanding of how inequality is manifested in the region and potential pathways forward.
Subjective data of this sort have rarely been collected systematically in LAC. Thus, there is limited up-to-date evidence on how the dynamics of perceptions of inequality play out across the region. Research in other middle-income regions, such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, points to how such information can extend the boundaries on how we think about inequality and relevant policy solutions. For example, bringing together evidence from income surveys, perception surveys, and in-depth qualitative research, Cancho et al. (2015) show that people in these regions do not feel that, despite objective indications of economic progress and poverty reduction, their lives are improving. Instead, people think that income polarization, characterized by a shrinking middle class, is increasing. They also think that there is little chance of climbing the ladder given the unfair gaps in access to jobs that offer stable employment and steady earnings (gaps that are supported by a reliance on political connections and traditional gender norms). This research is just one example from a larger and rich body of empirical and theoretical work on perceptions of inequality. It points at how subjective measures can reframe our existing analyses and policy debates and how this may play out in a middle-income context.

Using a novel dataset covering 17 countries in Latin America and collected for this report by Latinobarómetro, this chapter explores how people perceive inequality in the region and what they think should be done about it.¹ It emphasizes perceptions of fairness related to inequality in the distribution of income, access to services, and legal guarantees. It points towards the underlying deficits in process legitimacy in the region in the ways in which policies are determined and implemented to favour the few rather than the many. The chapter also explores people’s normative views about the role of government and the responsibility of other members of society in combatting inequality, highlighting the way distributional tensions and political polarization shape potential policy trajectories. It seeks to provide a fresh perspective on how these issues are emerging differently across the region in 2020. Moreover, given how recent they are, the data allow us to understand people perspectives on the current moment in which the region is undergoing unprecedented health and economic crises because of COVID-19—crises that have brought structural inequalities to the forefront of the debate.

The data presented in this chapter point towards the finding that people in LAC know to a large extent how unequal the region is and believe this is unfair. Moreover, they are frustrated about the unfairness not only in outcomes but also in processes, particularly the outsized political influence of a few powerful groups. People want a more equitable society and believe the rich should have a greater responsibility for the poor. However, political ideology and perceptions about their place on the income

¹ See UNDP (2020); Latinobarómetro (dashboard), Corporación Latinobarómetro, Santiago, Chile, http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp.
distribution can make changing the status quo difficult. These results help explain the micro-foundations behind the high-inequality, low-growth trap in which the region is caught: a concentration of power at the top that distorts policies (see chapter 3 on how this can dampen economic dynamism); large gaps between groups that strain the social fabric (see chapter 4 on how this results in violence or the threat of violence, breaking down social cohesion); and the challenges this poses to effectively enact the policy changes necessary to break out of this vicious cycle (see chapter 5 on the need to overcome the tendency toward fragmentary social protection frameworks).

2.2. What do Latin Americans think about the state of inequality in their countries?

How do we know what people think about inequality? Just like there are many approaches to the objective measurement of inequality (the Gini, the Theil, the 90–10 ratio, and so on), there are also multiple approaches to its subjective measurement. Examples include asking people about the shape of the income or wealth distributions in their society by making them choose among diagrams provided or drawing their own structures on a computer, asking them whether they believe the income gaps in society are too large or asking them where they perceive themselves to be on the income distribution. The data on these and other survey responses have been used to construct multiple indicators and measures, including perceived mean-to-median ratios and perceived Gini indices. Evidence has found that the way these survey questions are framed matters in determining how much inequality people perceive.

Qualitative methods also offer rich insights into the context surrounding people’s perceptions of inequality. These methods include the use of life histories (asking informants to map economic turning points in their lives); focus groups (conducting ladder of life exercises to understand group perceptions of relative well-being and the prospects for mobility); or in-depth interviews (asking informants to offer detailed explanations of how they view and value issues in a certain way).

Across different types of measures and different national contexts, empirical studies have found systematic gaps between how unequal people perceive their society to be and how unequal it is. They have also found gaps between where people believe themselves to be on the income distribution and where they are (box 2.1).
In January 2020, *CBS This Morning*, a television news programme in the United States, went to a local shopping mall and set up a table with five dining plates, representing the U.S. population broken into five wealth quintiles, and a pumpkin pie, representing the U.S. economic pie of $98 trillion in household wealth. The show’s host asked people passing by to place the slices of the pie onto the different plates according to how they thought wealth was distributed among the population. After a range of guesses, the host revealed the distribution of the 10-slice pie according to objective measures. The wealthiest got 9 pieces of the pie, and the upper-middle class and middle class shared the 10th piece. The lower-middle class received a few crumbs, and the poorest were given a bill for the pie because they are usually in debt and thus have negative wealth. None of the public’s guesses came close to the correct distribution. The show’s pie activity was a re-creation of a study by behaviour insight researchers Michael Norton and Dan Ariely (2011), who find that, in the United States, people vastly underestimate the extent of wealth inequality. They also find that all demographic groups and groups across the political spectrum desire a more equal distribution of wealth.

This study is one example of how people’s perceptions may differ from reality with regards to wealth inequality in one country. Across different measures and different national contexts, empirical studies find systematic gaps between how unequal people perceive their society and how unequal it is, with people both overestimating and underestimating inequality. For example, in a cross-country study, Choi (2019) finds that the relative level of a country’s perceived Gini does not correspond to its market Gini. Engelhardt and Wagener (2014) likewise find that the perceived mean-to-median ratios are uniformly lower than the objective ones, suggesting a widespread underestimation of inequality. Gimpelson and Treisman (2018) find systematic errors in people’s estimates of the level of inequality. Gründler and Köllner (2017) find that perceived income inequality is often lower than objective measures of income inequality. Niehues (2014) finds that, in several countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), there is little connection between people’s subjective evaluation of the income distribution and objective measures of it, with a tendency to overestimate inequality. Page and Goldstein (2016) find that people tend to underestimate inequality but overestimate the median income.

Studies also find systematic bias in people’s estimation of their rank within the income distribution. Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) find that in Argentina, individuals consistently over-estimate or under-estimate their rank in the income distribution, with a bias toward ranking themselves in the middle. A bias toward
the middle is also found in cross-country studies by Evans and Kelley (2004) and, more recently, by Hoy and Mager (2019). Fernández-Albertos and Kuo (2018) find that, in Spain, citizens cluster themselves in the middle-upper deciles, and Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim (2017) find that, in Sweden, people think that they are relatively poorer than they are.

Given that perceptions of inequality aren’t necessarily in line with actual levels of inequality, several studies have explored how these perceptions are formed and what factors may lead to these mismatches.

Some authors see the gaps between perceptions and objective measures of inequality as a result of limited information and cognitive bias (box 2.2) in interpreting that information. Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) fundamentally liken this to a problem of statistical inference—in which “individuals observe the income levels of no more than a sub-sample of the population and must then infer the entire distribution from that information.” Studies have found that people’s actual rank in the income distribution and their relative position in their immediate reference group matters quite a lot in shaping these perceptions.2 Interestingly, respondents with friends from heterogeneous social backgrounds are less prone to these biases—suggesting that socio-economic segregation may be an important factor in fostering such biases.3

Others find that it is not just that individuals are misinformed—but that their personal definitions of inequality may be more complex than those captured by simple objective measures such as the Gini. For example, in a cross-country study on the formation of inequality perceptions, Bussolo et al. (2019, 2) find that “individuals’ perceptions of inequality encompass a broader definition of inequality that correlates with poverty or unemployment, as well as with fairness or social mobility, own situation and ideology.”

Recent data from the Latinobarómetro public opinion survey provide an opportunity to put a lens on perceptions of inequality as they relate to objective measures of inequality, people’s visions of society, and policy preferences in several dimensions that influence demand for redistribution in the region. This is an annual survey carried out in 18 Latin American countries that has been ongoing for 25 years.4 The results

---

4 Latinobarómetro does not cover the Caribbean countries.
presented in this chapter are from 2020, a year in which the RHDR team collaborated with the Latinobarómetro team to expand the basic survey questionnaire with additional questions on perceptions of inequality and normative views on how to combat inequality. The results analysed here cover only 17 countries, given that fieldwork in Argentina was not possible during the reporting period because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The survey went to the field during the last quarter of 2020.

---

**Box 2.2: Cognitive bias**

The term cognitive bias was first coined in the early 1970s by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974) to describe systematic ways in which people’s thinking may be shaped such that they end up making irrational judgements, decisions, or interpretations. Further study of cognitive bias has shown the sorts of bias that influence people’s judgements, as follows:

- **Confirmation bias**: people misinterpret new information as supporting beliefs they already hold.
- **Anchoring bias**: people extrapolate based on an initial piece of evidence.
- **In-group bias**: people show a pattern of preference for others perceived as belonging to the same group.
- **Framing**: the way information is presented affects people’s decisions.
- **Self-serving bias**: people attribute positive outcomes to skill and blame external events for adverse outcomes.

There are many other forms of cognitive bias that have been identified and studied. People are seldom entirely rational, and a combination of preconceptions and a limited capacity to process all available information leads them to make irrational or mistaken judgements. The impact of cognitive bias on people extends to their views on public policy.
People in LAC know how unequal the income distribution is, and they think that it is unfair

Comparing the objectively measured and the perceived distribution of income one finds that people in LAC generally have a good understanding of how unequal society is. Income distribution is estimated by the share going to each quintile (20 percent) of the population, based on data from the most recent official household surveys. The perceived distribution of income is measured by asking people about the shares they think are going to each quintile. Figure 2.1 illustrates that there is a relatively good correspondence between the objective and perceived distributions. People accurately estimate that the top 20 percent (the top 20) captures over 50 percent of the income. However, people tend to slightly overestimate the income of both the richest and the poorest and slightly underestimate the income of those in the middle and middle-high ranges of the distribution.

Across all countries, people overestimate the income of the bottom 20 percent of the distribution (the bottom 20) (figure 2.2). Thus, in general, people in LAC are not aware of how poor the poor are. This unawareness may dampen people’s demand for more redistributive policies. Indeed, research has found that people who overestimate the income of the poorest tend to show less support for redistribution. Also, while on average people also overestimate the income of the top 20, in five countries in the region (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru), people underestimate it. They believe the bottom 40 captures more. In these countries, people tend to think the income distribution is more equal than it is and concentration at the top is lower.

Despite some over- or under-shooting, nonetheless, on average, LAC citizens are to a large extent aware of how unequally income is distributed, and a large share of them (81 percent) believe that income distribution is unfair. The share reaches over 90 percent in Chile, Paraguay and Venezuela (figure 2.3). This widely held belief spilled out onto the streets of Chile in late 2019 and early 2020 when protests over a public transport fare increase rapidly transformed into more general demonstrations over many forms of inequality. In December 2019 and January 2020, around 55 percent of the population agreed that poverty and social inequality represented the issues of greatest concern in the country.

People’s perceptions of the fairness of income distribution do not correlate strongly with objective measures of income inequality, such as the Gini index (figure 2.4). For example, while Chile and Mexico exhibit similar levels of inequality based on the Gini, a much larger share of people in Chile believe that the income distribution is unfair. Likewise, although Brazil shows a much higher level of income inequality than

---

6 The average response of the survey respondents in LAC is calculated as the simple mean across countries.
7 Page and Goldstein (2016).
8 Ipsos (2019).
Peru, a similar share of people in both countries think that income distribution is unfair. This weak correspondence between an objective measure of inequality and the perception of its fairness suggests that there are issues related to how people feel about the broader economic or political system that creates and perpetuates conditions of income inequality that are not captured in objective indicators. For this same reason, perceptions of fairness are more correlated with perceived than with objective inequality. Those who perceive the income distribution as highly unequal are more likely to see unfairness than the average person.9

9 To assign people to groups according to how unequal they perceive their country’s income distribution to be, the ratio of the income shares they assign to the top 20 and the bottom 20 are calculated. For example, a person who assigned a share of 45 percent of income to the top 20 and one of 15 percent to the bottom 20 would have a ratio equal to 3 (45/15). People in each country are ranked according to this ratio, from those with the lowest perception of inequality to those with the highest.
Importantly, perceptions of unfairness are often found to be more important drivers of behaviour and choices than perceptions of inequality (see box 2.3).

People are also concerned about inequality in access to basic public services and guaranteed rights

Not only do people in LAC tend to think that the distribution of income is unfair, but they also think that access to basic public services is unfair. Respectively, 80 percent, 66 percent and 60 percent of people in LAC believe that access to the justice system, access to health care, and access to education are unfair (figure 2.5). Chile consistently ranks the highest; there, more than 90 percent of the population considers access to services unfair. Nonetheless, the provision of these services is arguably better in Chile than in many other countries included in evaluations of coverage and quality based on objective indicators. The perception data here must be capturing an aspect of respondents’ expectations about what fair access means to them that is failing to be met by the current provision.
Box 2.3: Perceptions of fairness and demand for redistribution

While perceptions of inequality are essentially a positive expression of how unequal people think the distribution is, perceptions of fairness bring in a more normative perspective to bear on the issue. Although people may think the income distribution is unequal, if they feel that it is still fair, they may not demand redistribution. This distinction is highlighted in the research of Starmans, Sheskin, and Bloom (2017), who show that humans naturally favour fair distributions, not equal ones, and that, when fairness and equality clash, people prefer fair inequality over unfair equality. Reyes and Gasparini (2017) find that in Latin America, perceptions of unfairness in income distribution are correlated with individual characteristics such as being older, more educated, unemployed, and being left-wing. However, they also find that the widespread perception of unfairness in the region is closely correlated with relative measures of actual income inequality. Roth and Wohlfart (2018) find that people’s experiences of unfairness also matter for their perceptions of fairness and subsequently for their demand for redistribution —with people having experienced higher inequality showing less support for redistribution. Ahrens (2019) argues that a critical link between perceptions of fairness and redistribution comes from whether or not people “consider their income and incomes, in general, to be disproportional to relevant exchanged inputs”—with supporting evidence from 39 countries. In their theoretical note, Iacono and Ranaldi (2019) push us to understand better the links between the nature of inequality aversion and demand for redistribution. They ask, “to what extent does the demand for redistribution depend on the degree of inequality aversion, and is the inequality aversion concerning the top incomes in society or concerning the poorest that plays a larger role?”

Figure 2.5: There is widespread concern regarding fair access to basic public services

*Share of respondents who think access to the service is unfair*

a. Access to the justice system  

b. Access to health care  

c. Access to education

People in the region rank the poor access to education opportunities, poor access to health care services, and poor access to the justice system as the worst expressions of inequality in their countries. Access to education was ranked the worst by 42 percent of respondents (figure 2.6). As chapter 1 shows, despite solid progress in expanding education coverage, there are still gaps in access, particularly at more advanced levels, and large inequalities associated with education quality. Yet, both basic and advanced educational attainment among all people is crucial in the transition to more equal societies and more dynamic economies and thus a fundamental lever for removing the vicious cycle of high inequality and low growth. Moreover, the data suggest that people in LAC believe that the inequality gap in society is worse between the rich and poor than between other demographic groups, such as between women and men, ethnicities, social classes, and rural and urban residents, even though many of these groups overlap (urban dwellers tend to be more well educated and less poor than rural residents, for example), and people tend to face multiple barriers to advancement associated with their demographic profile.

**Figure 2.6: People in LAC consider lack of educational opportunities the worst expression of inequality**

*Share of respondents indicating the expression of inequality as the worst (first choice)*

At a fundamental level, people in LAC question the degree to which certain rights and opportunities are guaranteed equally (figure 2.7). Despite the ideal that equal treatment before the law is a basic right of all citizens, more than three quarters of the
population in LAC do not believe that equality before the law is guaranteed. Similarly, despite the ideal of equal access to opportunity regardless of one’s circumstances at birth and principles of non-discrimination based on personal characteristics, such as gender, 64 percent of people in LAC do not believe that equality of opportunity is guaranteed, and 57 percent do not believe that equality between women and men is guaranteed. There is some variation in this latter perception. Thus, a larger share of women (61 percent) than men (52 percent) are doubtful about the effective guarantee of gender equality.

Figure 2.7: Most people in LAC doubt that equal rights and opportunities are protected in their countries
Share of the population that thinks the following types of rights and opportunities are not guaranteed

a. Equality before the law

b. Equality of opportunity

c. Equality between women and men


The shares of people who think that gender equality is or is not properly guaranteed do not correspond with objective measures of outcomes in gender equality, as shown in figure 2.8, which compares people’s perceptions about guarantees of equality between men and women, and the Gender Inequality Index. Countries in the bottom left-hand corner of the plot, such as Uruguay, exhibit both better gender equality outcomes and a greater share of people believing in the guarantee of
equality. Countries in the upper right-hand corner, such as Brazil, have both worse gender equality outcomes and a greater share of people doubting the guarantee of equality. However, most countries are scattered throughout the plot without a clear relationship. Chile stands out as an exception because of the widespread belief in inequality related to process, although the country fares relatively well in outcomes.

Figure 2.8: There is no clear relationship between objective measures of gender equality outcomes and people’s perceptions about the guarantee of gender equality

The Gender Inequality Index (x-axis) and the share of respondents who think equality between women and men is not guaranteed (y-axis)

Whether people believe they are winning or losing affects how fair they think the system is

Whether or not people think the distribution of income or the access to public services is unfair differs depending on where they think they are located along the income distribution (figure 2.9, panel a). People who believe they belong in the top 20 (those who think they are winning) are less likely than those who believe they belong in the bottom 20 (those who think they are losing) to see these outcomes as unfair. They are also less likely to doubt the effective guarantee of equality before the law, equality of opportunity, and equality between men and women (figure 2.9, panel b). Thus, those who think they are benefiting are less likely to see problems with inequitable systems. While the dataset does not allow a deeper exploration of the reasons, one hypothesis is that people who benefit from unfair systems do not wish to believe they have won an advantage unfairly. Instead, they may wish to believe that, for example, they have earned a high-paying job or entrance to an elite university only because of their superior intelligence and hard work. This myth of meritocracy can be damaging to social solidarity and undermine political support for policies that would otherwise
advance the common good. In his 2020 book, political philosopher Michael Sandel refers to this as the tyranny of merit. Another hypothesis may be that people at the top do not perceive the unfairness of a process. For instance, if certain individuals have never faced discrimination within the justice system because of their position of privilege, they may not have any idea that others are systematically treated differently. Systems of inequality can be upheld and deepened through many such invisible ways that allow advantages to some but not others.

Figure 2.9: A system may be considered fair by those who believe they are in the top 20, but unfair by those who believe they are in the bottom 20

![Graph showing perception of fairness by income distribution]

a. Share of respondents who think a system is unfair, by perceived place in the income distribution

b. Share of respondents who think equality is not guaranteed, by perceived place in the income distribution

However, the perception data suggest that most people in LAC do not think they are winning or losing. Indeed, people in LAC tend to believe they are located somewhere in the middle of the income distribution. The largest share of people (39 percent) believe they are firmly part of the middle 20 (figure 2.10, panel a). This bias towards the middle is consistent with country-level and cross-country studies on people’s estimation of their rank within the income distribution. Figure 2.10, panel b, shows where the average individual in each income quintile thinks they are located along

---

10 Latinobarómetro data are representative nationally in each country, but do not perfectly capture all income groups. The three bottom quintiles are overrepresented in the sampling, particularly the poorest quintile, and the top two quintiles are underrepresented. For this reason, the dark blue columns in panel a are not all equal to 20 percent.
the income distribution. As panel b shows, people in the bottom two quintiles (the bottom 40) tend to think they are a bit more well off than they really are, relative to the rest of the population, and people in the top three quintiles tend to think that they are poorer. The distance between the dots (which indicate the perceived locations of respondents in the distribution) and the 45-degree line (the objective location of respondents in the distribution) signals the extent of the average mismatch. This distance is particularly pronounced among the bottom 20 and the top 20. There may be reasons why people might overreport or underreport their incomes, particularly at the tails of the distribution. For example, the poor might wish to hide their poverty out of shame or a desire to maintain dignity, and the rich might wish to hide their wealth to protect their own security or control their social image.

Figure 2.10: Most people in LAC think they belong in the middle of the income distribution

The fact that people believe groups in the middle-upper range of the distribution capture less than they really do is most interesting when considered in the light of people’s perceptions about their place on the income distribution.

---

12 In 2020, UNDP included a question in the Latinobarómetro survey about where respondents would locate themselves along the income distribution in their countries. Respondents were offered a choice among five income ranges built by CEDLAS using the latest national household surveys available on each country. See CEDLAS (Center for Distributive, Labour, and Social Studies) (dashboard), CEDLAS, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, La Plata, Argentina, https://www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/en/.
People are concerned about the transmission of inequality across generations

The data suggest that people are not only worried about the structural inequalities that hold them back today, but they are also worried about how these gaps might prevent the next generation from achieving higher levels of well-being relative to their parents. A question on the survey asks respondents about their expectations for their children’s future. Specifically, the question asks respondents to indicate at which place along the income distribution they expect their descendants to be located. Figure 2.11, panel a, shows that, among those who perceive themselves in the bottom 20, only 35 percent expect their children to be upwardly mobile and to exit this quintile. Figure 2.11, panel b, shows the same information, but by country. There is substantial cross-country variation. Respondents in Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela exhibit the least expectation of upward mobility among the next generation. Respondents in Brazil stand out because 65 percent of the corresponding group expect a brighter future among their offspring, followed at a distance by respondents in Paraguay. The limited expectations of mobility among the bottom 20 across the region hold across all demographic groups distinguished by sex, educational attainment, ethnicity, and age). The only exception to this pattern is youth (the 16–25 age group). The poorest among them are more hopeful: 40 percent expect their children to fare better than they have.

Figure 2.11: The majority of those who think they are in the bottom 20 have low expectations about prospects for upward mobility for their children

a. Respondents expecting their children to fare better, worse, or the same, by perceived quintile

b. Respondents in the perceived bottom 20 who expect their children to fare better, by country


At the regional level, however, the majority of the poorest expect that their descendants will remain as poor as they are. The hope for mobility is highest among the next quintile and then decreases according to perceived income. A share of the population also
expects their descendants to do worse, which increases with perceived income—a quarter of the top 20 falls into this category. Perceptions of limited mobility are aligned with objective measures of intergenerational educational mobility (see chapter 1). Both objective and subjective measures suggest that the promise of a better future will remain elusive for many in the region.

Low expectations of intergenerational social mobility are not merely reflections of an unequal system but may also play a role in recreating the same inequalities in the future. One key channel through which this occurs is aspirations. Aspirations can play a powerful role in shaping the ability of people to pursue lives that they have reason to value and are, for that reason, a critical link in the transmission of inequality over time. Aspirations are built around the universe of possible futures that one may envision and the subset of these futures that seem achievable. Thus, aspirations are shaped by the inequalities revealed both through objective measures (particularly, the degree of stratification or polarization in society) and perceptions (especially if the perceptions are informed by limited prospects for upward mobility or unfair processes of advancement). Because the capacity to aspire is fundamentally forward-looking, it is influenced by the inequality and prosperity currently in society and affects future outcomes in inequality and prosperity, playing an unseen but not unimportant role in powering the high-inequality, low-growth trap (box 2.4).

People’s concerns about inequality point to a larger frustration about who policies work for

Despite a general sense of unfairness about the income distribution, LAC people do not necessarily believe that inequality is, per se, morally wrong. While more Latin Americans consider inequality “totally unacceptable” (27 percent) than “totally acceptable” (9 percent), the beliefs of the majority in the region fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum (figure 2.12).

Instead, people’s perceptions point to a broader discontent with the underlying issue of the process by which inequality is created and sustained. Generally, this is a problem of governance and, in particular, of how inequality undermines the effectiveness of government by distorting policies, which seem to function well for the haves, but not for the have-nots. Both subjective and objective measures indicate that resources are concentrated largely at the top. It is therefore clear that the haves are the few, while the have-nots are the many. Latin Americans are deeply aware of how much these imbalances are undermining their democratic systems. People are, thus, frustrated with the quality of the democratic process, which systematically recreates and reinforces the inequality of outcomes more than with inequality itself.

---

13 Sen (1999); UNDP (2010).
What People Think About Inequality and How They Think Policy Should React · 113

As the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai famously observed, the capacity to aspire is not evenly distributed among the members of society. It is skewed in favour of the wealthy. Using a navigational metaphor, Appadurai (2004, p. 69) argues that if an individual’s map of aspirations consists “of a dense combination of nodes and pathways,” then “relative poverty means a smaller number of aspirational nodes and a thinner, weaker sense of the pathways from concrete wants to intermediate contexts to general norms and back again.” Thus, people living in situations of poverty have more limited access to the types of experiential inputs required to build robust aspirational maps. Moreover, it is not only poverty that shapes the limits of this navigational metacapacity but also the degree of stratification in society, as the Regional Human Development Report for Latin America and the Caribbean 2010 (UNDP 2010) highlights in its treatment of aspirations and intergenerational inequality. Where stratification among people is substantial, people may have fewer aspirational windows. Their less extensive exposure to new possibilities and the insurmountable aspirational gaps they face in their efforts to reach the possibilities available within the next stratified level of achievement contribute to narrowing their aspirations.

Research unpacking and modelling the role of aspirations in driving development has grown in recent years. Of particular relevance to this report is understanding the link among aspirations, inequality and growth from a dynamic perspective. Indeed, their incomes, their positions along the income distribution and, critically, their perceptions of their ability to advance along the distribution matter to individuals in forming their aspirations. Yet, aspirations also reshape future income and income distribution through their dynamic impact on the effort people choose to exert to realize their aspirations, the types of investment decisions they make for themselves and their offspring, and the broader trends in the preferences of society and in politics and policy.

In the individual sphere, at the psychological level, all people face a behavioural bias in the failure to recognize that not only do aspirations determine the effort they choose to dedicate to achieving their aspirations, but the effort also determines how high people set their aspirations. Dalton, Ghosal, and Mani (2016) explore how the incomes of individuals interact with the determination of aspirations and effort. They find that the constraints of poverty can render the poor more vulnerable than the rich to this aspirational failure. The failure to aspire may create a unique behavioural poverty trap and contribute to a society where the poor remain poor while the rich become richer. In the social sphere, socio-economic outcomes matter in establishing how high individuals set their aspirations and how much effort they choose to invest in developing their own
or their children’s human capital. In aggregate, this ultimately fixes the future socio-economic outcomes. Genicot and Ray (2017) explore the trajectory of aspirations, income, and income distribution within a dynamic model. They find that a central factor driving this dynamic is the gap between people’s aspirations and their current living standards. (If the gap is moderate, it is likely to promote more investment, but, if it is large, it is likely to induce frustration.) In the political sphere, aspirations can shape the evolution of an economy dynamically through people’s preferences and social attitudes towards issues such as redistributive policies. Besley (2017, p. 3) models how aspirations matter dynamically for the evolution of income distribution between and within countries. He finds that countries can become “locked into a low aspirations’ culture’ which inhibits development.” He states that “this is due to the interplay between preferences and politics which creates a feedback loop which in turn affects a society’s equilibrium trajectory.”

---

* UNDP (2010); Ray (2016); Genicot and Ray (2017).

**Figure 2.12. On inequality, the majority of people are in the middle of the unacceptable-acceptable spectrum**

*Share of respondents who believe inequality is acceptable on a scale of 1 to 10*

There is an overwhelming agreement among Latin Americans that their countries are governed in the interests of a few powerful groups, and not for the greater good of all (figure 2.13). In 2020, 77 percent of people in the region believed this to be so, and the share reached 95 percent in Paraguay and 91 percent in Chile and Costa Rica.

**Figure 2.13. Latin Americans believe their countries are governed in the interests of a few powerful groups**

*Share of respondents who believe their countries are governed in the interests of a few groups*

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents who believe their countries are governed in the interests of a few powerful groups for various countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.](chart)


Those groups that possess the power to influence political decision-making directly may be described as elites. From this perspective, one may think one of the key forces propelling the high-inequality low-growth trap in LAC is how the concentration of power in the hands of certain elites has distorted the efficacy of policies to promote greater cumulative welfare gains as well as greater welfare gains across the distribution. Elites is a neutral concept, however. Depending on how they use their influence, elites may advance or hinder the achievement of development goals.

The Latinobarómetro questionnaire asked respondents to indicate who they think holds the most power in their countries by selecting one among the following

---

14 Reyes and Gasparini (2017).
groups: big business, the military, unions, the media, banks, political parties, the government, parliament, businesspeople and a few families. In LAC, 32 percent of the respondents believe the government has the most influence, and 24 percent believe it is big business (figure 2.14). There is, however, significant variation in the frequency of responses singling out the most powerful groups, and significant shares of the population choose other groups.

**Figure 2.14: Many Latin Americans think the government and big business are the most powerful groups**

*Share of respondents that choose each group as the most powerful (first choice)*

![Graph showing the share of respondents choosing each group as the most powerful.](source)


There is enormous variation across countries in singling out the government and big business as the most influential, but also a striking regularity: government is not perceived as powerful as frequently in countries where big business is thought to be the most powerful, and vice-versa (figure 2.15). (See chapter 3 on the political power of business and the role business has played in promoting or undermining progress towards growth and equality.)
2.3. How do Latin Americans think inequality should change?

While people in LAC believe the current distribution of income in their countries is unfair, how do they think it should look? Figure 2.16 shows the distribution of income based on objective measures, people’s perceptions of the distribution based on subjective measures, and the survey responses on the most desirable distribution. Figure 2.1 compares the first two. Now, the view is added on what people say they value. The average Latin American across the region desires a distribution of income that is more equitable than the distributions indicated by the objective or subjective measures.

People agree: reaching a more equitable society will require greater accountability among the rich

What should societies do to achieve this more equitable world? Public policies that redistribute resources are based on two key elements: raising funds through taxation and spending funds through public programmes, services, and benefits. Therefore, the extent to which these policies combat inequality depends on who is paying (and how much) and who is receiving (and how much). These are normative matters and
are contingent on societal values. Moreover, these issues are deeply intertwined with distributional tensions or the strength of the threads holding together the fabric of the social contract. The Latinobarómetro survey includes a few questions targeted specifically at understanding people’s attitudes towards the progressivity of taxation and social spending. The way people perceive inequality is a crucial factor in informing people’s attitudes towards redistribution (box 2.5).

**Figure 2.16: Latin Americans want a more equitable distribution of income**

Objective, subjective, and desired distribution of income (percent of income captured by each group)

![Figure showing the distribution of income](source)

Latin Americans agree that a household’s responsibility to pay taxes rises linearly with household income (figure 2.17). While a small share (7 percent) of the population believes no one should have to pay taxes, one third of Latin Americans think everyone should pay, regardless of their place on the income distribution. Indeed, a majority approves of taxing the top 60, and four fifths agree that the top 20 should pay taxes. This finding that a majority thinks the top 60 should pay taxes is interesting in a region where large population segments are untouched by personal income taxes, often including those among the top 20. Asked about how progressive taxes should be, most Latin Americans agree that the tax rate should be higher for those who earn more (figure 2.18). However, among those who believe they are located among the top 20 (those who likely expect to lose in a more progressive tax system), 66 percent agree that the tax rate should be higher among those who earn more; this compares with 76 percent among those who believe they are located in the bottom 20 (those who likely expect to win in a more progressive tax system).
Scholars have been exploring the links between inequality and people’s demand for redistribution for many years. Much of the research builds on early theoretical models. These models propose that, in a democratic economy of self-interested, consumption-maximizing individuals, where a majority vote determines the tax rate, “the equilibrium tax rate depends on the degree of (objective) inequality.” The empirical tests of this model, however, have led to mixed results, including supporting, contradictory, and inconclusive evidence. Many researchers have extended and revised the approach by introducing alternative motivations behind people’s preferences for redistribution, such as personal history, cultural values, political indoctrination, family structure, and perceptions of fairness. A growing body of empirical work challenges this approach further by adding perceptions of inequality as a factor influencing people’s demands for redistribution.

Across a wide range of countries, many studies have found evidence suggesting that the demand for redistribution is closely associated with how unequal individuals perceive their society to be, often much more than with how unequal their society is according to objective measures. More specifically, Page and Goldstein (2016) find that people who overestimate the income level of the poorest tend to show lower support for redistribution. Windsteiger (2017) also finds that income segregation in society has a negative mitigating effect on the demand for redistribution through its impact on perceptions of inequality.

Experimental data also broadly supports the link between perceptions of inequality and demand for redistribution. Several studies have tested the impact of information on preferences for redistribution. They have found that when people’s incorrect perceptions of their own rank in the income distribution are updated with correct information, this has a significant impact on changing their preferences for redistribution. Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2015) find both correlational and experimental evidence that perceptions of relative status can cause changes in political preferences regarding redistribution. Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) find that in Argentina, people who learn that they are relatively poorer than they thought tended to demand more redistribution. Karadjia, Mollerstrom, and Seim (2017) find that in Sweden, people who learn that they are relatively richer than they thought tended to demand less redistribution. Fernández-Albertos and Kuo (2018) find that in Spain, people who learn that they are relatively poorer than they thought and people who learn that they are in the bottom quintile of the distribution tend to increase their support for
tax progressivity. In contrast, Hoy and Mager (2019) find cross-country evidence that people who learn that they are relatively poorer than they thought are not more supportive of redistribution. The authors argue that this is driven by a “benchmark” effect, in which people use “their living standard as a ‘benchmark’ for what they consider acceptable for others.”

Other experimental studies have explored the effects of providing information about the correct levels of overall inequality in society (as opposed to one’s rank in the distribution) as well as about the levels of inequality in other societies. Regarding the former, Kuziemko et al. (2015) find that, in the United States, if people are provided with accurate information about actual levels of inequality, their concern about inequality increases, but their preferences for tax or transfer policies only change slightly—except the estate tax, for which support more than doubles. In testing mechanisms, the authors find that the low elasticity between perceptions of inequality and demand for redistribution is likely due to the public’s inability to connect their concerns of inequality with policies designed to reduce them—an idea also presented by Bartels (2005). In a different experimental study, Pellicer, Piraino, and Wegner (2019) test the impact of information on “the inevitability of inequality” and find that, in South Africa, learning information about levels of inequality in other countries leads people to update their views about whether such high levels of inequality are inevitable and ultimately increases support for redistribution.

---

\(^a\) Romer (1975); Meltzer and Richard (1981).
\(^b\) Bussolo et al. (2019, p. 3).
\(^c\) Lind (2005).
\(^d\) See Alesina and Giuliano (2011) for a summary.
\(^e\) Kuhn (2009); Niehues (2014); Tay (2015); Page and Goldstein (2016); Gründler and Köllner (2017); Gimpelson and Treisman (2018); Kim et al. (2018); Bussolo et al. (2019); Bobzien (2020); Choi (2019).
Latin Americans generally agree that a household’s right to receive support from the government in free or subsidized goods or services declines steeply with the level of income (figure 2.19). The majority of the population agrees that those in the bottom 20 should receive support: 96 percent agree that the poorest decile should receive support, and 60 percent agree that the second poorest decile should also receive support. However, less than half the population believe that any other decile should receive support. This unwillingness to support social assistance programs targeting people who are not among the extremely poor reflects a history of fragmented social protection that has left many in the region without an adequate safety net. While much of the population in LAC has managed to escape extreme poverty in recent decades, many in the bottom 40 or even the lower 50 are still relatively poor or remain at risk of falling back into poverty (see chapter 1). Moreover, asked whether support should be free of cost or partially subsidized, Latin Americans are generally divided. Curiously, however, the differences in views between those who perceive themselves among the richest and the poorest are not large (figure 2.20). This suggests that, where practicable, the provision of partial subsidies in place of cost-free support would likely not be a highly controversial approach for fiscally constrained states seeking to expand the reach of safety nets to more income groups.
Figure 2.19: Latin Americans agree that a household’s right to government support declines with income

By income decile, which households should receive free or subsidized government support in your country?

![Graph showing percent in favour and against by income decile.]


Figure 2.20: Latin Americans are divided on whether government support should be free or subsidized

Respondents who agree that low-income households should receive free government support

![Graph showing perceived place on the income distribution.]


People’s views on how redistributive policies need to change involve not only a normative stance about who should get what, but also one about who currently gets too much or too little. The Latinobarómetro survey asked respondents to identify groups who, they think, receive more or less than they “deserve based on their effort.” This concept is included in quotation marks because it carries moral weight and people may have strong notions about what constitutes deservingness (for example, whether deservingness depends on effort, citizenship, or one’s inherent humanity, and so on). In LAC, people overwhelmingly agree that the rich currently receive more than they deserve (figure 2.21). Moreover, those who believe they are the poorest (panel a) or the richest (panel b) agree with this statement even more strongly than the average respondent. This is so, despite much of the public political debate over fiscal spending involving rhetoric framing the public concern around the benefits that reach the undeserving poor rather than around those that go to the undeserving rich. This finding suggests that there may be room within public opinion for more equitable fiscal policies whereby the rich receive less and others receive more.
Figure 2.21: Latin Americans agree that the rich receive more than they deserve
Share who thinks certain groups receive more than they deserve (first choice)

a. Those who believed they were in the bottom 20

b. Those who believed they were in the top 20

Note: The average responses in Latin America are shown as blue dots.

Where income and political polarization overlap, the path to equality may be rocky

Even if a majority agrees on the types of changes that should occur, realizing change is fundamentally a political process. People believe that those who benefit from unequal systems, such as the rich, tend to exercise undue influence on the political process and may thus prevent change. Indeed, the way income overlaps with other political factors, such as political ideology, may matter in determining the effectiveness of democratic mechanisms, such as political parties, voting, social movements, and public deliberation, in elevating citizen preferences equally (see spotlight 4). In particular, the polarization in political beliefs in the region has become the focus of increasing concern in recent years.

Polarization may be measured in various ways. The Latinobarómetro survey asks respondents to position themselves on a scale between the extreme left and the extreme right (figure 2.22). At the regional level, the extreme positions capture 27 percent of the population, relatively evenly divided between the two. Most people place themselves somewhere in between; 30 percent place themselves squarely in the center. There may be a bias towards the center at play in these responses, but this still suggests that the population is not as divided in political ideology as may sometimes appear. There is variation across countries, and, in some cases, the extremes capture a much larger share of the population, reaching over half the population, for instance, in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. Particularly relevant in the context of income inequality and the political process, however, is how people who believe they are among the top 20 are more likely to position themselves on the extreme right (39 percent). In contrast, those who think they are among the
bottom 20 are more likely to position themselves on the extreme left (24 percent). In countries where the polarization of income overlaps more tightly with the polarization of political ideology, the path towards a more comprehensive policy framework to combat inequality will likely be rockier. The same is true of the path towards a more sustainable economy, given that preferences for redistribution and pro-environmental preferences seem to go hand in hand (spotlight 5).

**Figure 2.22: Extreme political positions vary by country and perceived top or bottom quintile**

a. Respondents place themselves on the political spectrum

b. Respondents place themselves on the extreme left or right, by country

c. Respondents on the political spectrum, by perceived quintile

2.4. Building the world people desire

Chapter 1 shows that the region is facing substantial inequality and mediocre prospects for growth. This chapter shows that people in the region are not only aware of the challenges this represents but find the inequality unfair. The situation does not represent the society in which they would like to live. The subjective measures explored in the chapter highlight that an overwhelming majority are frustrated by the state of inequality in LAC. This frustration holds across the many manifestations of inequality and across the countries of the region.

Freeing the region from the high-inequality, low-growth trap requires policy reforms that are able to promote a more equitable and dynamic future. This is a challenge rendered inherently more difficult by the current distribution of resources, especially the concentration of resources at the top. Reaching a new equilibrium would involve not only adopting redistributive reforms to support households through a more equitable system of personal taxes and transfers, but also regulatory reforms to promote fairer market competition (see chapter 3). Ultimately, support for a more comprehensive vision of social protection for all will be needed to break out of the high-inequality, low-growth trap (chapter 5).

Understanding how people perceive inequality in society and how these perceptions contribute to shaping their normative policy views on what should be done to resolve the numerous associated problems can shed light on where the region stands in the effort to reach the necessary consensus to move forward.
References


ARE PREFERENCES FOR DEMOCRACY TINTED BY PERCEPTIONS OF INEQUALITY?

The perception that democracy does not function well is shared by 46 percent of the LAC people; 13 percent go so far as to say the form of government in their countries is not a democracy, and 12 percent say they do not understand the meaning of the word democracy. Democracy is in crisis and much of the social unrest in 2019, before the pandemic, speaks to that. People’s perceptions do not contradict this statement.

The breakdown of the responses by groups, according to perceptions of inequality, shows that those who believe they are in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution (the bottom 20) are more disappointed than the average respondent. A larger share of the bottom 20 sees major problems rather than small problems with democracy in their countries (figure S4.1). If this group is compared with those who believe they are in the top 20 percent of the income distribution (the top 20), the share who believe their governments are not democratic is almost twice as high. Similarly, those who believe that the income distribution in their countries is highly unequal are more prone to believe that democracy is more at fault than the average respondent.

The share of the population that would not mind having a non-democratic government if the government were effective is high in the region. More than 50 percent of the people in all but 5 of 17 countries share this view, and the proportion is above 65 percent in four countries (figure S4.2). Those who believe they are on the extremes of the income distribution also share this view. Those who place themselves in the middle or closer to the middle disagree.

Figure S4.1: How would you characterize democracy in your country?
Are Preferences for Democracy Tinted by Perceptions of Inequality?

Figure S4.2: Share who would not mind a non-democratic government if the government were effective

In El Salvador, 68 percent of the population consider it fine for the president to control the media (figure S4.3). Dominican Republic and Guatemala follow at a distance, but the average Latin American disagrees. Only among those who perceive they are among the top 20 will a majority grant this right to a president.

Although a few believe that protesting is more effective than voting (5 percent), the majority still believe in voting. Half the population (48 percent) believes voting is the only suitable channel for demanding change, and a third (32 percent) believe in a combination of voting and protesting. The rest of the population say they do not know what is best (12 percent) or think neither channel works (5 percent). Those who believe
that the income distribution is not particularly unequal are less well represented than the average respondent among those who believe in a combination of voting and protesting (26 percent versus 32 percent). More than 50 percent of the population say they would march for more equality. This holds across groups except those who believe the income distribution is not so unequal (Figure S4.4).

**Figure S4.3:** Share who think it is acceptable for the president to control the media

a. By perceived inequality and perceived place on the income distribution

b. By country

![Figure S4.3: Share who think it is acceptable for the president to control the media](chart)


**Figure S4.4:** Share that would march for equality

a. By willingness

b. By perceived inequality and perceived place on the income distribution

![Figure S4.4: Share that would march for equality](chart)

Latin America has a huge endowment of natural capital and great potential for providing ecological services for the region and the world. However, it is also plagued by structural inequalities. These inequalities are part of the population’s concerns because they restrict the possibility and opportunity of unleashing forces that might help lift people out of poverty.

Concerns about protecting the environment are also on people’s minds. A growing share of public opinion believes that preserving natural wealth may also trigger long-run processes of sustainable development. This would occur through a transition towards ecological services that would help realize the potential for well-being, employment and income for all.

A connection between the fairness of the economy and the sustainability of the natural environment is becoming more evident. Inequality creates forces that tend to degrade ecosystems. The degradation also drives more people towards poverty and outmigration. The vicious cycle of deforestation, land concentration and the dislodging of rural communities to precarious conditions in cities is a feature of the recent history of much of the region.

As people come to care more about creating a sustainable society, they also seem to care more about income redistribution and resolving the problems of the unfair economy that provides benefits only for the few.

The Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Latin America and the Caribbean conducted a large representative survey (n = 4,207 individuals) in 13 cities in 7 countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru) during the second half of 2019. The survey included three sets of questions. One set of questions inquired about people’s preferences and behaviours regarding redistribution and pro-poor policies, as follows:

- How worried are you that families do not have enough money in your country?
- How worried are you about the inequalities in access to education and health in your country? Climate change will affect the poorest more; climate change will affect the future generation more; In the last two weeks, have you bought any products with stamps or labels that certify environmental or social actions? How much would you be willing to pay extra for coffee that supports a social cause, such as fair payment to growers, support for a vulnerable community or group?
The second set of questions asked about the attitudes of respondents towards the environment:

*How worried are you about climate change and its consequences in your country? How worried are you about the future conservation of the seas and forests of your country? On the effects of climate change, do you think that climate change will affect plants and animals the most (compared with affecting the poorest, future generations, economic development)? Do you agree with this statement: “We should buy and use environmentally friendly products even if they are expensive”? Do you agree with this statement: “We should buy and use useful products even if they are NOT environmentally friendly”? When a new product or service appears on the market that is environmentally friendly or supports a social cause, will you be the first to use it?*

A third set of questions asked people about their past environmentally friendly behaviour:

*In the last six months, how often have you used or purchased products that reduce environmental damage? In the last two weeks, have you used reusable bags in your shopping? Have you turned off the lights and disconnected appliances that are not in use? Have you consciously limited the amount of water you use for bathing / brushing your teeth / washing dishes? Have you purchased products with stamps or labels that certify environmental or social actions? Have you separated and recycled trash from your home? Which of the following is your primary means of transportation? Have you participated in carpooling activities with friends, family, or study/work colleagues in the past year? In your last home purchase or rental decision, did you consider reducing the size of your home? Did you consider reducing time or distance to work or study in your last home purchase or rental decision? In your last home purchase or rental decision, did you consider less expensive public services? In your last home purchase or rental decision, did you consider the availability of environmentally friendly technologies? In the last two weeks, have you consumed less meat? less sugar? more vegetables?*

Based on the responses to these questions, Cárdenas (2022) estimates an index of pro-social preferences, another index of pro-environmental preferences and an index of sustainable behaviour. The preferences for the environment and sustainable practices of the respondents predict the index of pro-social preferences. In fact, the relationship is consistent across all countries in the sample (Figure S5.1). Regardless of the indices’ levels, which vary across countries, the correlation between pro-environment preferences and behaviours and the preferences for a fairer society and concerns with inequality is positive and significant.
Figure S5.1: Pro-environment preferences and preferences for fairer societies correlate positively in LAC

Source: Cárdenas 2022.

From these data it can be inferred that policies addressing both the creation of a more inclusive society and the conservation of the environment, should find strong support from the public.

Reference