Final Evaluation

of

COMPASIS Joint Project

Community Mobilization for Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion in Service Delivery

Final Report

Participating UN Agencies: FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP
Convening Agency: UNDP
Funding: UN Human Security Trust Fund (Governments of Japan, Slovenia and Thailand)

Timor-Leste

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Preface

This report conforms to the terms of reference for the evaluation assignment, which was developed by the convening and participating UN agencies and endorsed by the Project Steering Committee, and was based on a review of project documents and reference materials coupled with interviews and an in-country mission carried out during June 3 and 25, 2013. The views presented in this report are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Government of Timor-Leste or the participating UN agencies. The conclusions and recommendations provided are solely those of the author and are not binding on the government, program management or other stakeholders.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the many people who kindly gave their time during interviews with government institutions and UN agencies in Timor-Leste, as well as those people who provided useful inputs to the assessment and comments on earlier versions of this report. The report, as well as the related preparatory work could not have been completed without the support of Ms Beatriz Marciel, UNV posted to UNDP Timor-Leste, who helped to arrange meetings with a wide range of stakeholders. The consultancy that led to this report was funded by the UN Human Security Trust Fund (UNHSTF).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMPASIS was designed to address the underlying causes that led to the 2006-2008 conflict, involving a multi-sectoral approach to rural development, encompassing support to livelihoods, agriculture, infrastructure, water, sanitation and hygiene. Apart from direct delivery of food and other inputs, the project also promoted community mobilization activities through group savings and loans, and a range of other mechanisms intended to empower communities.

The joint project was implemented by 6 UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, ILO, and UNFPA), working in close collaboration with their counterpart government agencies, implementing activities in 17 villages (sucos) in 2 remote districts, Ermera and Oecusse. There were two interrelated objectives:

1) To reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support;
2) To promote social inclusion in the service delivery system.

The focus of the final evaluation was on analyzing the impact of the project, using both quantitative and qualitative methods to determine the extent to which the project was able to increase the level of community empowerment and reduce the level of extreme poverty. The assignment included an in-country evaluation mission in Timor-Leste between June 3 and 25, 2013.

The evaluation yielded the following results and lessons learned:

Project Design
• COMPASIS was designed during a period of tense political and human security turmoil, where a pilot project was needed to address the inter-connections between poverty, food insecurity and conflict, and where investments in community empowerment, basic social services and human capital were intended to reduce the probability of civil and political unrest recurring
• More than providing basic services, the project was designed to mobilize communities to achieve their own empowerment whilst equipping them with the skills and tools to improve their own food security, education, sanitation, hygiene, and family planning. Thus, community mobilization was used as a tool to rebuild the trust necessary to establish a sense of community

Self-Help Groups and other Community Motivation Mechanisms
• The cornerstone of the project involved establishing and supporting SHGs, which turned out to be highly effective for helping people to improve income management at the household level. This represents a significant change in behaviour, as most individuals did not have access to savings prior to joining the groups. The group activity raised the confidence of women, who tended to focus on managing household finances, by enabling them to smooth out spikes in income and gain access to credit
• The project highlighted the use of some important methodologies for community mobilization that can be passed on to the government to implement over a longer time period. Different groups were established to manage the outcomes of different components: savings and loans (SHGs), business activity (BFGs), water management (WUGs), sanitation (ODF, SBGs) and literacy (SPGs)
• In attempting to empower communities by introducing community mobilization techniques, behaviour change was a critical element for changing perceptions. Behaviour change needs special motivational facilitators who can operate effectively at the community level, and provide handholding support on a continuing basis
Business Training
• Before rural communities can develop a culture of self-reliance and self-employment, a change in the mindset is needed, which is often hampered by low levels of education and entrepreneurship
• In areas of low literacy and business skills, group members need continued handholding support long after the completion of project activities. But support should be provided as part of a graduated program of assistance that encourages groups to move up the value chain, where they can gradually become part of the formal market system

Agriculture
• The project’s agricultural activities contributed to increased food consumption and production and reductions in post harvest losses. However, follow up assessments have not been undertaken to determine the extent to which these activities led to an increase in self-reliance and empowerment, particularly for long-term food security
• In a project where agriculture was such a key component for increasing incomes and food security, a tighter framework should have been created to ensure greater synergies between key agencies, where for example FAO and WFP could have worked closer together to improve agricultural productivity

Infrastructure
• Small-scale rural infrastructure rehabilitation was the largest component, involving inputs from 4 agencies, UNDP, FAO, WFP and UNICEF. However, these components were not always targeted towards specific objectives under COMPASIS, as the decision-making processes were aligned with priorities established under different jurisdictions, suco development plans, district assemblies and particular communities. Greater impact could have been achieved in income generation and food security if the infrastructure components were specifically targeted to the outputs of Objective 1, as they were in the case of UNICEF WASH under Objective 2
• Small-scale infrastructure at the suco level can be enhanced considerably by involving community members in the planning and construction phases. To improve sustainability and ownership, small-scale rural infrastructure projects should be accompanied by a community mobilization component, along with training in management and maintenance to promote self-reliance

Literacy
• UNICEF’s literacy component had limited impact primarily because they had difficulty in getting participation from the youth target group. But by undertaking a number of assessments and consultations UNICEF hopes to salvage some results through the organization of a pilot project in Ermera in conjunction with the youth centre

Family planning
• UNFPA’s family planning component was poorly implemented because the approach did not take into account the need for community-based, behaviour change and communication methods

WASH
• UNICEF’s WASH component was highly effective in improving services in the three targeted areas, water, sanitation and hygiene. In addition, community motivation techniques were designed to initiate community ownership and to mobilize communities to identify, manage and maintain their own needs in these areas

Implementation of UN Joint Projects
• Independent delivery mechanisms are common among joint projects, where UN agencies tend to ‘plan together’ but do not necessarily ‘deliver together’
• As a result of the separate agency implementation processes where each UN agency was focused on its specialized role, a great deal of coordination was required at the national, district and community levels. This flexible process was aided by a high degree of adaptive management, as most components needed adjustment after start-up
The hands-off approach to management allowed some slippage to occur in some components, such as UNICEF’s literacy, UNFPA’s family planning approaches, and UNDP’s infrastructure components. As a result of this slippage, a 6-month no-cost extension was needed to allow the agencies to complete their activities.

Delays in the implementation of particular components did not affect the achievement of results, except in cases where the implementation strategy had not been configured correctly (e.g., family planning and literacy).

The project would have benefited from a tighter framework for management, coordination and policy issues, which would have provided more consistency in establishing a policy on the issue of subsidization of latrine construction; directing the infrastructure components towards income generation and food security; and preventing delays through a more rigorous system of monitoring and reporting.

As of February 2013, 85% of the project budget was spent, with 15% remaining. Expectations are that all funds will be disbursed by the end of the project (August 31).

**Monitoring**

- Joint programs should have an independent monitor to track progress during implementation to avoid slippage and identify alternative strategies for difficult components.
- As a follow up, each agency should undertake a detailed assessment of the impact of their component, in order to advise the government on specific interventions that are needed in rural areas.

**Impact**

- Project components that were part of a UN agency’s regular activities tended to perform better (WFP, ILO, FAO, WASH) than activities where agencies tried to introduce new methods (UNFPA, Literacy).
- The true impact of the project is in the heightened degree of community empowerment, where SHG activity led to improvements in the management of household income, and a number of communities made improvements in the management and maintenance of their water supply, sanitation and hygiene, etc.
- Among UN agencies, there should be more effort to provide support using specialized techniques designed to motivate communities and with the involvement of government departments in order to build capacity, as these techniques have greater impact in the long run and are more sustainable.

**Sustainability**

- To a large extent, the process of ownership transfer is underway, where some components have been integrated into government programs (WASH committees are certifying ODF areas, ILO’s activities are integrated into IADE/SEFOPE’s program of activities, and UNDP’s small-scale infrastructure component will be expanded through the new Village Improvement Program).
- District institutions may have the willingness to take over the activities, however, they may not have the capacity; the government is looking at the issue of building capacity in the districts before transferring responsibility. In the interim, many project components may have to be coordinated by MSA.
- A well-planned exit strategy includes early discussions with government departments to ensure smooth handover of appropriate project components.
- COMPASIS’s “bottom-up” approach can be used to provide guidance to government policies on supporting rural areas, as there are significant lessons to be learned from the project interventions, particularly in community mobilization and empowerment.

**Rural Development in Remote Enclaves**

- The government should pay special attention to Ocessue where some people feel they are “a pilot project that has been left behind and forgotten about.”
1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Project Context and Background

COMPASIS was designed to address the underlying causes that led to the 2006-2008 conflict, involving a multi-sectoral approach to rural development, encompassing support to livelihoods, agriculture, infrastructure, literacy, family planning, water, sanitation and hygiene. Apart from direct delivery of food and other inputs, the project was intended to promote community mobilization activities through group savings and loans, and a range of other community empowerment mechanisms involving improvements to water management, sanitation, income generation, among others. The ultimate human security goal was to improve the lives of extremely vulnerable households in the districts of Ermera and Oecusse so as to increase their resilience against hunger, poor health, illiteracy, social exclusion, poverty and threats of civil strife.

The project was a ‘joint’ initiative intended to be implemented by 6 UN agencies over a relatively short period of time (3 years, March 2010 until February 2013), with a total budget of US$4.088 million funded by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) with financing from Japan, Slovenia and Thailand. The human security approach emphasizes a triangular relationship between security, development and human rights, which are seen as the building blocks of national security. While COMPASIS was conceived in a human security context following a period of violence and destruction, the peaceful country situation during the period of implementation enabled the project to put more emphasis on the development component, namely by emphasizing livelihoods and service delivery, as opposed to security, the rule of law or access to justice.

1.2 Description of Project Interventions

The joint project was implemented by 6 UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, ILO, and UNFPA) based on their individual specializations, working in close collaboration with their counterpart government agencies, as well as with NGOs contracted to deliver specific activities. The project was implemented in 17 villages (sucos) in 2 remote districts, Ermera and Oecusse, 10 sucos in Ermera (the sub-districts of Letefoho and Atsabe,) and 7 sucos in Oecusse (sub-districts Passabe and Nitibe).1

There are two interrelated objectives:

1. To reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support;
2. To promote social inclusion in the service delivery system.

To achieve these objectives, the six UN agencies implemented 18 activities grouped into the following 9 components:

- UNDP – Strengthening of self-help groups (SHGs)
  - Micro-finance
  - Rehabilitation of small-scale infrastructure
- FAO – Training in home gardening and construction of storage silos
- ILO – Training in entrepreneurship and self-employment
- WFP – Distribution of food and mini infrastructure through food-for-work schemes
- Unicef – WASH (Water, Sanitation, Hygiene) using community motivation techniques
  - Literacy classes and related to while
- Unfpa – Family planning and reproductive health

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1 Oecusse is an enclave district in Western Timor with limited access by air, road and ferry
As lead agency, UNDP’s role was to coordinate the inputs of the different agencies, not to manage the project activities. The Project Steering Committee provided overall guidance, but there was no “Managing Agent” that had ultimate responsibility and accountability for achieving the results and management of funds. Each agency followed its own independent procedures for planning, budgeting, managing and implementing. There was an attempt to coordinate activities under Objective 1, where UNDP, FAO and ILO targeted similar SHGs. To some extent, WFP and UNFPA also targeted similar SHGs. But for the most part, the activities involving WFP, WASH, Literacy and UNDP infrastructure followed plans that had been developed independently by the agencies in collaboration with their government counterparts and for suco development plans.

### 1.3 Expected Results of the Joint Project and the UN Delivering as One Initiative

Table 1 provides a detailed breakdown of the expected results of the project when it was originally designed in 2009, as well as the changes in the results framework following the revision in late 2011 and early 2012.

#### Table 1: COMPASIS Objectives and Results (as revised in late 2011/early 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broader Human Security Goal</th>
<th>Protection of extremely vulnerable households in the districts of Ermera and Oecusse against threats of civil strife, poverty, hunger, poor health, illiteracy and social exclusion so that they are empowered to realize their fundamental rights and full human potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results Framework: Objectives, Outcomes and Activities (revised targets)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 1:</strong> Reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Improved income generation and food security for vulnerable groups through community mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1 Establish 200 self help groups (UNDP) (reduced to 100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 Identify 30 business/finance service providers and train them in business management tools (ILO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3 Provide 200 self help group members with market-oriented vocational training/business development services/financial literacy training (ILO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4 Provide agricultural-based livelihood skills to 120 self help groups or 2,400 beneficiaries (FAO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.5 Facilitate provision of micro-finance to at least 100 self help groups for starting micro-enterprises (UNDP) (cancelled; enterprise development refocused on capacity development of SHGs and CAFs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.6 Rural assets created through 76 schemes of food-for-work (WFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.7 Community-based rehabilitation of 16 small rural infrastructure projects (UNDP) (increased to 17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.8 Provide technical support and post-harvest equipment to 50 self help groups and silos for 400 households (FAO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.9 Provide integrated agriculture activities to 30 self help groups (600 beneficiaries) (FAO)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 2:</strong> Promote social inclusion in the service delivery system</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Increased education participation of out of school children</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Develop functional literacy materials and print basic literacy teaching and learning materials (UNICEF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Implement literacy classes and training of literacy tutors (UNICEF)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
COMPASIS was conceived as a multi-agency ‘joint project’ involving six UN agencies. As is common with many joint projects, the agencies may have planned and coordinated together but they did not necessarily deliver together. When it came to implementation, each agency was responsible for delivering their various components separately. This differs from a UN “Delivering as One” approach, which applies to programming at the country level.

At the country programming level, the project supports UNDAF Outcome 2 by assisting vulnerable groups to improve their livelihoods and reduce poverty within an overarching crisis prevention and recovery context (however, there was no component addressing disaster risk management), and Outcome 3 by assisting children, young people, women and men to improve their quality of life through reduced malnutrition, strengthening learning achievement, and enhancing social protection. The project also supports CPAP Outcome 3 by improving access to livelihoods for vulnerable groups.

The project’s integrated approach to rural development was very much aligned with the multifaceted needs of the government’s rural development strategy as COMPASIS attempted to defuse the root causes and the underlying tensions that led to the conflict. This approach included community mobilization, food security, improved livelihoods, rural infrastructure and improved access to social services such as literacy, water, sanitation and reproductive health. This alignment is reflected in the government’s “one budget one sub-district” approach, where the government’s integrated plan appears to fit with the UN system’s integrated “Delivering as One” approach.

1.4 Purpose and Mandate of the Evaluation

The mid-term evaluation (MTE) focused on making adjustments and course corrections to the project, including redefining objectives, indicators and implementation timeframes, including making recommendations for an extension. The focus of the final evaluation will be on analyzing the impact of the project, in particular the multi-agency approach to implementation and the impact of the project on increasing the level of community mobilization and reducing the level of extreme poverty. According to the ToRs, the final evaluation has the following 5 objectives:
1. To discover the programme’s design quality with regards to the achievement of the stated objectives and performance indicators within the allotted time frame.

2. To understand how the joint programme has operated and assess the efficiency of its management model in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the One UN framework.

3. To identify the programme’s degree of effectiveness among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Human Security thematic window, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

4. To assess the impact level of the intervention in the different locations based on the approach, implementation, design and outreach.

5. To serve as an opportunity for reflection and to provide recommendations to the project partners and Donor.

1.5 Structure of the Report

Section 1, Introduction and Description of the Project, is followed by the Evaluation Methodology (Section 2), Evaluation Findings (Section 3), and Summary of Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations (Section 4).

2.0 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

2.1 Methodology

The evaluation methodology was based on a participatory approach which used consultative methods to engage a range of stakeholders so that they could contribute to and learn from the evaluation process. The evaluation was undertaken using a mix of tools and methods to ensure validity and reliability of the overall findings. The assignment included an in-country evaluation mission in Timor-Leste between June 3 and 25, 2013, during which time the following activities were carried out:

1. Review of Documents:
   a. Reviewed project documents and government publications and reports (national development plans) to identify key issues as a means of focusing the evaluation tasks
   b. Assessed the status of baseline conditions using information from available reports and information provided by key participants

2. Interviewed various stakeholders and beneficiaries:
   a. Extensive meetings with the project team and key stakeholders were held in order to maximize their knowledge and input
   b. Individual and group discussions were held with a wide and representative set of stakeholders, beneficiaries, IPs, UN agencies and other development partners (see list in Annex 4)
   c. Use of semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions to ascertain evidence-based evaluation responses

3. Field visits to project sites:
   a. Site visits and discussions with representative stakeholder institutions, organizations, community groups and leaders
b. Field observations to a selection of implemented activities in Ermera and Oecusse (the list of meetings is attached at Annex 4)

4. Assessment and analysis:
   a. Examined the weight of evidence compiled from reports, interviews and site visits, and compared current conditions and results in relation to baseline information
   b. Applied evaluation criteria to assess the major achievements and rated project performance and achievements using the UNDP rating scale
   c. Analyzed performance and achievements to determine the quality of the joint planning and implementation methods used by the project
   d. Making observations and findings to generate recommendations, alternative options that can be pursued, and identifying lessons learned that can be used for similar initiatives in the future

5. Analytical report writing:
   a. Prepared and reviewed a draft report inviting feedback for revisions to the final report

2.2 Evaluation Framework and Rating System
An evaluation framework and a standardized rating system were used to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the project’s achievements in relation to the targets assigned to each component (see Table 1 for details). The framework was used as a general guide for the interviews (attached at Annex 1), and the rating system was used to rate the quantitative and qualitative achievements of each component, objectives and the project as a whole (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Project Component Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly Satisfactory (A)</td>
<td>Component is expected to achieve or exceed all its major objectives, and yield substantial national benefits, without major shortcomings, and can be presented as “good practice”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
<td>Component is expected to achieve most of its major objectives, and yield satisfactory benefits, with only minor shortcomings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginally Satisfactory (C)</td>
<td>Component is expected to achieve most of its major relevant objectives but with either significant shortcomings or modest overall relevance, and is not expected to achieve some of its major objectives or yield some of the expected benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginally Unsatisfactory (D)</td>
<td>Component is expected to achieve some of its major objectives with major shortcomings or is expected to achieve only some of its major objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory (E)</td>
<td>Component is not expected to achieve most of its major objectives or to yield any satisfactory benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Unsatisfactory (F)</td>
<td>Component has failed to achieve, and is not expected to achieve, any of its major objectives with no worthwhile benefits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Constraints and Limitations
The following points summarize the limitations of the evaluation methodology and other factors that affected the ‘evaluability’ of the project:
• The outcome and objective level indicators selected for the project were too broad to be measured or have any impact on a pilot project based in remote sub-districts.
• There was a limited amount of baseline data and UN agencies tended to report on activities as opposed to monitoring against the indicators, which affected the ability to assess the impact of the project on the basis of quantitative targets. As a result, it was necessary to focus on assessing the project’s achievements using qualitative methods.
• Identifying qualitative indicators in the design phase of a project is difficult, as it requires some foresight into the type of behaviour change that is expected from the project interventions. Nevertheless, qualitative indicators would provide a more accurate picture of the impact of the project.
• The interviews were undertaken with project staff acting as translators, which may have restricted the responses during interviews and hence the objectivity of their comments may have been compromised.

3.0 Evaluation Findings

3.1 Introduction
This section presents an assessment of project performance at a number of levels including project design, activities, outputs, objectives and project management and implementation. In undertaking the assessment of achievements, emphasis was focused on the main project components that were implemented by the different agencies. These components were then tabulated under each output and objective to make a broad assessment of results. Based on the performance, an evaluative rating was given to the main project components, which are summarized in a table at the end of each section. The review of activities and analysis of each component is presented in the following manner:
• Background information on what was intended (what was supposed to happen)
• Review of activities (what actually happened)
• Assessment of performance (based on evidence, observations and interviews)
• Summary of findings and observations

3.2 Assessment of Project Design and Relevance
The relevance of the project is evaluated against the context of the human security situation following the 2006-2008 crisis, the continued importance of the project objectives during implementation (2010-2013), and the alignment with national priorities and polices. The shortcomings of the project’s intervention logic and M&E framework were addressed in the MTE and will only be discussed here insofar as they relate to project impact.

Context of Addressing the Human Security Situation
In 1999, a large-scale scorched-earth campaign was undertaken by the anti-independence militia in Timor-Leste, destroying the country's infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, schools and electricity grids. A second crisis in 2006 added an internal human security dimension to the already tense situation, resulting in over 150,000 people being interned in 65 IDP camps in 3 locations, including Ermera. This led to the establishment of a United Nations multidimensional integrated mission (UNMIT) with a mandate to support the government, focusing its efforts on fostering dialogue and reconciliation.

Within this context, the COMPASIS project was intended to address the underlying causes that led to the 2006 conflict, which included addressing the inter-connections between poverty, food insecurity and conflict. It was designed during a period of tense political and human security
turmoil (2008-2009), and as a result it was appropriate to apply a human security approach and UNTFHS principles to its design. The human security approach rests on a number of principles applied in a “protection and empowerment framework” that is designed to address pervasive threats and crises, and to empower people by promoting behavioral changes in order to prevent the threats and crises from recurring in the future. These principles include the following:

- Strategies that enable people to develop their resilience to difficult situations
- Developing the capabilities of individuals and communities to make informed choices and to participate in solutions that not only ensure human security for themselves but also for others

With its emphasis on community mobilization and empowerment, COMPASIS fits within this protection and empowerment framework, as part of the objective was to rebuild trust and empower people by involving communities in decision-making at the local level. Thus, investments in community empowerment, basic social services and human capital were designed to strengthen the resilience of communities and reduce the probability of civil and political unrest recurring. This involved addressing the full range of issues affecting rural areas including food security, savings and credit, income generation, agricultural productivity, skills training, literacy for out-of-school children, awareness about maternal and child health including family planning, and increasing the capacity of local service providers in community-based water, sanitation, and hygiene.

In this respect, by recognizing the link between local socio-economic development and promoting a durable solution for the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs), COMPASIS was aligned to the government’s National Recovery Strategy (2007). Also, by supporting the development of a pilot strategy for remote rural areas, the project was aligned to the national priorities articulated in the government’s strategy document “Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development” (March 2009).

More than providing basic services in remote areas, the project involved “mobilizing communities to achieve their own empowerment whilst simultaneously equipping them with the skills and tools to improve their own food security, education, sanitation and hygiene, and child and maternal health”. Thus, from a human security perspective, community mobilization was seen as a tool to rebuild the trust and resilience necessary to establish a sense of community.

**The Project’s Continued Importance During Implementation (2010-2013)**

By 2010, Timor-Leste had moved into a recovery phase, and the UN was focused on institutional strengthening and development in preparation for a new phase in the country’s development. As a result, during the period of implementation (2010-2013) COMPASIS functioned more like a community development project, with the activities addressing several areas that the government had prioritized in rural areas, including roads and water (priority 1), food security with a focus on productivity (priority 2), and social services and decentralized service delivery (priority 5).

During this period, the project remained relevant to the government’s priorities, which were articulated in the long-term Strategic Development Plan (2011-2030), as COMPASIS helped to address problems associated with food insecurity, self-employment, reduction of poverty through SHG activity and improving rural infrastructure. For example, the SDP indicates that rural households go without enough food (rice and maize) for 3.8 months each year, and basic public services, knowledge of agricultural production and markets, education, skills training and economic opportunities are less easy to access in rural areas, where 75% of the population lives.

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2 Project document page 6, emphasis added
3 SDP pg 109
The SDP strategy for improving the lives of the rural population involves the creation of jobs through micro enterprises. And while COMPASIS attempted to address these problems, it was realized early on during implementation that the project’s emphasis on enterprise development had to be reduced because of a low level of literacy and lack knowledge about markets in the rural areas where the project was being implemented. For example UNDP’s MFI component (Activity 1.5) was cancelled and ILO/IADE/SEFOPE had to simplify their training material to adjust for the low level of business knowledge and literacy among participants in the rural areas where COMPASIS was implemented. Similarly, as mentioned later in this report, agricultural productivity is another issue that the government will have to tackle in rural areas if the problems of food security and income poverty are to be addressed beyond the subsistence level home gardening activities that FAO piloted under COMPASIS.

The elections in 2012 signaled that a certain degree of peace and stability had been achieved in Timor-Leste, with well over 70 per cent of the population voting. In addition, the private sector started re-investing in construction, telecommunications and other sectors. Following the 2012 elections, there was a change of government, and COMPASIS continued to be of importance to the new government, particularly with its emphasis on accelerating community development.

Table 3: Rating of Project Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Component</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
<th>Comments/Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>The JP concept and strategy was effective and appropriate for the objectives of the project, the needs of the beneficiaries and the government’s plans.</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>• Human security situation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• COMPASIS was aligned with national priorities and the needs of the target beneficiaries when it was designed in 2008/9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The objectives of the project remained valid through implementation, and key stakeholders and partners participated in the development and implementation of COMPASIS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Highly Satisfactory (A)</td>
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<td>• Highly Satisfactory (A)</td>
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3.3 ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT RESULTS

COMPASIS was a pilot project that was designed to help selective remote communities meet their basic needs. To evaluate a project of this nature, it is necessary undertake both quantitative and qualitative assessments. Quantitative assessments involve calculating the percentage of achievement of each component against the anticipated target, and rating each accordingly. Tables 4 and 5 below indicate a percentage figure and an alphabetical rating for each component. However, because of the profile of the target population, comprising low levels of education and business skills, the project was designed to provide support at a very rudimentary level – such as formulation of SHGs, basic business and literacy training, home gardening activities, etc. A quantitative assessment is only able to measure the number of people trained, groups supported, etc., and not the quality or effectiveness of the support provided. Thus, in addition to quantitative measurements, the evaluation will make qualitative assessments based on the impact of project activities.

The project structure involved a multi-agency effort where 6 UN agencies, in conjunction with their government counterparts, implemented 18 activities divided into 8 components and two objectives. The evaluation will follow the project implementation structure and assess the results of the following 8 components: (Objective 1): 1) SHG formulation and strengthening (UNDP), 2) business and self-employment training (ILO), 3) agriculture (FAO), 4) food-for-work (WFP), 5)
infrastructure (UNDP); (Objective 2): 6) literacy (UNICEF), 7) family planning (UNFPA) and 8) WASH (UNICEF).

The following sections provide an assessment of each component, including a discussion of the qualitative aspects, in order to determine the effectiveness of each component and the impact of the project as a whole.

3.2.1 Objective 1: Reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support

The following section assesses the nine activities associated with Objective 1 that were implemented by UNDP (activities 1.1, 1.5 and 1.7), ILO (1.2 and 1.3), FAO (1.4, 1.8 and 1.9), and WFP (1.6). Information in the annual progress reports indicates that most of the agencies achieved most of their targets, although some experienced delays in implementation due to a variety of factors.

SHG establishment (Activities 1.1 & 1.5): The cornerstone of the COMPASIS project involved UNDP establishing and supporting a number of SHGs to improve income management at the household level, thereby contributing to the building of social capital in rural areas. This strategy was borrowed from the success of SHGs in India, following the implementation of a project in Oecusse during 2004-2009 (OCAP). The original target under COMPASIS was to establish 200 SHGs and assist them to manage their resources and make decisions on a shared basis in order to improve their living conditions. There was an assumption that the SHGs would develop into enterprises, however, analysis undertaken in October 2010 recommended revisions to the enterprise development orientation, primarily because of the low level of entrepreneurship, lack of market linkages and high degree of coping behaviour in the target districts. Instead, it was recommended that UNDP focus on strengthening self-help groups and build the capacity of community activation facilitators (CAFs). These recommendations were supported by the mid-term evaluation (November 2011), which also recommended reducing in the target number of SHGs from 200 to 100. This analysis also contributed to the cancellation of the micro-finance component (Activity 1.5), which was justified on the basis of the low level of business activity among SHGs. This justification is supported by the final evaluation where it was found that few groups are in a position to graduate to a higher level of business activity. In the end, 86 SHGs were formed and 5 were disbanded, leaving 81 supported under the project (31 in Ermera and 50 in Oecusse). As a result of its 81% achievement, this component received a “B” rating (satisfactory).

Support to SHGs turned out to be highly effective for helping people manage their household income, particularly women. The group activity – which involved weekly meetings, shared savings, decision making, and other community-based activities – appeared to build the confidence of women, who tended to focus on managing household finances, by enabling them to smooth out spikes in income and gain access to credit from a trusted source. Discussions with several groups indicated that SHGs have been instrumental in strengthening the management of household income and helping individuals to engage in income generating activities. This represents a significant change in behaviour as most individuals did not have access to savings prior to joining the groups. Now, SHG members use their savings for a variety of reasons, such as to purchase food during food insecure periods, to support their children’s school activities, in emergency situations and for informal business activities. As an indication of the level of activity, one group reported that the members consume half the food they produce and sell the other half. Also, several women’s groups indicated that the male members tended to have ambitious plans that divert resources and attention away from the simple task of managing household income. In addition, the role of CAFs in providing handholding support to SHGs was extremely useful, and UNDP sub-contracted FEEO, an NGO based in Oecusse, specifically for this purpose.

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4 The Oecusse-Ambeno Community Activation Program was a 5-year project funded by EC and executed by UNDP/UNOPS that introduced the MYRADA approach to communities through SHGs.
SHGs were linked with a number of other activities in the project, particularly FAO’s technical assistance support to livestock, post-harvest and home gardening through MAF extension workers; and ILO’s business training activities that was delivered through its main counterparts, BDC and SEFOPE. UNFPA also used the SHG structure to arrange family planning awareness sessions through trained focal points supplied by MoH.

**Business and self-employment training (Activities 1.2 & 1.3):** ILO provided business training and support to self-employment, largely through its regular program of support to IADE/CDE and SEFOPE. By the end of the project, 12 business services providers (BSP) from 2 institutions (IADE/CDE, HABEM) participated in business development training; and 50 entrepreneurship training courses were conducted (17 in Ermera and 33 in Oecusse), benefiting 783 individuals (433 Women and 354 men) from 40 SHGs in business development services and financial literacy.

Although all of the quantitative targets were met, there were challenges in implementing this component, particularly in providing support to the development of entrepreneurship and self-employment. This was largely because people in the rural areas of Timor-Leste do not have a culture of entrepreneurship, and the focus of COMPASIS was to assist the poorest of the poor, whose initiative to develop self-employment has been hampered by a lack of education and low levels of entrepreneurship. Even though rudimentary training materials were used that had been developed specifically for Timor-Leste, there was still difficulty in adjusting the training and support to the low literacy level of the target group. ILO found that, more than anything else, a change in the mindset was needed, which was difficult to achieve in a 3-year project. As a result, IADE/CDE found it necessary to use another method for encouraging enterprising individuals into business-oriented groups – through “Business Group Formulation” (BGF). BGF is a targeted expansion of the SHG concept, which goes beyond the savings and credit function of SHGs to identify business-oriented groups/individuals for further training and support. As a result of these accomplishments, this component received an “A” rating (highly satisfactory).

It is difficult to determine the impact of the business and self-employment training. As an indication of the low level of entrepreneurship within the target groups, no BGF groups had been formed in Oecusse by the end of the project, and Ermera had 1 or 2 that were in the early stages of formulation. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the training piqued the interest of one or two business-minded groups and individuals, who have submitted proposals to CDE for follow-up support in establishing rural business activities involving block-making and sewing. In terms of sustainability, ILO’s component is one of the few COMPASIS activities that have been integrated into the government’s program. However, it was learned during the evaluation that the government did not allocate any budget to IADE in Oecusse during the 3-year project period, and that over the past 6 months no budget has been announced, which has paralyzed their operations in Oecusse. This is an indication that business training and access to markets are not high priorities in the government’s rural development strategy, which is primarily focused on agriculture and infrastructure.

**Agriculture (Activities 1.4, 1.8 & 1.9):** All FAO’s planned activities in the agriculture component were completed, and most of the targets were exceeded. The first undertaking on this component was an assessment of farmers’ needs, following which FAO’s interventions were based on these assessments. In the end, this component involved completion of home garden training, distribution of horticulture seeds (fruit and vegetables) and hand tools to 119 SHGs (60 in Oecusse and 59 in Ermera), 23 MAF livestock training sessions (13 in Oecusse and 10 in Ermera), construction of 625 post harvest silos (300 in Oecusse and 325 in Ermera), and training of 14 MAF extension workers in communication techniques to improve the transfer of knowledge to SHG members. Some activities experienced problems in delivery, for example the distribution of seeds arrived too late for the planting season, and some varieties of pigs were unsuitable for...
upland areas (which was the result of a shortage of pigs on the local market at the time). As a result, these activities received a combination of “A” and “B” ratings (highly satisfactory and satisfactory).

There has been no follow up assessment by FAO or MAF to determine the impact of the project activities, in terms of increased food production, or reductions in post harvest losses. Also, because of the different implementation cycles of FAO and WFP, it was difficult to determine if the short-term food security goals of WFP’s component and its accompanying FFW schemes were linked to the longer-term food production goals of FAO – although it can be assumed that there will be some benefit in the use of silos for food storage. A follow up assessment should be undertaken to determine not only the extent to which the activities increased food production, but also the extent to which the community mobilization initiatives increased the degree of self-reliance and empowerment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most individuals were hoping that project support would continue with the expectation of receiving more seeds and tools, which is an indication that the level of self-reliance and entrepreneurship is still quite low.

Food-for-Work (Activity 1.6): Prior to the initiation of activities, WFP established a Local Project Review Committee in each district comprised of the District Administrator/Deputy District Administrator as chair, sub-district administrators (SDAs), community development officers (CDOs) and suco chiefs. In this way, village leaders and communities identified and prioritized activities to be undertaken, such as distribution of food, construction of feeder roads to connect communities to markets, clinics and schools; agriculture land reclamation, land terracing and irrigation systems. In the end, WFP distributed 609 mts of food and completed 128 food-for-work schemes (87 in Ermera and 41 in Oecusse), which involved 163 kms of feeder roads, 67 ha of slopping agricultural land terracing (SALT), 15 kms of irrigation canals, 10 kms of fencing, construction of 1 school unit, improvement of 150 sqms of water reservoir and 4 fish ponds. These activities increased the assets of 6,525 beneficiaries (3,518 male and 3,007 female), representing 200% of the original target.

In spite of this component’s quantitative achievements, it is difficult to measure the extent to which WFP’s activities led to a qualitative increase in food security, whether agricultural production has been increased in the targeted communities, or how closely WFP’s activities were coordinated with the activities of other UN agencies, particularly FAO. Interviews with WFP and FAO indicate that both organizations found it difficult to coordinate activities, even though some sites were the same. The agencies had different agendas: FAO worked with MAF and WFP coordinated its activities at the suco, sub-district and district levels. This lack of alignment between UN agencies was also reported in WFP’s country portfolio evaluation for 2008-2012 (May 2013), which found the alignment in joint programs in which WFP participated was “quite shallow”.

These difficulties are further complicated by the fact that the food security baseline was not determined at the beginning of the project and WFP did not report on the level of food insecurity at the end of the project.\(^6\) Anecdotal evidence suggests that some communities are still food insecure, particularly in Oecusse, and interviews with the communities and WFP indicate that ‘climate change’ has been singled out as the culprit. But the food security problem goes beyond the long term changes associated with climate change; and has more to do with a lack of markets, poor infrastructure, reliance on rain fed agriculture, poor soil retention, etc. While the project did support the building of irrigation canals and while feeder roads provided some connectivity, it appears that the longer term food security situation was not addressed directly in the project, and it will have to be taken up in the long-term plans of the Ministry of Agriculture, which will involve providing better agricultural productivity, infrastructure, and linkages to the market, particularly in Oecusse.

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\(^6\) In 2007, the baseline in Ermera and Oecusee was recorded as 4.8 and 4.2 months of low food consumption. But in October 2011, a different measure was used – a WFP/FFW consumption survey conducted with 150 households in Ermera and Oecusse – which recorded 16% at an acceptable level, 28% under the borderline and 56% poor.
WFP’s involvement in the COMPASIS project has to be contextualized in the 2006-2008 crisis, which involved IDPs returning to the villages, resulting in heightened levels of food insecurity. In fact, WFP’s 2006 project was used to design the COMPASIS interventions, where WFP’s activities were more related to the needs of short-term food distribution, and may not have included a high degree of sustainability or self-sufficiency. While WFP’s activities were appreciated by the communities, because they provided concrete benefits by stemming the immediate need for food, the longer-term problems associated with food production have not been solved.

Regarding WFP’s infrastructure component, more effort should have gone into each activity to ensure that it would be sustainable. For example, the evaluation team visited a few feeder road projects that had been washed out by heavy rains, making the roads unusable. Even though the FFW schemes may have provided basic infrastructure, WFP and the community stakeholders should make sure to involve the government’s engineering department in planning these mini projects to ensure the roads are being built in the appropriate location and to an adequate standard. There is little value in raising a community’s expectations with an incomplete feeder road that will end up being transferred to the government’s maintenance department for repairs. This calls for better planning at the beginning and better monitoring during implementation.

In spite of WFP’s excellent performance in meeting and exceeding its quantitative targets (which received an “A” rating), the qualitative shortcomings resulted in a downgrade by one notch to “B” (satisfactory).

Infrastructure (Activity 1.7): UNDP’s small-scale rural infrastructure rehabilitation was the largest component in the COMPASIS project, representing 13 percent of the overall project budget, and more than 40% of UNDP’s budget. Stakeholders were consulted at all levels, and $30,000 was allocated to support each of the 17 suco development plans, totaling $510,000, half of which went to water systems. In the end, 26 infrastructure projects were rolled-out, 17 in Ermera and 9 in Oecusse. (The reason for the greater number of projects was that Ermera identified a number of small projects).

The infrastructure component was based on another UNDP/UNCDF project, Local Government Support Project (LGSP) and the government’s Local Development Program (LDP), which prioritized rural infrastructure. At the government’s request, the infrastructure component followed the guidelines established on the LDP, including project identification, prioritization, assessment, procurement and contracting of local companies for each individual project, where documentation was submitted to and shared by the District Administrator or District Assemblies of Oecusse and Ermera with UNDP and the Ministry of State Administration. This process required UNDP to undertake capacity assessments at the national and district levels, and to negotiate a Letter of Agreement (LoA) between UNDP and the government, which caused a delay in the implementation process.

It is difficult to measure the impact of the small-scale rural infrastructure component. Nevertheless, it is clear that agriculture and infrastructure were the government’s top priorities for rural areas, and the government is in the process of rolling out a similar small-scale rural infrastructure scheme (National Program for Village Development – PNDS) involving $50,000 per suco, totaling $300 million over an 8-year period, with 15% funding from AusAid. So, the structure and delivery method of UNDP’s infrastructure component were consistent with the government’s emphasis on rural development. Also, comments from national, district and suco officials recorded in PSC and District Assembly meetings and during interviews for the evaluation indicate that rural infrastructure was much needed and much appreciated. Indeed, the communities had requested basic needs such as better access to water, rehabilitation of bridges, irrigation canals, schools, etc., which is what the project delivered. Six mini infrastructure projects were delivered through a Local Community Contract modality or KIK1, which provided more direct benefits to the communities as they were executed directly by the communities.

1 KKK projects involve direct community implementation, a modality that is used when there are not enough suppliers making realistic bids on a project
It is clear that the infrastructure component was aligned with the priorities of the government and the communities, and the activities were equally focused on the income generating and food security outputs of Objective 1 and the service delivery outputs of Objective 2. However, it is not clear if this 50-50 split was by design or happenstance, which is discussed in more detail in the next section. Nevertheless, as this component met and exceeded the target number of infrastructure projects, it has been given an “A” rating (highly satisfactory).

Even though each infrastructure project went through a highly consultative process of prioritization and selection where decisions were taken by the District Assembly, there was some evidence of tension from sucos that felt they did not receive their full $30,000 allocation (where unused funds from some projects were diverted to other sucos for a number of small projects prioritized by the District Assembly). Also there was some evidence of tension between the central and district levels of government, which appeared to reflect differing attitudes towards the pace of the government’s decentralization process. It appears that the districts need capacity building before the central government is willing to allocate more authority over budgets and establishing priorities.

Table 4: Summary of Quantitative Results By Activity: Objective 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Component</th>
<th>Project Results/Achievements and Comments</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 1</td>
<td>Did the project achieve its planned outputs and objectives and how satisfactory was the achievement?</td>
<td>• Highly Satisfactory (A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Reduce extreme poverty among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based enterprises, skills training and post-training support | Output 1: Improved income generation and food security for vulnerable groups through community mobilization  
• 1.1: UNDP supported the establishment/strengthening of 81 SHGs: 81% of target (100)  
• 1.2: ILO identified 32 business service providers and provided training in BDS and financial literacy: 107% of target (30)  
• 1.3: ILO supported training of 783 (433 women and 354 men) from 40 SHGs for vocational training under SEFOPE: 366% of target (200)  
• 1.4: FAO provided agricultural-based livelihood skills in home garden, post-harvest and livestock activities to 2,582 beneficiaries from 134 SHGs and 14 extension workers (pigs died, seeds came late): 112% of target (120);  
• 1.5: UNDP cancelled the micro-finance component and concentrated on developing the internal savings and credits schemes of SHGs, focusing on developing CAF capacities  
• 1.6: WFP increased the rural assets of 6,525 beneficiaries (3,518 male and 3,007 female) through distribution of 609 mt of food, 126 FFW schemes, 163 km of feeder road, 67 ha SALT, 15 km of irrigation, 10 km of fencing, construction of 1 school unit, improvement of 150 sqm of water reservoir and 4 fish ponds: 286%, 111% & 166% of targets (2,280, 547 mt, 76 FFW)  
• 1.7: UNDP supported 28 rural infrastructure projects: 165% of target (17)  
• 1.8: FAO provided technical support and post-harvest equipment to 50 SHGs (650 members) and 425 storage silos to reduce post harvest losses: 100% and 106% of targets (50, 400)  
• 1.9: FAO provided integrated agriculture activities to 40 SHGs (620 beneficiaries): 133% and 103% of targets (30, 600); | • Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• Satisfactory (B)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• N/A  
• Satisfactory (B)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A) |
Qualitative Assessment of Objective 1

A detailed assessment of the multi-sectoral approach used under Objective 1 to reduce poverty in rural communities would require a comparison of achievements against targets. Unfortunately, the indicators do not lend themselves to such analysis – as the rate of agricultural productivity, undernourishment, poverty and post-harvest losses were not measured in the targeted communities before and after the project. Nevertheless, it is possible to undertake an overall assessment of the two interrelated outputs under Objective 1, income generation and food security.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the project generated a greater amount of food production and a greater amount of savings and income in COMPASIS communities – where for example, SHG savings were used to purchase food during food insecure periods, in particular during the rainy season. In this case, better management of household income contributed to improvements in food security and increased food production contributed to increased incomes (but we don’t know how much of an increase the project was responsible for).

In hindsight, Objective 1 should have been divided into two separate outputs: one focused on increased income generation and the second on improved food security. This would have provided a platform for greater inter-agency coordination for each output, with ILO and UNDP focusing on income generation, and FAO and WFP concentrating on agricultural production and food security. At the operational level, this may have improved linkages between the two outputs – linkages that were implicit in the project design but not made explicit in the intervention logic. For example, improvements in agricultural productivity would have led to greater levels of income, and increased income would have led to improvements in food security and nutrition.

The focus of the infrastructure components adds another dimension to the targeted approach that could have been used to improve the focus and impact of Objective 1. Decision-making under each agency’s infrastructure component followed a different set of priorities: UNDP’s infrastructure activities were aligned with projects prioritized by the suco development plans and the district assemblies, WFP’s activities were decided by local project review committees, and FAO’s were decided in conjunction with MAF. As a result, while FAO’s infrastructure component was focused on increasing food production and reducing post-harvest losses (Objective 1), WFP’s infrastructure activities were not specifically integrated into Objective 1’s food security objectives. By contrast, UNICEF’s WASH infrastructure was targeted directly to Output 3 of Objective 2. The decision-making structure on UNDP’s infrastructure component provided reasonable assurance that projects would be targeted toward COMPASIS’s objectives. However, there did not appear to be a well-defined plan targeting the amount and type of infrastructure projects to support the income and food security outputs under Objective 1. This would have entailed designing a more targeted approach towards activities associated with income generation (e.g., industry-related infrastructure, such as coffee dryers) and food security (e.g., increased agricultural productivity through construction of irrigation canals). Nevertheless, as events unfolded during the course of the project, UNDP’s infrastructure component ended up being focused equally on objectives 1 and 2, providing access to water (half the number of projects or 23% of the budget), irrigation systems (37% of the budget), roads and bridges (26%) and schools (14%).

The danger in a haphazard approach to infrastructure development is that by following varied priorities that are established outside of the project design and decision making mechanisms, this could lead to the construction of inappropriate “white elephants”, such as unnecessary roads, schools or bridges that may seem desirable at the time or may meet individual or political interests, but do not serve the community in appropriate ways.

The approach that the project ended up adopting may have resulted from the realities encountered during project implementation, where the level of entrepreneurial activity in the communities was
not deemed sufficient to support more industry-related infrastructure. By the same token, the level of food production may have not been sufficient to increase agricultural yields by very much. In order to address these issues, more investment would be needed in agricultural infrastructure, marketing, etc. But this was not the focus of the COMPASIS project.

The evaluation did not explore the infrastructure components in enough detail to make any pronouncements beyond the recommendation to make sure that future infrastructure projects follow a targeted plan that is integrated with the objectives of the project. This is something that should be considered in the government’s future plans, particularly in its short-term suco development program (PNDS), where income generation and food security activities could be integrated into targeted suco economic and infrastructure development plans. But this approach also applies to the long-term strategies involved in the establishment of a series of ‘national strategic zones’ that are designed to transform rural areas through large-scale investments in infrastructure and agriculture, where for example the plan for Oecusse involves attracting billions of dollars in investments for plantation agriculture, fish processing, a port and a free trade zone; and the plan for Ermera involves establishing new coffee estates and food processing industries.

3.2.2 Objective 2: Promote social inclusion in the service delivery system

The results for Objective 2 were not as consistent as those for Objective 1, which may stem from the fact that it contained a less cohesive array of outputs that were broadly focused on the delivery of social services, involving literacy, family planning, child and maternal health, water, sanitation and hygiene. In fact, this component went through a separate design process, which was requested by the ministries, and the resulting structure attempted to wrap a diverse set of outputs under a single banner promoting ‘social inclusion in service delivery’. Putting aside any weakness in the design of this objective, the following section assesses the three components (outputs) that were implemented by UNICEF (outputs 1 and 3) and UNFPA (output 2).

Output 1: Literacy (Activities 2.1, 2.2 & 2.3): UNICEF had been working with youth in Timor-Leste prior to COMPASIS and found that the illiteracy rate among the 15-24 age group in the target areas was over 50%. In attempting to address the correlation between high literacy rates and poverty, UNICEF targeted out-of-school children that may have missed their chance at obtaining an education because they and their parents may not have recognized the value of education or may have been caught up in the conflict – products of the so-called “lost generation”.

Between 2010 and 2012, UNICEF met or exceeded the quantitative targets under the literacy component, involving the number of literacy kits produced (3,600), tutors trained (82) and literacy classes supported (50). However, in 2011 UNICEF undertook an in-depth assessment in the communities and discovered that the literacy classes were attracting a large number of adults but very few youths. This was largely because the counterpart institution, the Department of Recurrent Education in the Ministry of Education, had a broader mandate than the 15-24 age group that UNICEF was targeting. This created challenges for UNICEF to implement its youth-targeted activities. In 2012, in an attempt to identify the specific problems at the community level, UNICEF undertook further in-depth assessments, which revealed some pertinent findings: 1) there was a high degree of subsistence farming where youth were expected to help their parents in the fields, 2) there was little demand for literacy, as there was a high level of unemployment among those who were educated, and there was no remedial education program to coordinate education into career paths, 3) there was no community buy-in, as the target group had not been sensitized to the value of an education, 4) the tutors were not qualified or motivated, and did not use techniques that would engage youth, and the salaries for the tutors were not effectively distributed (taking up to 6 months in some cases), and 5) the youth lacked role models, as parents didn’t always understand the value of education.

In response to these assessments and consultations, UNICEF changed its strategy in 2013, and decided to target youth more directly through the Secretary of State for Youth and Sports, which supports youth activities through district-based youth centres. Because of resource constraints, UNICEF could only afford to implement a pilot project and decided to work in
Ermera only. The pilot project is financing 5 literacy classes with one focal point per suco, one overall coordinator, and five tutors/teachers. The idea is to mobilize communities through the sucos and parents by establishing a “strategic partners group” (SPG), introduce community-based planning by consulting with youth to determine where and when to hold the literacy classes and in the selection of the tutors, initiate a public awareness campaign, and include life-skills training. The Ministry of Education is still involved, but only for training the tutors, transferring payments and testing students before and after. The pilot program was being conducted through the Gleno Youth Centre during the time of the evaluation (June 2013), so the results were not available. The hope is that the program will be picked up by other youth centres and sucos, where they are hoping that the lessons learned will be taken up by the MoE, and incorporated into the government’s on-going plan to continue literacy in rural areas.

It is evident that the UNICEF literacy component had difficulty in identifying and meeting the youth target in its component. The implementation team did not have a dedicated, community-based staff in the community, and at first they tried to rely on existing programs in the Department of Recurrent Education. This was not sufficient to tackle the youth literacy problem. However, by undertaking detailed assessments at the community level, UNICEF may be able to come up with lessons learned that have broad applicability for literacy training in rural areas throughout Timor-Leste and other remote areas. As a result, because it managed to salvage some results through a pilot project, this component received a “B” rating (satisfactory).

Output 2: Family Planning (Activities 2.4, 2.5 & 2.6): UNFPA’s goal was to increase awareness of maternal and child health issues in the target communities, which were selected because of their high fertility rates. The primary cause of the high fertility rates was assumed to be a lack of information and high levels of poverty. As a result, UNFPA’s program involved providing awareness on family planning at the community level (through SHGs) and producing and distributing educational materials through Health Centres at the sub-district level. They produced a film on family planning, about “birth spacing”, which the Ministry of Health has used country-wide, and they also made use of community radio to broadcast public service announcements on family planning.

Achievement of the quantitative targets in the family planning component was below average in relation to the other components. Activity 2.4 achieved 43% of the target, reaching only 30% of SISCa program initiatives; and while all 17 family planning focal points were trained under Activity 2.5, they were not used effectively; finally, only 67% of the target number of SHGs were engaged in Activity 2.6. There are a number of reasons for the lack of achievement on this component, ranging from staffing problems, funding delays and difficulties in dealing with behaviour change in a short timeframe: i) Staffing: in an attempt to provide information on family planning at the community level, UNFPA tried to establish focal point volunteers in the SHGs; however, there was a high turnover among the volunteers, primarily because the pay was low ($40) and MoH experienced long delays in payments; ii) The transfer of funds took a circuitous route, from the funding agency to UNFPA to the Ministry of Health (central level) to MoH (district level); iii) Changing behaviour takes time, and COMPASIS was a short project.

Internally, UNFPA did not have the correct staffing profile or systems to manage a community-based behaviour-change project. The agency did not have a great deal of experience on implementation of field level projects, as they normally work at the national level to influence policy and design national strategies, rather than working on behaviour change at the community level. However, UNFPA did have an on-going behaviour change and communication (BCC) project, which was aimed at engaging communities, so there were opportunities to develop synergies between the two projects (as COMPASIS was involved in changing behaviour and providing better access to health care services, where for example roads were designed to provide better access to health centres, etc.). In their own estimation, the COMPASIS project strategy and approach were good, but UNFPA’s component was poorly implemented: they should have strengthened their staff and coordination to emphasize field level activities, mentoring, etc.; and they did not put in place sustainability components such as building the capacity of the MoH to take up the advocacy components. In the past few months, in an attempt to complete the family
planning component, UNFPA has contracted an international consultant with experience in community mobilization and behaviour change, so they may be able to salvage some results.

Measuring the impact of this component would have been difficult. Anecdotal information suggests that some target beneficiaries are interested in family planning issues. And UNFPA did establish a baseline at the district level, including undertaking a profile of 528 SHG members in Ermera, which has seen an increase in contraception. So, while UNFPA has a community-based consultant on contract, they should take the opportunity to measure the impact of this component, including changes in behaviour.

However, at the moment there is no new agreement with the government, so making the arrangements to transfer UNFPA’s advocacy programs to MoH may be delayed. As a result of these shortcomings, and the delay in devising a revised project strategy, this component has received a “C” rating (marginally satisfactory).

Output 3: Increased capacity of service providers in planning and executing community-based water, sanitation and primary health/hygiene schemes (Activities 2.7, 2.8 & 2.9): The WASH component involved 3 activities, all of which were implemented through government departments, which was designed to build their capacity, and all of which surpassed the planned targets: a) providing communities and primary schools with access to improved water sources (15 will be completed by August 2013, surpassing the target of 8 by 188%; b) providing rural communities access to improved sanitation, with 15 communities declaring ODF and 4 verified, surpassing the target by 158%; and c) providing primary school students with access to information on improved hygiene practices, reaching 1,628 students or 108% of the target. In general, UNICEF WASH used community motivation tactics and techniques to initiate community ownership and to keep communities motivated:

a) The water component was implemented in conjunction with the National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation (DNSAS) of Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) and Water and Sanitation Services (SAS) at the district level, which involved establishing a partnership approach at the community level, where UNICEF supplied materials and technical experts such as masons, and the community supplied labour. This involved establishing water users groups (WUGs) to identify the issues and priorities, supporting training on the operation and maintenance of water supply systems and providing a toolkit for maintenance and repair. Each WUG nominates a technician at the village level to take responsibility for maintaining the water system. By establishing the water groups and maintenance technicians, the intention was to empower communities to maintain the water systems on their own. UNICEF also supported training of government technicians (sub-district facilitators, SDFs), who would oversee the water users groups to make sure they were motivated and maintained a healthy membership. A community-level savings fund was also created to pay for small damages to the system, and for larger repairs, they are hoping to create a similar fund through the government.

b) The sanitation program was implemented through the Ministry of Health, with facilitators supported by UNICEF. The process commenced by a mapping of villages, providing the community with information to mobilize and motivate them into declaring “open defecation free” (ODF) areas, and then encouraging the community to develop an action plan. A district level WASH committee was established, which was responsible for verifying and certifying the ODF areas. Also, as part of the community motivation process, family health facilitators (PSFs) tried to provide “triggers” to keep the communities motivated. In addition, UNICEF encouraged the establishment of Sanitation Business Groups (SBGs), which involved identifying skilled labourers to provide latrine building services – in effect, creating a market for the building of latrines by empowering the community to recognize the benefits of ODF and using latrines. This community motivation approach is part of UNICEF’s global program, called Community-Level Total Sanitation (CLTS), which is moving away from providing subsidies for sanitation. However, it should be noted that UNDP’s infrastructure component under COMPASIS was providing funding for latrines, sometimes without the communities being ODF, which caused some inconsistencies in the project as a whole.

8 A “community action plan” (CAP) process involved identification of water users groups.
c) The primary school hygiene, water and sanitation sub-component was provided through the appropriate government departments (DNSA of MoPW and Health Promotion Department of MoH). To avoid the risk of schools’ WASH facilities not being properly maintained and to minimize conflicts arising between the communities and the schools (where communities had claimed that schools are using too much water), UNICEF developed a process of combining the school and community approaches together. In this approach, the parent teachers association (PTA) members were involved in the WUGs and they jointly oversaw the maintenance of water supply in schools.

Apart from involving the appropriate government institutions, the WASH component contracted local district-based NGOs to implement specific parts of the programs, such as facilitating the community triggering sessions. However, the evaluation found that often the NGOs found it easier to deal directly with the community groups and did not always keep the district level SAS departments informed, which caused some minor tension at the district level. This reinforces the need to build the capacity of district-level stakeholders in providing services.

This component was able to support the building of a greater number of water and sanitation facilities in communities and schools because unspent funds ($121,000) were transferred from UNICEF’s Literacy. As a result, it received an “A” rating (highly satisfactory).

Table 5: Summary of Quantitative Results By Output: Objective 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Project Results/Achievements</th>
<th>Comments/Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 2</strong></td>
<td>Did the project achieve its planned outputs and objectives and how satisfactory was the achievement?</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Promote social inclusion in the service delivery system** | **Output 1**: Increased education participation of out of school children (UNICEF-Literacy)  
- 2.1: Distributed 3,600 literacy kits for literacy classes: 103% of target (3500)  
- 2.2: Trained and equipped 82 literacy tutors (48m 32w) in basic literacy delivery skills (10 planned for 2013 pilot): 92% of target (100)  
- 2.3: Supported 150 literacy classes for 2,240 participants (39 classes or 720 participants to level 2), with 5 planned for 2013 pilot: 103% of target (150), but few youth participated | • Satisfactory (B)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• Satisfactory (B)  
• Marginally Satisfactory (C) |
| **UNFPA** | **Output 2**: Increased community awareness of maternal and child health  
- 2.4: Expanded availability of family planning and reproductive health information by developing and disseminating materials through 30% of SISCA program: 43% of target (70%)  
- 2.5: Incorporated family planning and reproductive health issues into training modules of Family Health Promoters and supported the training of 17 Family Health Promoters at the district level: 100% of target (17); FPs were trained but were not used effectively  
- 2.6: Orientated 54 self help groups to family planning and reproductive health issues: 67% of target (70) | • Marginally Satisfactory (C)  
• Unsatisfactory (D)  
• Marginally Satisfactory (C)  
• Marginally Satisfactory (C) |
| **UNICEF-WASH** | **Output 3**: Capacity of service providers in planning and executing community-based water, sanitation and primary health/hygiene schemes increased  
- 2.7: Provided 9 (15 by 2013) primary schools and communities with access to improved water sources, benefiting 2,235 people: 113% (188%) of target (8)  
- 2.8: Provided 30 rural communities (1,798 families) access to improved sanitation; with 15 declared ODF (4 verified): 158% of target (19)  
- 2.9: Provided 1628 students with access to information on improved hygiene practices: 108% of target (1500) | • Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A)  
• Highly Satisfactory (A) |
3.2.3 Assessment of Community Mobilization and Empowerment

Community mobilization techniques are a common thread running through the successful components on the COMPASIS project. The self-help group concept was an integral part of the project design, and it was perhaps initially assumed that the other agencies would simply use UNDP’s SHG structure in their components. And this happened to some extent, where ILO and UNFPA used UNDP’s SHGs for their activities. However, each agency was responsible for its own targets and achievements, so it was not always possible to synchronize activities. For example, FAO ended up targeting 134 SHGs; and WFP assisted over double the target number of beneficiaries in its FFW schemes, which were identified and prioritized by local project review committees. Also, other UN agencies were quick to establish their own community mobilization techniques, based on their own experiences. For example, in identifying issues associated with access to water, UNICEF’s team encouraged the establishment of water users groups (WUGs) and appointed water maintenance technicians. Under the sanitation component, WASH committees were established at the district level to verify and certify communities’ ODF practices, sanitation business groups (SBGs) were established at the community level to create a market for latrine building services, and family health facilitators (PSFs) tried to keep communities motivated. Also, in an attempt to go beyond the savings and credit activities of the SHGs, ILO/IADE recognized the importance of organizing business-oriented groups by encouraging “business group formulation” (BGF). Other adjustments took place during implementation. For example, UNDP found it necessary to strengthen SHGs by contracting four additional community activation facilitators (CAFs) by sub-contracting FEO.

This leads to the realization that there are a number of ways to organize groups at the community level, where each group performs a different function in the community mobilization process. In activities where community group formulation was not tailored specifically for an activity, the results tended to be less successful. For example, UNICEF’s literacy component tried to rely on the Department of Recurrent Education’s program of activities and their tutors. And, although UNFPA did appoint local family planning “focal points”, these were volunteers selected from SHGs who were expected to distribute information on family planning, rather than being skilled facilitators trained in community motivation. The UNICEF literacy component has since changed its strategy and is now establishing ‘strategic partners groups’ (SPGs) in an attempt to sensitize communities to the value of basic literacy by involving youth, parents and suco leaders in the target communities. And UNFPA has hired an international consultant with experience in community engagement.

The previous section highlighted some shortcomings in the multi-sectoral approach utilized under Objective 1 in improving income and food security. The question remains under Objective 2 is whether there are ways to synergize service delivery in remote areas? In attempting to empower communities by introducing community mobilization techniques, behaviour change was identified as a critical element (whether involving perceptions of savings and credit, business or management of water systems, hygiene practices, etc.). However, community mobilization techniques will only go so far within a short timeframe. Although most of the activities under Objective 2 were within the bounds of behaviour change and community empowerment (literacy, family planning, sanitation, hygiene, minor maintenance to water systems), some activities went beyond what community mobilization techniques can be expected to accomplish in a 3-year pilot project. For example, although family planning information can be distributed to raise community awareness, the value of ‘birth spacing’ may not become evident until the economic situation for rural women improves to such an extent that they understand the benefit of having an education or running a business, which in turn may lead to reduced birth rates. Currently, children in rural areas provide necessary functions for household and farming activities by helping around the house, babysitting, farming or selling items at the market. So, a change in the mind-set is needed.

Although community mobilization was a common thread running through the project, only a few indicators were designed to monitor improvements in performance associated with group
behaviour (activities 1.1, 2.7 and 2.8). Nevertheless, it is evident that there are advantages to group formulation in terms of shared savings, decision-making and increased trust. SHGs were instrumental in changing people’s behaviour by demonstrating the value of managing fluctuating income through group savings, disciplined bookkeeping and regular weekly meetings. Within the SHGs, behaviour change was a result of a great deal of handholding support provided by the CAFs, which had a profound effect on women in particular, giving them confidence in the management of income and home affairs in general. Similarly, other groups were able to facilitate other community change processes involving water systems, sanitation, hygiene, home gardening, literacy, business activities, etc. By encouraging group activity, community motivation techniques helped to build social capital and a renewed sense of community, which empowered people and improved the effectiveness of the integrated activities on the COMPASIS project.

But a 3-year project is short time in which to make communities more resilient. A large number of donor-funded projects are operating throughout the rural areas of Timor-Leste, each providing some aspect of community mobilization. But what are the next steps in transforming these communities to a state of self-sufficiency? Government departments and donor agencies can’t keep supplementing the basic needs of rural communities through successive projects. The COMPASIS project provided some lessons in the short term to translate community mobilization into empowerment by involving group activity (SHGs, WASH, SBGs, SPGs, etc.). But in the long-term, there will be a need to provide links to markets, jobs and improved service delivery. COMPASIS provided a model for integrated planning and implementation in remote rural areas that went beyond the provision of infrastructure to include community mobilization. The sections of this report on impact and sustainability provide some suggestions for continuing these processes; it is up to the government to take the lessons learned and incorporate them in future programs. These ‘next steps’ will require more handholding, training and technical assistance; and they will also require separating entrepreneurs from those interested in simply having access to savings to manage the household income. If there is going to be some progression from SHGs to production-oriented cooperatives, this will require another change in the mindset with respect to entrepreneurship, first by encouraging participants to form business groups, then providing targeted training. This will also require an effort in providing better linkages to markets (or self-employment opportunities), access to finance and additional training so that people can see the benefits and rewards of risking their savings or borrowed capital. Similarly, changing people’s perceptions towards literacy and family planning will take time and opportunities, such as improved economic opportunities that demonstrate the value of an education.

3.4 Project Management and Implementation

This section reviewed the management and implementation structures to ascertain whether they were suited to the effective implementation of project activities and achievement of the overall objectives. It also involved a review of project financing for delivering the results, and a review of expenditure by agency and by year.

Management and Oversight

In the context of the crisis, and the fact that state institutions were in the process of being established and developed, the UN country program in Timor-Leste operated under a direct execution (DEX) modality. From 2009 onwards, project level implementation followed a direct implementation (DIM) modality. In the case of COMPASIS, six UN agencies took the lead in designing and implementing their separate components under the framework of a ‘joint program’. Under the DEX/DIM modality, there are expectations for UN agencies to build national capacities, where the Country Office ascertains the strengths and weaknesses of national capacities during the project formulation stage. As a result, some of COMPASIS’s components were partly implemented by the government: for example, ILO’s country program was embedded into various government institutions, providing TA, training and resources to those institutions; and UNDP’s infrastructure component followed government procurement procedures but paid the contractors directly.
As the lead UN agency for the project, UNDP was responsible for overall coordination of activities involving the other UN agencies and the government counterpart institutions. This involved 18 separate activities delivered through 8 components. To facilitate this coordination role, a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was established to organize the separate activities being implemented by the UN agencies and government institutions. The PIU was comprised of an International Coordinator, a National Coordinator and two Finance and Administration Associates based in Dili\(^9\). The role of the Coordinators was to ‘coordinate’ the components of the other agencies, not to ‘manage’ their inputs. In addition, two district teams were established in Ermera and Oecusse, with each comprising a District Project Officer, two CAFs and an engineer (in 2012)\(^10\). The District Project Officers were responsible for coordinating the activities of the project components at the district level. To ensure close collaboration with district administration, the district team offices were located in the same compound or in close proximity to the district administration offices. This aided coordination at the district-level, which was important because personnel assigned to the COMPASIS project from the UN agencies were not always full time, nor were they based in the districts.

Overall guidance on behalf of the government was provided by a Project Steering Committee (PSC), which was chaired at the highest level by the Vice-Minister of Economy and Development (up to July 2012, and following the Elections by the Minister of State Administration), with representatives from the Ermera and Oecusse District Administration, appropriate line ministries and each of the UN agencies. The project was originally coordinated under the Ministry for Economy and Development (MED) through District Administrators who were responsible for coordinating activities in Ermera and Oecusse. After 2012, MED was disbanded and the project was coordinated by the Ministry for State Administration (MSA), specifically the Local Development Department with responsibility for rural development.

**Contribution of the UN Agencies**

In implementing the separate components, the project utilized a multi-layered approach where each agency used its own management teams and implementation systems. Following a broad-brush design process, each agency undertook detailed community-level assessments and designed their activities accordingly, using a combination of teams, boards and committees to assess the needs, establish priorities and maintain consultations during implementation. For example, WFP’s activities were based on a joint assessment conducted by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) between December 2009 and March 2010, following which activities were coordinated with its district team based in Oecusse and local authorities. FAO supported implementation through its regular staff and program activities, coordinating activities through MAF extension workers and one staff based in Oecusse. ILO activities were coordinated through district teams comprised of CDE and SEFOPE staff. UNFPA coordinated activities through the District Health Services in conjunction with a team of family planning focal points. UNICEF WASH coordinated its activities with the National Directorate of Water and Sanitation at the central and district levels, supported by an international WASH Chief and 2 national engineers. UNICEF literacy worked through district level Recurrent Education departments and tutors contracted through the Ministry of Education.

In addition, each agency had its own approach for involving government implementing partners. For example, UNDP used a Letter of Agreement (LoA) with the government for the infrastructure component and contracted a local NGO for SHG support, and ILO worked through existing relationships with its counterpart institutions (IADE/SEFOPE). Also, the project was based on a “parallel funding” modality where each agency signed a specific funding agreement directly with

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\(^9\) Up to August 2012 there were 2 (one per district), up to October 2012 there was 1, and from October to the end of the project there was no project Finance Associate, only PRE Unit support.

\(^10\) 2 engineers were hired for the infrastructure component (12 months in Oecusse and 16 in Ermera)
the funding agency (UNTFHS), allowing each agency to maintain a degree of independence in budgeting and implementation of their components.

**Coordination**

As a result of the separate agency implementation processes, a great deal of coordination was required at the national and district levels, organized by the Project Coordinators and District Project Officers. The coordination process was aided by a series of meetings at the district level (quarterly meetings of the District Project Coordination Units, DPCUs), which coordinated the planning and implementation activities of the separate agencies and government departments, in particular those activities targeting SHGs under Objective 1. A high degree of coordination at the district level is very important on a project of this nature, not only to coordinate the community-based activities between the six different UN agencies, but also to avoid duplication with other donor agencies and NGOs working in the target districts. An example of coordination between donor agencies and government departments was evident in UNICEF’s water systems activities destined for Passabe and Nitibe sub-districts in Oecusse, where UNICEF and Oecusse Public Works identified that Passabe had already been targeted by a USAID project, and as a result all COMPASIS resources were allocated to Nitibe sub-district. Communication is also important for managing expectations at the community level, as some communities have come to expect a similar level of support as their neighbouring communities. For example, one COMPASIS community was expecting to receive latrines because an adjacent community received latrines under an EU-funded project. In this respect, the project team tried to lower the villagers’ expectations at the start of the project by holding a sensitization process in March 2011 to outline what could realistically be expected from the COMPASIS project.

Overall, COMPASIS’s flexible approach to implementation seemed to work well, where each UN agency was able to focus on its specialized role, while inputs were coordinated through meetings held in the districts. Some joint programs are constrained by overly bureaucratic guidelines, policies and strict financial control imposed by the Lead Agency. The flexible process on COMPASIS was aided by a high degree of adaptive management, as most components needed adjustment after start-up, such as reducing the enterprise focus, increasing the concentration on CAFs and establishing various community mobilization groups. However, the hands-off approach to management allowed some slippage to occur in some components, where some adjustments took time to identify, such as redefining the literacy and family planning approaches, and negotiating the use of government procedures for UNDP’s infrastructure component. As a result of this slippage, UNDP applied for and was granted a 6-month no-cost extension to allow UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF to complete the activities on their components.

In this flexible approach to implementation, coordination was left to the district level, where it was difficult to coordinate activities among beneficiaries and UN agencies, as there was little preparation in targeting the beneficiary groups by the different agencies. In the words of the district teams:

“Coordination in a joint project is difficult as each partner is focusing on their respective work plan, so coordination is left to the district level, which has little capacity”.

“Joint program implementation did not function well in 2010 but started to work well from 2011 to the termination of project, especially involving ILO, FAO and UNDP”

There was also a positive element to the district-level coordination, particularly the increased communication and collaboration between district administration, UN agencies and field-based activities:

“One example of the joint program was the improvement of coordination in the District level and agencies involving project implementation meetings, field visits, communication and training in the field”.
The project would have benefited from having a tighter framework for management, coordination and policy issues. For example, a directive should have been established between the agencies on the issue of subsidization of latrine construction (where UNICEF and UNDP had different policies), which would have provided more consistency. And there could have been a more targeted focus for the infrastructure components, focusing more on the income generation and food security outputs of Objective 1. Such a framework would have emphasized the need for greater synergies between the agencies, particularly those focused on income generation and food security, where for example FAO and WFP could have worked closer together to improve agricultural productivity.

Also, a tighter management framework would have prevented delays through a more rigorous system of monitoring and reporting. As it was, each agency was responsible for monitoring its own component, where most agencies tended to submit activity-based reports rather than monitoring progress against the indicators. This was partly because the indicators were too broad to be tracked at the community-level, where, for example, WFP would have had to track the percentage of food insecure households, and FAO needed to track agricultural productivity and post-harvest losses. The difficulty with measuring the indicators was addressed in the MTE, so there is no need to repeat that information here. Nevertheless, in an attempt to achieve better results, most agencies saw the need to track the progress of their components using individual assessments. For example, following assessments in 2011, UNDP saw the need to adjust the enterprise focus and concentrate on strengthening SHGs and CAFs, and ILO/IADE saw the need to simplify the business training materials to meet the needs of the target beneficiaries. UNICEF Literacy spent a great deal of effort trying to figure out how to reach the youth target group, involving consultations and assessments at the district and community levels. Similarly, UNFPA has taken a long time to identify the problem and they still have not come up with a definitive strategy.

For the most part, WFP, UNICEF WASH and FAO experienced fewer implementation problems, primarily because the activities were part of their regular programs. In general, the components that did the best were those that were part of an agency’s regular program, such as ILO’s business training, and particularly those that were suited to community involvement (WASH, FFW). In addition, components also performed well that had a successful track record from previous projects, such as UNDP’s SHG formation and support, where the OCAP project in Oecusse provided several years experience on which to draw.

As a follow up, each agency should undertake a detailed assessment of the impact of their component in order to advise the government on specific interventions that are needed in rural areas. For example, UNICEF/WHO have developed a method for monitoring improved access to water and sanitation through joint monitoring of WASH programs; and FAO and UNICEF have teamed up to monitor improvements in food and nutrition.

**Contribution of Government Implementing Partners**

As COMPASIS used a DEX/DIM modality, involvement of government counterpart institutions in the planning and implementation of activities varied with each agency, based on existing relationships. Both the district and central levels of government were involved in the project to varying degrees. At the national level, UNDP involved MED/MSA to guide project activities at the highest level in the PSC, and involved the Infrastructure Department for its infrastructure component; ILO’s technical and financial resources were embedded into various government institutions (IADE/SEFOPE); UNICEF WASH worked through 3 departments, Ministry of Health for sanitation, DNSAS for water, and Ministry of Public Works for school hygiene; FAO aligned their activities with the policies of the Ministry of Agriculture; UNFPA worked closely with the Ministry of Health, particularly the Integrated Community Health Services unit; and

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\[1\] UNICEF Literacy’s problem was aggravated by the fact that they did not have their own team in the field and relied on the Department of Recurrent Education
UNICEF literacy worked with the Department of Recurrent Education and later the Ministry of State for Youth and Sports. The relations between UN agencies and government implementing partners are outlined in Table 6.

### Table 6: Summary of Objectives, UN Agencies and Implementing Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Participating UN Agency</th>
<th>National Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Intended Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Improved income generation and food security for vulnerable groups through community mobilization</td>
<td>UNDP FAO ILO WFP</td>
<td>MED/MSA MAF SEFOPE, IADE, CEOP MSS, MED/MSA</td>
<td>Development of SHGs, enterprise development, self-employment, food distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Promote social inclusion in the service delivery system</td>
<td>UNICEF Literacy UNFPA WASH UNFPA</td>
<td>Ministry of Education Ministry of Public Works DNSAS and MoH (Health Promotion)</td>
<td>Improved access to literacy, water, sanitation and health, Increased access to family planning and reproductive health services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the district and community levels, the project established a high degree of ownership by locating the district PCUs in close proximity to District Administration offices, through the involvement of district-based committees, and involving District Development Officers in coordinating processes and mobilizing communities. The project also established a high degree of buy-in at the community level by consulting with suco chiefs, SHG members and other community mobilization groups.

To a large extent, the process of ownership transfer appears to be working, where the national levels of government are ready and willing to take over many COMPASIS activities, particularly MSA. Minutes of PSC meetings indicate that the Minister was encouraging UN agencies to prepare to handover activities, and directing government departments to get ready. The DEX/DIM modality provides an easy mechanism to transfer project activities to government departments, as some agencies and departments were already implementing activities. But the extent to which this has been done remains dependent on the capacities of the government departments, and to some extent the speed of implementing the decentralization process.

Some project components have already been integrated into government programs: WASH committees are engaged in verifying and certifying ODF areas at the district level, and responsibility for this program will be taken over by the National Directorate of Environmental Health under Ministry of Health, through the recruitment of an officer at the sub-district level. UNICEF’s “child to child” approach to school hygiene involved training master trainers at the national level, at the MoH and MoE, and school teachers were trained at the community level, who were then supported by NGOs. With respect to water, UNICEF provided training to support government technicians at the sub-district level (sub-district facilitators, SDFs), who would oversee the water users groups to make sure they were motivated. ILO’s activities were already integrated into IADE/SEFOPE’s program of activities, and UNDP’s small-scale infrastructure component will be expanded through the new Village Improvement Program.

However, interviews during the evaluation raise some doubts about the willingness and capacity of some district level institutions to be able to continue supporting and coordinating the activities at the district level. For example, SAS officers were mainly involved in planning and monitoring and do not have the capacity to implement. Also, the district MoH does not appear ready and willing to take over UNFPA’s advocacy role in family planning. Similarly, questions regarding the capacity and willingness of the Department of Recurrent Education to continue the youth literacy initiative in conjunction with the youth centres will have to wait for the results of UNICEF’s pilot project in Ermera. Finally, there is a big question over continued support for
SHGs, as FEEO is being supported by a dwindling number of NGOs and donor-funded projects, and it needs financial assistance to continue its handholding activities.

Although the district institutions may have the willingness to take over the activities, the issue is whether they have the capacity. For example, following COMPASIS’s support for IADE/SEFOPE in Oecusse, the government has not allocated any new funding for 6 months and plans for expansion have been put on hold, which has paralyzed their operations. This suggests that the government is looking at the issue of building capacity in the districts before transferring responsibility. In the interim, many of these lingering project components may have to be coordinated by MSA, perhaps through a grant funding mechanism.

The project’s district coordinators shed some light on the difficulties surrounding coordination at the central and district levels:

“Coordination with government stakeholders without clear contract and commitments is hard.”

“Follow up by government stakeholders will weaken SHG’s sustainability”.

**Financial Management and Project Efficiency**

Financial management was undertaken by each agency independently, and financial reports were completed by each agency in an agreed format, reporting on the parallel funds received and aligning expenses with activities and milestones.

As of February 2013, 85% of the project budget was disbursed, with 15% remaining. Three of the six agencies were behind on expenditures: UNDP had expended $1,184,205 out of a budget allocation of $1,391,000 (85% delivery rate); UNICEF had expended $800,000 out of a budget allocation of $995,100 (80%) and UNFPA had expended $211,000 out of a budget of $300,000 (70%). Table 7 outlines the delivery rates for each agency based on their expenditure figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Organization</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>Share of budget</th>
<th>Expended Feb 2013</th>
<th>Overall Delivery Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Transferred 495,767</td>
<td>943,383</td>
<td>1,391,000</td>
<td>1,391,000</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>1,184,205</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expended 106,829</td>
<td>471,380</td>
<td>1,184,205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery % 21.5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Transferred 347,750</td>
<td>684,800</td>
<td>995,100</td>
<td>995,100</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>799,120</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expended 202,982</td>
<td>540,275</td>
<td>799,120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery % 58.4%</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Transferred 147,130</td>
<td>235,400</td>
<td>235,400</td>
<td>299,600</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>211,362</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expended 4,416</td>
<td>95,243</td>
<td>211,362</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery % 3%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Transferred 302,275</td>
<td>485,780</td>
<td>485,780</td>
<td>524,300</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>480,849</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expended 75,602</td>
<td>287,035</td>
<td>480,849</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery % 25%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Transferred 535,000</td>
<td>385,200</td>
<td>385,200</td>
<td>535,000</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>499,089</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expended 299,696</td>
<td>362,555</td>
<td>499,089</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery % 56%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>130%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Transferred 158,360</td>
<td>276,060</td>
<td>276,060</td>
<td>343,470</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>309,736</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expended 13,849</td>
<td>193,910</td>
<td>309,736</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery % 8.7%</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
<td>112%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Transfers</td>
<td>1,986,822</td>
<td>3,010,623</td>
<td>3,768,540</td>
<td>4,088,470</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3,452,982</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Expended</td>
<td>703,374</td>
<td>1,930,399</td>
<td>3,484,362</td>
<td>Unspent (Feb 2013)</td>
<td>635,488</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Delivery</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Efficiency and Effectiveness**

A number of factors contributed to delays in project start-up and the delivery of some components, prompting the need for a 6-month extension. Staffing of the key UNDP national and international coordinator positions was not undertaken until November 2010 and March 2011, effectively delaying start-up by 9 to 12 months. Staffing by some other UN agencies was also delayed by up to 9 months, with one project staff being recruited in December 2010. During implementation, there was some interruption in human resource inputs as some staff went on extended periods of maternity and study leave (UNICEF Literacy); and UNFPA took some time to identify the staffing profile needed to manage a community-based project.

In spite of these set backs, the project was able to meet most of the intended targets, albeit within an extended period. This was primarily due to the presence of effective coordination teams in Dili, Ermera and Oecusse, and the independent implementation structure adopted by each agency. Project inputs were coordinated through a layered administrative structure that included a PIU in Dili (4 staff) and two district-based PCUs in Oecusse and Ermera (3 staff each). In addition, each agency had a team of staff allocated to the project.

This demonstrates the value of district- and community-level planning and coordination processes involving multiple UN agencies, government departments and local stakeholders. Building consensus on diverse project interventions is a time-consuming undertaking, particularly when the beneficiaries are scattered throughout 17 communities in 4 remote sub-districts. District and community level consultations are particularly important in rural development initiatives because of the multi-stakeholder approach that is needed to support target groups at the village level, involving the transfer of ownership. The district-level coordination processes created synergies in planning and implementation among the different UN agencies and in collaboration with the relevant government departments. What remains is to continue with the process of building empowered communities through government programs.

**Rating or Ranking of Agency Efficiency**

In order to make any judgment on project efficiency, it would be necessary to measure the cost of each component against the achievement of the output. However, financial expenditures were reported by agency not by component, so it would be difficult to make any pronouncements on ‘value for money’. In addition, there was no overall project budget showing each agency’s planned expenditures or coordination costs, as each agency maintained a separate budget with details on activities and staff costs. Nevertheless, it is possible to rank each agency’s performance (against the other agencies) by estimating the achievement of the outputs against the delivery and expenditure rates. By this method, which is very subjective, UNICEF WASH was ranked the highest (1) and UNFPA the lowest (9). A component for “coordination” has been added to UNDP’s components because this involved a specific function which was independent from each agency’s component, and which had an additional cost of approximately $400,000, or 28% of UNDP’s budget (10% of the overall project budget). See Table 8. In Table 9, overall management and implementation received a “B” rating (satisfactory).

### Table 8: Ranking of Efficiency by Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency (Component)</th>
<th>Output (Adjustment)</th>
<th>Expenditure (% of Agency)</th>
<th>Delivery</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP (SHGs)</td>
<td>81% (with extra emphasis on strengthening SHGs and CAFs)</td>
<td>$481,000 (35%)</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP (Infrastructure)</td>
<td>165% of target (but not necessarily directed towards COMPASIS)</td>
<td>$510,000 (37%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP (Coordination)</td>
<td>10 staff in 3 offices, 2 DPCUs and a PSC</td>
<td>$400,000 (28%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO (BDS training)</td>
<td>366% of target (low level of business skills to work with)</td>
<td>$343,470</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Above target (increase in food)</td>
<td>$524,300</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Agriculture) production</td>
<td>WFP (FFW)</td>
<td>Above target (long-term food insecurity remains an issue)</td>
<td>$535,000</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF (WASH)</td>
<td>Above target, used specialized community mobilization techniques (additional $121,000 from literacy)</td>
<td>$725,000 (73%)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF (Literacy)</td>
<td>Met targets (but few youth participated, unspent funds transferred to WASH)</td>
<td>$270,000 (27%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA (Family Planning)</td>
<td>Marginally satisfactory performance</td>
<td>$299,600</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Summary of Project Management and Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Component</th>
<th>Achievements/ Comments</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Management &amp; Implementation</td>
<td>UNDP coordinated the implementation of the project in a manner that was consistent with the design, particularly in view of the amount of collaboration that was required, both among the other UN agencies and particularly at the district and community levels</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive management</td>
<td>• COMPASIS provided a flexible mechanism for decision-making, which suited the project structure and objectives</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M &amp; E and reporting</td>
<td>• Reporting tools and templates were adequate, and some adjustments were made at the mid point, but there should have been better on-going monitoring of results by each agency</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project efficiency and timeliness of implementation</td>
<td>• 3 of the 6 agencies experienced delays in disbursements which affected delivery</td>
<td>Marginally satisfactory (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project budget and duration</td>
<td>• The 3 year timeframe was short to be very effective, but this was adequate for a pilot project</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial management</td>
<td>• Some agencies raised parallel funding through their own programs, which increased the impact</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder involvement and relevance</td>
<td>• COMPASIS was highly participatory and its collaborative planning and implementation processes helped districts to coordinate project inputs.</td>
<td>Highly satisfactory (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of UN Agencies</td>
<td>• UN agencies tended to plan together, but stuck to their specialized mandates during implementation</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of IPs</td>
<td>• Involvement of government implementing partners varied with each agency based on existing relationships</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress toward overall objectives</td>
<td>• UNDP provided critical coordination and support for the project objectives: 1) Improved income generation and food security, and 2) Improving service delivery</td>
<td>Satisfactory (B)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 ACHIEVEMENT OF HIGHER LEVEL GOALS

Higher Level UN Goals (DaO, Human Security, MDGs & Cross-cutting Issues)

Over the past few decades, UN agencies have shifted their focus to the policy level, providing policy guidance and advice to governments at the national level, rather than supporting direct interventions at the community level. The fact that COMPASIS was designed as a direct delivery project implemented under a DEX/DIM modality is an indication of the special context in which it was conceived. At the time, there was a need for a direct intervention approach to address the underlying causes that led to the 2006-2008 conflict.

The joint project involved combining the activities of six UN agencies to address the multi-sectoral needs of communities in several remote rural areas on a pilot basis, while attempting to meet many of the government’s priority areas, as well as those associated with the MDGs (water, sanitation, hygiene, literacy, etc.). Because of the project’s independent implementation structure and the parallel funding modality, there is some evidence to suggest that COMPASIS functioned as 8 separate projects (SHG support, business training, agriculture, FFW, literacy, family planning, WASH and infrastructure). This independent nature of delivery is common among joint programs, where UN agencies tend to ‘plan together’ but do not necessarily ‘deliver together’. Each agency is limited by its mandate to provide specialized services ranging from water and sanitation to literacy to business training, etc. Many UN agencies are taking a similar joint or multi-sectoral approach to addressing problems in Timor-Leste, which currently has 5 joint programs, in addition to other combined efforts to tackle the problem of food and nutrition (FAO and UNICEF), and joint monitoring for WASH (UNICEF and WHO). This is an indication that COMPASIS was using an appropriate modality, particularly for supporting the needs of rural communities.

In this respect, the project met expectations for improving the lives of rural communities by promoting community mobilization activities through group savings and loans, and a range of other community empowerment mechanisms involving improvements to water management, sanitation, income generation, etc. The group activity surrounding SHGs was particularly important for empowering women in managing household income. As a result, in the case of COMPASIS, this “bottom-up” approach can be used to provide guidance to government policies on supporting rural areas, as there are significant lessons to be learned from the project interventions, particularly in community mobilization and empowerment.

During the project implementation period (2010-2013), the human security situation improved dramatically. By September 2011, conditions had improved enough to allow the government and UNMIT to sign a Joint Transition Plan (JTP) to prepare for UNMIT’s withdrawal by the end of 2012. The elections in 2012 signaled that a certain degree of peace and stability had been achieved, and the private sector began investing again. Following this, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste completed its mandate on December 31, 2012, and the UN agencies moved to a new phase of the country’s development, focusing on institutional strengthening and development.

The lessons in joint programming in Timor-Leste have only begun to be realized. As the UN system enters a new phase of development, perhaps lessons learned from joint projects like COMPASIS will provide the means to improve inter-agency coordination to adopt a tighter One UN framework.

Contribution to National Priorities

In the context of the government’s national development strategies and plans, COMPASIS provided a number of methods and techniques that could be used to supplement the needs of rural programming, while avoiding a ‘dependency syndrome’ – where rural communities come to expect never-ending handouts. The individual project activities supported government priorities
in rural development (particularly in agriculture, food security and infrastructure), which improved income generation and service delivery. More than this, the community mobilization techniques utilized by the UN agencies provided a wide range of methodologies aimed at raising the level of community empowerment in a number of priority areas (management of household income, maintenance of water, sanitation, hygiene, etc.).

As outlined in Table 10, the COMPASIS project was given an “A” rating (highly satisfactory) in areas associated with higher UN and government goals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: Summary of Higher Level UN and National Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Achievement of Higher Level UN and National Goals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivering as One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to National Priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cutting Issues (Gender, Human Security Approach)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.0 Conclusions, Findings, Lessons Learned & Recommendations

Conclusions on Project Impact

COMPASIS was a community-based pilot project providing basic services to a number of remote communities. The impact of the project is difficult to measure using the indicators selected, as the higher-level indicators are too broad to measure impact at the community level. For example, the indicators for Objective 1 assumed there would be an increase in agricultural productivity (measured by agriculture’s contribution to GDP, no percentage specified), a 5% reduction in under nourishment rate, and a 10% reduction in the population living below the poverty line. In reality, it would be very difficult for a small pilot project to have any impact on agriculture’s contribution to GDP at the national level, particularly when agriculture has been in decline for a number of years; and it is unlikely that home garden activities in a few communities would make much of a difference to GDP, even if agricultural productivity was measured at the community level. It is a similar story with the indicators for under nourishment, poverty, and Objective 2, where the expected quantitative results were too ambitious for a 3-year pilot project. For example, it would be difficult to achieve a 20% increase in primary school completion when children may not appreciate the value of basic literacy, or a reduction in the fertility rate when the benefits of birth spacing are not understood.

According to the National Accounts (2000-2011) Statistics and Analysis, the share of agriculture, forestry and fishing to GDP declined by 19.6% in 2011, due to a 70% decrease in rice and maize production (because of unseasonable rains) and because of growth in other sectors (the construction and telecommunication sectors grew by 40.5% and 33.8% respectively).
COMPASIS was focused on broad-based suco development, which was accomplished to some extent through the project inputs (provision of infrastructure, food, seeds, training, etc.). However, the underlying objective also involved an element of community mobilization and empowerment. This is evident in the project design, where the broad human security goal involved ensuring that people were ‘empowered’, and Objective 1 specified the need to reduce poverty ‘through community mobilization’. Therefore, on a project where the underlying goal is community mobilization, the indicators should have been designed to track evidence of behaviour change. In this respect, more than providing food, infrastructure and seeds, the project succeeded in establishing and strengthening a number of community mobilization mechanisms that had been identified in the project document but which were not evident in the indicators or monitoring framework. So, the true impact of the project can be seen in the heightened degree of community empowerment – where for example, SHG activity led to improvements in the management of household income, and where a number of communities made improvements in the management and maintenance of their water supply, sanitation and hygiene, etc.

These qualitative changes in behaviour are difficult to measure, but they provide the essence of the overall impact of the project at the community level. Identifying qualitative indicators in the design phase would have required some foresight into the type of behaviour change that was expected from the project interventions. Nevertheless, this point is useful for thinking about how to select qualitative indicators on future projects.

In the absence of indicators at the objective and output level, Table 11 attempts to summarize the impact at the activity level.

Table 11: Summary of Impact by Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity/Component (Agency)</th>
<th>Expected Result</th>
<th>Result, Impact (and qualification)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 SHGs (UNDP)</td>
<td>100 SHGs established/ strengthened and engaged in income generating activities</td>
<td>81 SHGs established, and benefiting from savings and credit activities for managing household income. (But the level of entrepreneurial activity was not sufficient to support much of an increase in income generation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 &amp; 1.3 BDS training (ILO)</td>
<td>Train 24 business service providers, and 200 beneficiaries in vocation, business and financial literacy</td>
<td>32 BSPs and 783 beneficiaries trained, provided with increased business and self-employment skills. (But the impact of the training was reduced significantly because of the low level of entrepreneurship in the communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4, 1.8 &amp; 1.9 Agriculture (FAO)</td>
<td>2,400 trained in agricultural livelihoods, provide 400 silos to reduce post-harvest losses</td>
<td>2,582 trained in home garden, post-harvest and livestock activities, 425 storage silos, providing an increase in food production and reduction in post-harvest losses (amounts unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 MFI (UNDP)</td>
<td>100 SHGs provided with micro-finance</td>
<td>Cancelled. (The level of entrepreneurial activity was not sufficient to support this activity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 FFW (WFP)</td>
<td>5,869 households benefit from 500 tons of food and, 19 rural asset schemes</td>
<td>6,525 beneficiaries received 609 tons of food and benefited from 126 FFW schemes. (But it is not known if food security was increased)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Infrastructure (UNDP)</td>
<td>17 small-scale, community-based infrastructure projects</td>
<td>28 rural infrastructure projects were completed. (And this component ended up supporting both project objectives equally)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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13 The indicators for activities 1.1, 2.7 and 2.8 try to capture qualitative improvements in group activity.
In spite of the project’s small accomplishments in a limited timeframe, the level of dependency in the target communities is still quite high, and the level of self-reliance is still quite low. But the project activities provided some improvement to a number of community-based activities. In the words of one district coordinator:

“The main impact during the implementation of COMPASIS was the saving activity of SHGs, which increased each month and contributed to the feeling among beneficiaries that their life had changed... This helped transform them from being dependent to independent.”

Conclusions on Sustainability

COMPASIS’s sustainability strategy involved transferring ownership of individual project components to the government by integrating project activities into ongoing government programs. This emphasis on handover was evident in PSC meetings, where the Vice Minister and District Administrators encouraged the PIU to work closely with the relevant government departments to assess the extent to which activities could be absorbed by the relevant directorates, and to identify support needed for various elements to ensure that the relevant groups are sustained following the end of project activities. In particular, these departments were DNC and the Directorate for Rural Development.

Some project components have already been absorbed into government departments. Under Objective 1, ILO’s activities were already embedded in IADE/SEFOPE’s program of activities, FAO’s agricultural activities were integrated into MAF’s extension and livestock programs, and UNDP’s small infrastructure component were part of the government’s rural development policy, which will be expanded through the new Village Improvement Program. Under Objective 2, many support activities included the establishment of local institutional mechanisms to ensure responsibility for maintenance and management would be transferred to the community or district level (WUGs, WASH committees, SDFs, etc.). In addition, training in the management of assets and tools for maintenance were included in UNICEF’s WASH activities. With respect to water, UNICEF provided training to support government technicians at the sub-district level (SDFs). In sanitation, WASH committees are engaged in verifying and certifying ODF areas at the district level, and responsibility for this program will be taken over by the National Directorate of Environmental Health. Under the school hygiene component, UNICEF trained master trainers at the national level, at the MoH and MoE, and school teachers were trained at the community level, who were then supported by NGOs.

However, some elements will need a significant amount of continued support, including community mobilization, particularly SHGs, business training, literacy, family planning and infrastructure maintenance. These should form part of the project’s exit strategy in the final process of handover to government at the end of the project (August 31, 2013).
Sustainability in Community Mobilization

The SHG model adopted for the COMPASIS project involved an integrated approach to community empowerment, involving handholding support in bookkeeping, entrepreneurship programs and other activities aimed at increasing savings, income and food production. But the evaluation found that there were differences in SHGs, where some groups in Oecusse had been supported for 8 years and were not very interested in moving beyond savings and credit activities, while a few in Ermera were looking forward to more training in business services, and have submitted proposals to SEFOPE for consideration (brick-making, sewing, etc.). These differences have a bearing on the continued support that will be required to sustain the project’s achievements.

The COMPASIS project demonstrated that there is a gradual approach to empowering communities, which started with UN agencies providing support to SHGs by establishing a system for managing household savings and credit – “stage one”. Continued support and training sparked the members to learn more, to the point where some individuals and groups have started to become more business minded. The next step involved assessing the intentions and capacity of the individuals and groups that were interested in graduating to “stage two”. This process has already started, where the government requested the establishment of a special “joint task force” to assess the capacity of SHGs to determine the necessary follow up action on the part of the government, for example to determine whether they could ‘graduate’ to production-oriented groups by being incorporated into the cooperatives division.

Within this staged process, a change is meant to occur in the entrepreneurial mindset. Some groups or individuals will respond quicker than others. From the examples that COMPASIS provided, it is evident that most SHGs will need continued support from NGOs like FEEE – support in the form of continued handholding in bookkeeping and financial literacy, but also grant funds to help groups that are interested in graduating to business formulation groups (BFGs). By providing a graduated program of activities, groups can be encouraged to progress up the value chain as they become aware of the benefits and the different parameters of support. In this way, groups will be able to transform new information into knowledge and transform knowledge into business skills, which will start to bear fruit once new products and markets have been developed in rural areas.

In managing this gradual transition process, the requisite government departments will have to recognize that each type of group will require a different type of support, as groups may perform differently depending on their education levels, proximity to markets, etc. For example, groups in Ermera have learned to smooth out the spikes in income during coffee harvest seasons, while groups in Oecusse behave differently, primarily because there is no ready access to markets. In this graduated process, it is recommended that there be an intermediary step before attempting to transform SHGs into cooperatives, because most SHGs are not ready to make the conversion to cooperatives. Besides, cooperatives are oriented towards production and function at a business level, while most SHGs are oriented towards shared savings and credit, which is closer to the credit union model. The BGF is one example of an intermediary stage; there may be others.

Follow-up support will also have to consider the issue of community banking, as most SHGs are getting anxious about having to hide their cash savings in their homes. The risk is that members will start lending to non-members (which increases the risk of default) rather than risk having the money stolen from their homes. In 2010 and 2011, UNDP looked into the issue of financial inclusion in an attempt to provide a link between SHGs and MFIs. More recently, UNDP is currently assessing the possibility of developing a pilot under its INFUSE project to improve linkages between SHGs and National Bank BNCTL to improve bank services in rural communities (up to June 2014). In this respect, 6 mobile banking vans were donated to BNCTL by the government last year and more 7 will be given this year, covering all 13 districts.
**Sustainability in Infrastructure**

The COMPASIS project demonstrated the benefits of using small-scale infrastructure schemes to enhance local consultations, create employment and build ownership at the community level. This approach tends to create ownership by building a sense of community, where the residents have more control over project inputs – as opposed to programs that contract a large company to manage the infrastructure component as a “handout”, which often encourages dependency. Extending this approach, the government is in the process of launching two small-scale infrastructure programs aimed at accelerating rural development: a) a $300 million National Program for Village Development (PNDS) involving investments in small-scale infrastructure involving $50,000 per suco, and b) a housing program involving constructing 5 houses per suco.

In rural development initiatives it is common to put a great deal of emphasis on infrastructure, which is to be expected in Timor-Leste because infrastructure in the rural areas is sorely lacking. However, as far as sustainability is concerned, there is a danger to pouring funding into rural infrastructure without it being accompanied by community motivation mechanisms to ensure that the infrastructure will be maintained afterwards. While the communities’ requests for infrastructure under COMPASIS were not extravagant (involving simple requests for water and sanitation), the evaluation found that providing institutional mechanisms for them to participate and maintain these services tended to empower the communities further. Involve the community in establishing priorities and making decisions establishes consultative relations in the planning phase, creates employment during the implementation phase, and solidifies ownership for maintenance over the long-term. It is therefore recommended that future infrastructure programs devote a significant amount of emphasis to community mobilization in order to establish community ownership.

The UN and other donor agencies should make sure to support the government’s programs for village development, not so much in the delivery of services at the community level, but supporting the inclusion of community mobilization techniques in these initiatives, because these are designed to increase empowerment rather than encourage dependency. The process of implementation may be slower, but it is important to use the most appropriate mechanism.

**Exit Strategy**

As part of the exit strategy established at the beginning of COMPASIS, government departments participated in the design stage. Also, during the implementation phase, project activities were integrated into regular government programs and there was some attempt to strengthen local institutions to improve service delivery. Some agencies, such as ILO, FAO and UNICEF WASH, tended to involve government departments directly in implementing their activities. Furthermore, some agencies had a policy to utilize community mobilization techniques in return for infrastructure and other support, which was intended to encourage sustainability and discourage dependency. For example, WFP’s FFW schemes provided food assistance in return for small infrastructure works. UNICEF went even further by motivating communities to look after their own sanitation and water needs, rather than subsidizing the construction of latrines. In these cases, the evaluation found that community motivation techniques were designed to empower communities to improve their income, education, sanitation, health care, business ideas, etc. In future projects, it is recommended that community mobilization mechanisms be used as a way to avoid the dependency mentality that is often present in rural communities.

Some UN agencies tended to put more emphasis on delivering the activities rather than building the capacity of national institutions. This was particularly true for those components that fell behind during implementation because of difficulties in identifying viable project strategies, such as UNICEF Literacy and UNFPA. As a result, capacity is still lacking in the exit strategy for some components. In health services, DHS will need capacity building support to take over UNFPA’s advocacy role in family planning. Also, it is uncertain how much emphasis the government will devote to continuing some of the activities supported under the project. For
example, it is uncertain whether the Department of Recurrent Education will take over UNICEF’s literacy strategy aimed at youth only. And, it is not certain how much emphasis the government will put toward business training in rural areas. It was learned during the evaluation that the government did not allocate any budget to IADE/SEFOPE in Oecusse during the 3-year project period, because these institutions were being supported by COMPASIS; and that over the past 6 months the government has still not allocated any new funding, which has effectively paralyzed their operations in Oecusse. This raises questions about the sustainability of approaches where donor funded projects in effect supplement government programs that may not be deemed a high priority in rural areas, such as family planning, literacy and business training.

While it is recommended that the community empowerment approach be maintained and even replicated in other communities, this will require the involvement of a number of government departments to assume responsibility for the different activities, such as support to savings and credit (SHGs), water systems (WUGs), sanitation (WASH committees), literacy (strategic partners groups), etc. The Ministry of State Administration (MSA) has responsibility for many of the relevant activities surrounding rural development, such as infrastructure, sucu development and decentralization. Although MSA’s mandate doesn’t extend to livelihoods or SHG activities, a pilot project could be developed and implemented through a grant fund mechanism designed to finance necessary support activities at the rural level\(^4\). Such a grant mechanism does not have to involve very much direct funding, but it should involve providing technical assistance and NGO support services. Also, with the government’s focus on rural infrastructure, a community mobilization component should be built in to ensure sustainability.

**Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

**Community Motivation**

1. The project highlighted some important methodologies and lessons learned involving community mobilization strategies (SHGs, ODF, BGF) that can be passed on to the government to implement over a longer time period. In this respect, different groups were established to manage the outcomes of different components involving: savings and loans (SHGs), business activity (BFGs), water management (WUGs) and maintenance, and sanitation (ODF, SBGs), etc.

2. Behaviour change needs special motivational facilitators who can operate effectively at the community level, which is very different from establishing ‘focal points’ in communities to distribute information to residents.

3. Construction of small-scale infrastructure at the suco level can be enhanced considerably by involving community members in the planning and implementation phases. To improve sustainability and ownership, small-scale rural infrastructure projects should be accompanied by a community mobilization component, along with training in management and maintenance to promote self-reliance.

**Support to SHGs**

4. With low levels of literacy and business skills in rural areas, SHGs need continued handholding support long after project activities are completed. Continued support should be provided as part of a graduated program of assistance, so that groups can be encouraged to move up the value chain.

**UN Joint Programs**

5. Project components that were part of a UN agency’s regular activities tended to perform better (FFW, business training, home gardening, WASH) than activities where agencies had little experience with community motivation (family planning, literacy).

\(^4\) As with other government programs, a grant program would be sanctioned by Parliament, administered through a transparent process and managed by a government department (MSA).
6. Among UN agencies, there should be more consistency in the provision of support involving specialized mechanisms or motivational techniques, particularly on joint programs, where successful strategies or policies should apply to all agencies – such as UNICEF’s policy for using motivational techniques instead of constructing latrines.

7. A well-planned exit strategy includes early discussions with government departments to ensure smooth handover of appropriate project components.

**Project Design and Monitoring**

8. Projects that have an underlying community mobilization objective should select qualitative indicators that can track evidence of behaviour change, such as improvements in group activity.

9. Project components should be designed specifically to focus on specific targets within the initiative, rather than supplementing government programs in particular areas such as family planning, business training or infrastructure development.

10. Joint programs should have an independent monitor to track progress during implementation in order to avoid slippage and to identify alternative strategies for difficult components. Each agency should assess the results of their component at the end of the project to determine the impact of the project so as to be able to handover to the requisite government department.

**Project Implementation**

11. Delays in the implementation of particular components did not affect the achievement of results, except in cases where the implementation strategy had not been configured correctly (e.g., family planning and literacy).

12. As a result of the separate agency implementation processes where each UN agency was focused on its specialized role, a great deal of coordination was needed at the national, district and community levels. This process was aided by a high degree of adaptive management, as most components needed adjustment after start-up.

**Project Impact**

13. The true impact of the COMPASIS project can be seen in the heightened degree of community empowerment, where SHG activity led to improvements in the management of household income and growing crops to sell, and where a number of communities made improvements in the management and maintenance of their water supply, sanitation and hygiene, etc.

**Rural Development in Remote Enclaves**

14. The government should pay special attention to Ocessue where some people feel they are “a pilot project that has been left behind and forgotten about”.

**Final Recommendations**

1. Community mobilization approaches should be used as far as possible on human security and rural development projects as they help to build resilience; the government should find ways to integrate the achievements of the COMPASIS project into their on-going programs and replicate good practices in other communities.

2. As part of the final exit strategy, in the remaining time left on the project, the needs regarding a complete handover of project activities should be assessed, including a review of the remedial strategies adopted by UNFPA and UNICEF literacy to complete their components. This should also include assessing the capacity strengthening requirements at the district level.
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCC</td>
<td>Behaviour Change and Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDCs</td>
<td>Business Development Centers (IADE offices in the districts, CDE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGF</td>
<td>Business Group Formulation</td>
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<td>BNCTL</td>
<td>National Bank of Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>Business services providers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Community Action Facilitators (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Community Action Framework (UNICEF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Centro desenvolvimento Empresarial (Business Development Centers, BDC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDOs</td>
<td>Community Development Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLTS</td>
<td>Community-Level Total Sanitation (UNICEF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMPASIS</td>
<td>Community Mobilization for Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion in Service Delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Program Action Plan</td>
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<td>DaO</td>
<td>UN Delivering as One Initiative</td>
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<td>DEX</td>
<td>Modality for Direct Execution of country program</td>
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<td>DIM</td>
<td>Modality for Direct Implementation of projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNAS</td>
<td>Direcção Nacional De Água E Saneamento (National Directorate of Water Supply Services)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNC</td>
<td>Director Nacional de Cooperativas (National Director for Cooperatives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPCUs</td>
<td>District Project Coordination Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEEO</td>
<td>Fundasaun Esperansa Enclave Oecusse</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Family Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADE</td>
<td>Instituto Apoio Desenvolvimento Empresarial (National Institute to Support Enterprise Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FFW</td>
<td>Food-for-Work (WFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIK</td>
<td>Komisaun Implementasaun Komunitaria (Community implemented contract)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Local Development Program</td>
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<td>LGSP</td>
<td>Local Government Support Project</td>
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<td>LoA</td>
<td>Letter of Agreement</td>
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<td>LPRCs</td>
<td>Local project review committees</td>
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<td>MAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MED</td>
<td>Ministry for Economy and Development</td>
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<td>MFI</td>
<td>Micro-Finance Institution</td>
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<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoPW</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Works</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Ministry for State Administration</td>
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<td>MSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Solidarity</td>
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<td>MTE</td>
<td>Mid-Term Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAP</td>
<td>Oecusse-Ambeno Community Activation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODF</td>
<td>Open defecation free</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCUs</td>
<td>Project Coordination Units</td>
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<td>PIU</td>
<td>Project Implementation Unit</td>
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<td>PNDS</td>
<td>National Program for Village Development</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
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<td>PSFs</td>
<td>Family health facilitators</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent teachers association</td>
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<td>SALT</td>
<td>Slopping agricultural land terracing</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBGs</td>
<td>Sanitation Business Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDAs</td>
<td>Sub-district administrators</td>
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<td>SDFs</td>
<td>Sub-district facilitators</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Strategic Development Plan (2011-2030)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEFOPE</td>
<td>Government Vocational Training Institution sub-offices in the districts</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHGs</td>
<td>Self-help groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>SISCa</td>
<td>Serviso Integrado Saude Comunitaria (Community Health Services Program)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPGs</td>
<td>Strategic partners groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToRs</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTFHS</td>
<td>UN Trust Fund for Human Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation, Hygiene</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>WUGs</td>
<td>Water Users Groups</td>
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## Annex 1: Evaluation Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Component</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria and Lead Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.0 Project Design</strong></td>
<td><em>Was the JP concept and strategy effective and appropriate for the objectives of the project given the experience to date?</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **1.1 Project relevance/appropriateness** | The extent to which the JP pertained to national priorities and the requirements of the target group, particularly when it was designed in 2007:  
  - To what extent are the objectives of the project still valid?  
  - To what extent were partners involved in the design and implementation of the JP?  
  - Were the project activities and outputs consistent with the intended key results? |
| **2.0 Project Results** | *Did the project achieve its planned outputs, outcomes and objectives and how satisfactory was the achievement?* |
| **2.1 Project effectiveness** | - To what extent did the JP achieve the key results? |
| **2.2 Achievement of outputs:** |  
  - Were the planned outputs implemented according to the workplan?  
  - Factors contributing to achieving or not achieving the desired results, including institutional, management and financial arrangements?  
  - Perceptions of stakeholders regarding output quality |
| **2.3 Progress toward overall objectives and outcomes** |  
  - Support government institutions in Timor-Leste to improve capacity and service delivery, with a special focus on the needs of the poor  
  - Indicators of outcomes as per the UNDAF and the government’s goals |
| **2.4 Insights on the successes and weaknesses of the project** |  
  - Identification of factors contributing to effectiveness or ineffectiveness  
  - Issues and constraints identified by stakeholders  
  - Alignment and compatibility with other government initiatives |
| **3.0 Management & Implementation** | *Was the project implemented in an effective, efficient and sustainable manner, consistent with the design?* |
| **3.1 Adaptive management** | Are the requisite systems, structures, staff and other capacities in place and adequate?  
  - Extent to which well-structured project management and adaptive management practices led to strengthening capacity and disseminating lessons learned  
  - Observable management responses to issues and needs during implementation (adaptive management) |
| **M & E systems** |  
  - Use of the logical framework in monitoring and reporting  
  - Modification of the logical framework in response to issues  
  - Implementation of an effective, operational monitoring system  
  - Presence and quality of an M&E plan  
  - Use of the M&E Plan in data collection and reporting |
| **Work Planning** |  
  - Submission of work plans as per UNDP standards and timing  
  - The process for developing collective work plans through joint exercises  
  - Implementation of work plans as scheduled |
| **Reporting** |  
  - Quality, objectivity, frequency and relevance of project reporting  
  - Usefulness of reporting to management & decision makers |
| **Timeliness of Implementation** |  
  - Completion of activities in relation to schedule  
  - Explanations for delays and effects on project results |
| **3.2 Contribution of Participating UN Agencies, Implementing Partners and other partners** |  
  - Specific guidance and direction provided by UNDP staff and experts on key issues, including policy support  
  - Understanding of roles and responsibilities by IPs and PUNS  
  - Activities completed by implementing partners in relation to workplans  
  - Fulfillment of roles and responsibilities in relation to UNDP policies and procedures and/or government policies and procedures |
| Preparation and readiness | • Appropriateness of outputs and follow-up actions  
• Timeliness of budgets, workplans and activity completion |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stakeholder participation, partnership strategy | • Number and range of participants in project activities  
• Mechanisms for stakeholder participation in the project  
• Effective working relationships between PUNS and Implementing Partners involved in management and implementation  
• Extent of cooperative relationships between project partners |
| 3.3 Project efficiency | The extent to which delivery was undertaken by the most cost-efficient means;  
• Were activities cost-efficient?  
• Were outputs achieved on time?  
• Was the project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives? |
| Project budget and duration | • Extent to which disbursements occurred as planned  
• Changes in the budget to accommodate unforeseen events |
| Financial management | • Costs of Outputs and their general reasonableness  
• Fulfillment of the planned co-financing commitments.  
• Financial reporting in accordance with UNDP norms |
| 3.4 Stakeholder involvement, affiliation and relevance | • Extent to which national and local community participation are an integral part of the project concept  
• Mechanisms for stakeholder input to project design and operations |
| 3.5 Impact | • The positive and negative changes produced by the JP (directly or indirectly, intended or unintended)  
• What difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries?  
• How many people have been affected?  
• How did impact differ across key target groups, including vulnerability categories such as gender, age etc?  
• What were the transformational results achieved by the JP – policy and institutional. |
| 3.6 Sustainability | • Presence of explicit sustainability strategies in the project design and the feasibility of these strategies given experience to date  
• Are policies and institutional frameworks in place to support continuation of results  
• The degree to which outputs and outcomes led to the development of institutional frameworks (policy, laws, organizations, procedures)  
• Implementation of measures to ensure financial sustainability in government budgets or cost recovery mechanisms  
• Observable changes in attitudes, beliefs and behaviours |
| 4.0 Achievement of Higher Level Goals | Adherence to the principles and objectives of Human Security, DaO and MDGs, including reference to the One UN Process indicators:  
• Progress towards higher-level UN and government goals: Human Security, MDGs, DaO and cross-cutting considerations such as gender equality.  
• To what extent were the principles of Joint Programming in terms of collaborative planning, implementation and monitoring across participating agencies adhered to?  
• What factors facilitated or adversely impacted upon Delivering as One?  
• Lessons learned, future programming and additional priorities that could have been included in the project |
| Contribution to National Priorities | • Effective participation of beneficiaries  
• Extent to which JP was aligned with government priorities, evidenced by government internal resource allocation to JP priority areas |
| Lessons Learned | • Lessons to improve design and implementation of other programs |

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**Annex 2: Evaluation Terms of Reference**
TERMS OF REFERENCE

FINAL EVALUATION

COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND SOCIAL INCLUSION IN SERVICE DELIVERY (COMPASIS)

FEBRUARY 2013
Location: Dili, Ermera and Oecusse Districts, TIMOR LESTE
Application Deadline: Wednesday, 20th February 2013
Type of Contract: Individual Contract
Post Level: International Consultant (Final Evaluation)
Languages Required: English (tetum and/or bahasa Indonesia are advantages)
Expected Duration of Assignment: 6 weeks

Background
In February 2010, FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) signed a 3 year project document for the amount of US$4.088 million with the aim of contributing to human security development goals in Timor Leste. The UNTFHS is supported by the Governments of Japan, Slovenia and Thailand and the United Nations Partnering Agencies saw this opportunity to put into practice the notion of joint programming and One UN approaches to development implementation.

The COMPASIS project seeks to protect extremely poor households in the identified 17 villages of Ermera and Oecusse enclave districts in Timor Leste. The COMPASIS joint programme aims to protect these beneficiaries against threats of civil strife, poverty, hunger, poor health, illiteracy and social exclusion so that they are empowered to realize their fundamental rights and full human potential through the reduction of vulnerability levels. In November 2011, a Mid Term evaluation was conducted and served as an opportunity for reflection, allowing the project partners to make course corrections and redefine objectives, indicators and implementation timeframes.

After the project Mid Term evaluation conducted successfully in November 2011, the project Board analyzed the possibility to request a Non Cost extension for 6 extra months, in particular justified by the need of 2 Agencies (UNFPA and UNICEF) The Non cost extension was approved for the 6 agencies under COMPASIS Project from March up to August 2013. (i) Those Agencies responsible under Project Objective 1 (UNDP, FAO, ILO and WFP) would finish the implementation of the most of the activities on February 2013 and; (ii) Those agencies responsible under Project Objective 2 (UNICEF and UNFPA) would continue the implementation up to August 2013 as requested. Based on resulted specific structure during the last 6 months period, it was agreed to conduct the Final Evaluation during the 6 months final period of Project implementation while the most of the teams and coordination bodies are still in place to ensure a proper support to the implementation.

In accordance with the UNTFHS guidelines, the COMPASIS Joint Programme is seeking to undertake an independent final evaluation, the results of which will be used to analyze the effectiveness of the Multi Agency implementation and the impact of the approach at raising the level of human security in Timor Leste.

Relevant Documents
Terms of Reference; UNDP General Conditions of Individual Contracts

Duties and Responsibilities

- Provide an objective assessment of the achievements, constraints, performance, results, impact, relevance and sustainability of the interventions.
- Generate lessons from experiences in the respective interventions for the period 2010 to date including Joint implementation analysis as per One UN approach
• Identify whether past results represent sufficient foundation for future progress towards achieving improved human security.
• Provide clear and forward-looking recommendations in order to suggest effective and realistic strategies by UNDP and its partners.

Competencies
• Excellent communication, analytical and writing skills.
• Good knowledge of the social, political and economic contexts of Timor Leste.
• Previous evaluation experience of similar joint programmes with UNDP or other UN Agencies, Funds or Programmes preferably in the region.

Required Skills and Experience
• Advanced university degree in social sciences, public administration, international development studies or other related areas.
• Solid experience in the areas of monitoring and evaluation and human security.
• Sound knowledge about results-based management (especially results-oriented monitoring and evaluation).
• Minimum 5 years experience in conducting evaluations of projects in the socio-economic field.
• Fluency in written and spoken English.
• Add value if experience working Timor Leste and knowledge of tetum and/or bahasa indonesia.
• Add value if experience in community mobilization/saving groups approaches projects.
• Add value if experience in monitoring and evaluation of joint projects under UN system involving National Government.

1. GENERAL CONTEXT
In February 2010, FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) signed a 3 year agreement for the amount of US$4.088 million with the aim of contributing to human security development goals in Timor Leste. The UNTFHS is supported by the Governments of Japan, Slovenia and Thailand and the United Nations Partnering Agencies saw this opportunity to put into practice the notion of joint programming and One UN approaches to development implementation.

The COMPASIS Joint Programme utilises a parallel funding modality insofar as each of the 6 partnering agencies has signed an agency specific funding agreement directly with the UNTFHS. As a result all financial reporting of each Agency is undertaken directly by the agencies themselves. Narrative reporting and the monitoring and evaluation framework however, were drafted as a joint exercise and represent the objectives of each of the 6 UN partner agencies.

The COMPASIS project seeks to protect extremely poor households (with a major focus on women farmers, widows, unemployed youth, returning IDPs, children, and food insecure people) in the identified 17 villages of Ermera and Oecusse districts in Timor Leste. The COMPASIS joint programme aims to protect these beneficiaries against threats of civil strife, poverty, hunger, poor health, illiteracy and social exclusion so that they are empowered to realize their fundamental rights and full human potential. In this way, the COMPASIS project utilises community mobilisation and social inclusion approaches to both:
a) reduce extreme poverty and improve income generation and food security among vulnerable groups through community mobilization, agro-based micro-enterprises, skills training and post-training support; and 
b) promote social inclusion in the service delivery system through the education participation of out of school children; community awareness of maternal and child health; and capacity of service providers in planning and executing community-based water, sanitation and primary health/hygiene schemes.

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is the result of an ongoing consultative process intended to analyse how the United Nations can most effectively respond to Timor-Leste’s national priorities and needs in a post-conflict context. It is guided by the goals and targets of the Millennium Declaration, which has been endorsed by the Government, as well as the Programme of the IV Constitutional Government for 2007-2012, the International Compact for Timor-Leste, the 2007 National Recovery Strategy and other relevant documents. The UNDAF translates these into a common operational framework for development activities upon which individual United Nations organisations will formulate their actions for the period 2009-2013.

Consolidating peace and stability represents the cornerstone for the UNDAF; under this overarching goal, three inter-related areas of cooperation have emerged as particularly critical for United Nations support to the people and Government of Timor-Leste during this five-year period: (1) Democratisation and Social Cohesion, including deepening State-building, security and justice; (2) Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods, with particular attention to vulnerable groups, including youth, women, IDPs and disaster-prone communities; and (3) Basic Social Services, encompassing education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation, and social welfare and social protection. The COMPASIS joint programme is in adherence with these targeted thematic areas.

2. OVERAL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION
In accordance with the UNTFHS guidelines, the COMPASIS Joint Programme is seeking to undertake an independent final evaluation, the results of which will be used to determine whether the objectives and performance indicators outlined in the funding have been achieved. The final evaluation will also serve as an opportunity for reflection, allowing the project partners and donor to review the intervention and lessons learned. Specifically, the final evaluation will report against the revised logical framework as provided to the UNTFHS, as well as the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework of the project.

Final evaluations are highly informative in nature seeking and generating knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons learned that could be transferred to other programmes. As a result, the conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation will be addressed to the Project Steering Committee including UN Agencies and Government of Timor Leste, and the Donor UNHSTF.

In accordance with the UNTFHS guidelines, the COMPASIS Joint Programme is seeking to undertake an independent final evaluation, the results of which will be used to analyze the effectiveness of the Multi Agency implementation and the impact of the approach at raising the level of human security in Timor Leste.

3. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC GOALS
The unit of analysis or object of study for the final evaluation is the joint programme, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.
This evaluation has the following specific objectives:

1. To discover the programme’s design quality with regards to the achievement of the stated objectives and performance indicators within the allotted time frame.
2. To understand how the joint programme has operated and assess the efficiency of its management model in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the One UN framework.
3. To identify the programme’s degree of effectiveness among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Human Security thematic window, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.
4. To assess the impact level of the intervention in the different locations based on the approach, implementation, design and outreach.
5. To serve as an opportunity for reflection and to provide recommendations to the project partners and Donor.

4. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The final evaluation will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the terms of reference, the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. In all cases, the consultant is expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as annual reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form opinions. The Consultant is also expected to use interviews, group discussion, focus groups, and others in case appropriate tools as a means to collect relevant data for the evaluation.

The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the inception report and the final evaluation report, and should contain, at minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques.

5. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES
The consultant is responsible for submitting the following deliverables:

Inception Report (to be submitted within seven days of the submission of all programme documentation to the consultant: Project document, Annual Work plans, Substantive Reports, any other key document)

This report will be 5 to 10 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables.

Draft Final Report (to be submitted within 10 days of completion of the field visits to Ermera and Oecusse districts)

The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 20 to 30 pages in length. This report will be shared among the stakeholders involved in the evaluation. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief
description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be shared with the evaluation stakeholders to seek their comments and suggestions prior to finalisation and submission to the UNTFHS.

**Final Evaluation Report** (to be submitted within 14 days of receipt of the draft final report with comments)

The final report will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be sent to the evaluation stakeholders and the UNTFHS. This report will contain the following sections at a minimum:

1. Cover Page
2. Introduction
   - Background, goal and methodological approach
   - Purpose of the evaluation
   - Methodology used in the evaluation
   - Constraints and limitations on the study conducted
3. Description of interventions carried out
   - Initial concept
   - Detailed description of its development: description of the hypothesis of change in the programme.
4. Levels of Analysis: Evaluation criteria and questions (logframe, M&E framework)
5. Conclusions and lessons learned (prioritized, structured and clear)
6. Recommendations
7. Annexes

**6. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES OF THE EVALUATION**

The final evaluation of the joint programme is to be carried out according to ethical principles and standards established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

- **Anonymity and confidentiality.** The evaluation must respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.
- **Responsibility.** The report must mention any dispute or difference of opinion that may have arisen among the consultants or between the consultant and the heads of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/or recommendations. The team must corroborate all assertions, or disagreement with them noted.
- **Integrity.** The evaluator will be responsible for highlighting issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is needed to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.
- **Independence.** The consultant should ensure his or her independence from the intervention under review, and he or she must not be associated with its management or any element thereof.
- **Validation of information.** The consultant will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected while preparing the reports and will be ultimately responsible for the information presented in the evaluation report.
- **Intellectual property.** In handling information sources, the consultant shall respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities that are under review.
• **Delivery of reports.** If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than what was agreed, the penalties stipulated in these terms of reference will be applicable.

7. **ROLES OF ACTORS IN THE EVALUATION**

The main actors in the final evaluation process are the UNTFHS, the Project Steering Committee members, the Project Implementation Unit of the joint programme, and the District Project Coordination Unit members. This group of institutions and individuals will serve as the evaluation stakeholders and will facilitate the consultant’s access to all information and documentation relevant to the joint programme, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods.

8. **TIMELINE FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS**

**In Home Country**
- Provision of documentation to consultant for review.
- Preparation of inception report (within **7 days** of receipt of joint programme documentation)

**Dili, Timor-Leste**
- Briefing with the consultant. Discussion will take place over what the evaluation should entail.
- Presentation of the Inception report and methodology
- Meeting with evaluation stakeholders to finalise evaluation process.

**Ermera and Oecusse District Field visit**
- The consultant will travel to the target villages of the Joint Programme to carry out the planned agenda.

**Draft Final Report**
- The consultant will draft the final report and conduct a debriefing session with the key actors he or she has interacted with (within **10 days** of return from field visit).
- Evaluation stakeholders will have the opportunity to provide comments to the consultant regarding the draft final report.

**Final Report**
- The consultant will deliver a final report (within **14 days** of the deadline for receipt of comments from the evaluation stakeholders).

9. **APPLICATIONS**

- Interested candidates must submit Work plan and Financial proposal (proposed rate per day )
- Application sent to: justino.dacosta@undp.org ; reinaldo.soares@undp.org; beatriz.marciel@undp.org
  And CC to: procurement.tp@undp.org
- The deadline for submitting applications is **Wednesday 20th February at 12 a.m (Timor Leste - Local Time)**
Annex 3: List of Documents Referenced

Project Documents
COMPASIS Project Document, 25 February 2010
Annual Substantive Progress Reports to UNHSTF (2010, 2011, 2012)
COMPASIS Mid-Term Evaluation Report, Joel Beasca, December 2011
COMPASIS Government Transition Report, July 2012
Briefing Note to Secretary of State for Local Development, Feb 2013
Minutes of PSC Meetings (June 2010 to March 2013)
Recommendations for Strengthening SHGS, Yusuke Taishi, UNDP RBAP, October, 2011
Strategies to Address the Literacy and Non-Formal Education Needs of Adolescents of Timor-Leste, UNICEF concept paper, Ruth Kimball, January 2013

Government Publications and Documents
Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan (2011-2030)
National Program for Village Development (PNDS), Timor-Leste program briefing paper, March 2013
Concept Note on Accelerating Community Development in Timor-Leste, MSA, Nov 2011
Business Activity Survey of Timor-Leste (2011), General Directorate of Statistics

UN Publications
UNDAF 2009-2013
Timor-Leste Human Development Report, 2011 – Managing Natural Resources for Human Development
WFP Country Portfolio Evaluation for 2008-2012 (May 2013),
Final Evaluation Report – MDG-F Joint Program Timor-Leste
## Annex 4: List of Meetings and Interviews

### COMPASIS FINAL EVALUATION Dili Meetings – June 4th to 25th, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>Meetings in Dili</th>
<th>Partner Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 4: 3:00</td>
<td>1. Inception meeting</td>
<td>1. All agencies represented except WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7:00</td>
<td>2. Antonio Avella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5: 9:00</td>
<td>3. Paula LOPES DA CRUZ</td>
<td>3. FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>4. Beatriz Marciel and Justino Marlin Da Costa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>5. Mikiko Tanaka and Noura Hamladji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6: 9:00</td>
<td>6. Fernando Encarnacao &amp; Hernani Viterbo</td>
<td>6. ILO and IADE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>7. Manuel Barbosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2:00</td>
<td>8. Dr. Mana Domingas, Sam Sengupta and Jenny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>9. Beatriz Marciel and Reinaldo Soares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 7: 9:00</td>
<td>10. Ramesh Raj Bhusal</td>
<td>10. UNICEF WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>11. Candie Cassabalian</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2:30</td>
<td>12. Director Miguel Carvalho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3:00</td>
<td>13. Twatchai Koopirom &amp; Saklawat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 14: 10:00</td>
<td>14. Fernando Encarnacao</td>
<td>14. ILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20: 7:00</td>
<td>15. Ramesh and Carrion</td>
<td>15. UNICEF WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 21: 2:00</td>
<td>16. Candie Cassabalian</td>
<td>16. UNICEF LITERACY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>17. John Pile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24: 3:00</td>
<td>18. Debriefing presentation</td>
<td>18. UNDP, ILO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### COMPASIS FINAL EVALUATION FIELD VISITS – From Monday 10th to Thursday 20th June 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Meetings and Visits at District Level</th>
<th>Partner Agency represented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ermera</strong>&lt;br&gt;District from Monday 10th to Thursday 14th June</td>
<td><strong>Gleno</strong>&lt;br&gt;1. Meeting with Mr. Eusebio, Ermera WASH Director&lt;br&gt;2. Meeting with Mr. Juvenal Alves Ermera IADE/BDC and Mr. Josimo Ermera SEFOPE&lt;br&gt;3. Ermera District Health Centre&lt;br&gt;4. Mr. Victor dos Santos, Ermera DA&lt;br&gt;5. Meeting with Mr. Adelio WASH ATsabe Subdistrict responsible and CDO representative&lt;br&gt;<strong>Atsabe Subdistrict</strong>&lt;br&gt;6. VISIT to Atara suco infrastructure KIK project project and meeting with Atara Xefe do suco&lt;br&gt;7. VISIT to Parami water KIK project&lt;br&gt;8. VISIT Parami WASH project at School&lt;br&gt;9. VISIT SHGs Motabandeira and Bidau at Baboi Craik&lt;br&gt;10. VISIT SHG Inan Faluk&lt;br&gt;11. Meeting with Baboi Leen Xefe do Suco</td>
<td><strong>Gleno</strong>&lt;br&gt;1. UNICEF WASH&lt;br&gt;2. ILO&lt;br&gt;3. UNFPA&lt;br&gt;4. UNICEF WASH&lt;br&gt;5. COMPASIS overall project / UNDP infrastructure&lt;br&gt;<strong>Atsabe SubDistrict</strong>&lt;br&gt;6. UNDP infrastructure&lt;br&gt;7. UNDP Infrastructure&lt;br&gt;8. UNICEF WASH&lt;br&gt;9. UNDP, ILO and FAO&lt;br&gt;10. UNDP, ILO and FAO&lt;br&gt;11. COMPASIS overall project / UNDP infrastructure&lt;br&gt;<strong>Letefoho SubDistrict</strong>&lt;br&gt;12. WFP / Overall project through Xefe suco interview&lt;br&gt;13. UNDP, ILO, FAO, UNICEF WASH sanitation marketing activity&lt;br&gt;14. FAO&lt;br&gt;15. UNICEF Literacy&lt;br&gt;16. UNICEF Literacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Oecusse**<br>District from Monday 17th to Thursday 20th June | **Oecusse town/Pante Makassar**<br>1. Overall project implementation<br>2. UNDP<br>3. ILO<br>4. UNICEF WASH<br>**Passabe SubDistrict**<br>5. Meeting with Luis Colo WFP Oecusse project officer<br>6. VISIT to Malelat SHGs Bifel Bitimo and Bifel Binutu together with Xefe do Suco Malelat<br>7. Meeting with WFP beneficiaries and Malelat Xefe do Suco<br>8. Visit Malelat suco road built by WFP<br>9. Meeting with SHGs Bitisi A and Bitisi B<br>**Visit to Nitibe subDistrict cancelled** | **Oecusse town/Pante Makassar**
1. Overal project implementation
2. UNDP
3. ILO
4. UNICEF WASH
5. WFP
6. UNDP, ILO, FAO, UNFPA and WFP
7. WFP
8. WFP
9. UNDP, ILO and FAO |

**Ermera**<br>**District from Monday 10th to Thursday 14th June**

1. Meeting with Mr. Eusebio, Ermera WASH Director
2. Meeting with Mr. Juvenal Alves Ermera IADE/BDC and Mr. Josimo Ermera SEFOPE
3. Ermera District Health Centre
4. Mr. Victor dos Santos, Ermera DA
5. Meeting with Mr. Adelio WASH ATsabe Subdistrict responsible and CDO representative

**Atsabe Subdistrict**
6. VISIT to Atara suco infrastructure KIK project project and meeting with Atara Xefe do suco
7. VISIT to Parami water KIK project
8. VISIT Parami WASH project at School
9. VISIT SHGs Motabandeira and Bidau at Baboi Craik
10. VISIT SHG Inan Faluk
11. Meeting with Baboi Leen Xefe do Suco

**Letefoho SubDistrict**
12. VISIT Katrati Kraik WFP Food for work road project – Not possible to arrive, instead meeting with some beneficiaries and Xefe do suo Katrati Kraik
13. VISIT SHGs at Katrati Leten Cooperativa Harraik Haain, Merigue, Beluha Rema and Xefe do Suco.
14. Visit SHG’s home gardens guided by Extension Worker Manuel in Katrati Leten.
15. Meeting with Ms. Sandra Gusmao, Ermera Youth Centre Coordinator, focal point and tutor
16. VISIT to Literacy class at Lauana suco

**Oecusse**<br>**District from Monday 17th to Thursday 20th June**

1. Meeting with Oecusse District Administrator Mr. Salvadore da Cruz
2. Meeting with FEEO NGO and presentation of FEEO
3. Meeting with Mr. Remigio Lelam, 3 CDE staff/facilitators from Oecusse IADE/BDC and Mr. Calisto from Oecusse cooperatives department
4. Meeting with Mr. Jose Suni Oecusse WASH coordinator

**Passabe SubDistrict**
5. Meeting with Luis Colo WFP Oecusse project officer
6. VISIT to Malelat SHGs Bifel Bitimo and Bifel Binutu together with Xefe do Suco Malelat
7. Meeting with WFP beneficiaries and Malelat Xefe do Suco
8. Visit Malelat suco road built by WFP
9. Meeting with SHGs Bitisi A and Bitisi B

**Visit to Nitibe subDistrict cancelled**